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1. Introduction 
The German pension system was the first formal pension system in the world, 
designed by Bismarck nearly 120 years ago. It has been very successful in 
providing a high and reliable level of retirement income in the past at reason-
able contribution rates, becoming a model for many social security systems 
worldwide. While the generosity of the German public pension system is con-
sidered a great social achievement, negative incentive effects of past reforms 
in the 1970s and 1980s and population aging are threatening the very core 
of the pension system. These have led to fundamental pension reforms since 
1992. This thesis delivers an assessment of the German pension system and 
its reforms. 
Historical overview. As opposed to other countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands which originally adopted a Beveridgian social 
security system that provided only a base pension, public pensions in Ger-
many were from the start designed to extend the standard of living achieved 
during work life throughout retirement. Thus, public pensions are roughly 
proportional to labor income averaged over the entire lifecourse and feature 
few redistributive properties. The German pension system is therefore called 
'pension insurance' rather than 'social security', as in the United States. 
Workers used to understand their contributions as 'insurance premia' rather 
than 'taxes', although this has dramatically changed in recent years with 
contribution rates rising steadily while pension levels are reduced. The in-
surance character is strengthened by institutional separation; The German 
pension insurance system is not part of the government budget but a sepa-
rate entity. This entity is subsidized by the federal government. Rationale for 
this subsidy, almost 30% of expenditures, are 'non-insurance benefits' such 
as benefits paid to German immigrants after opening the iron curtain. Any 
surplus, however, remains in the system. It is not transferable into a 'unified 
budget' such as in the United States. 
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1. Introduction 
The German retirement insurance started as a fully funded system with a 
mandatory retirement age of 70 years when male life expectancy at birth was 
less than 45 years. At the end of the 1990s, life expectancy for men was more 
than 75 years, but average retirement age had dropped to less than 601. The 
system was converted to a de facto pay-as-you-go system (PAYG) after most 
funds had been invested in government bonds between the two World Wars. 
In 1957, after a long and arduous debate, the German Bundestag decided to 
convert the system gradually to a pay-as-you-go scheme. The remainder of 
the capital stock was spent about 10 years later. Since then, the German 
system has been purely PAYG, with a very small reserve fund lasting from 
a minimum of 6 to a maximum of 45 days. 
A second historical reform took place in 1972. It made the German pension 
system one of the most generous ones of the world. The 1972 system was 
generous in two respects. First, the system provided very high pension levels2, 
generating net pension benefits of around 70% of average earnings for workers 
with a 45-year earnings history and average lifetime earnings. Moreover, 
pension benefits were indexed to the development of gross wages. Second, 
the 1972 reform abolished the statutory retirement age of 65 years for workers 
with a service life of at least 35 years. Instead a window of retirement between 
age 63 and 65 was introduced without any actuarial adjustments. In addition 
to these generous early retirement options, easy ways to claim disability 
benefits and low statutory retirement ages for women and unemployed further 
increased the number of beneficiaries and effectively extended the window of 
retirement to between age 60 and 65. 
However, under the increasing pressure of population aging it has become 
clear that this generosity no longer can be maintained. All industrialized 
countries are aging. However, Germany, as well as Italy and Japan, will 
experience a particularly dramatic change in population age structure. The 
severity of the demographic transition in Germany has two causes: a quicker 
increase in life expectancy partly due to a relatively low level in the 1970s, 
1The average retirement age in a given year is the average age of those workers who retired the same 
year thus receiving public pension benefits for the first time. See Verband Deutscher Rentenver-
sicherungstriiger (VDR) (2007). 
2Note that this pension level is defined as the current pension of a retiree with a 45-year average earn-
ings history divided by the current average earnings of all employed workers. It is different from the 
replacement rate relative to the most recent earnings of a retiring worker that are usually higher than 
the life-time average. 
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1. Introduction 
and a more incisive baby boom/baby bust transition (e.g., relative to the 
United States) to a very low fertility rate of 1.4 children per women, only a 
bit higher than the low fertility rate of 1.2 in Italy and Spain. Consequently, 
the ratio of elderly to working age persons, the old age dependency ratio, will 
increase steeply in the next decades. Projections show that the dependency 
ratio will more than double in the next four decades, from roughly 30% today, 
to between 60% and 65% in 2050.3• 
This increase in the dependency ratio has immediate consequences for a 
PAYG based system because fewer workers must finance the benefits of more 
recipients. The German contribution rate to the public pension system, 
19.9% of gross income in 2008, was projected at the end of the 1980s to 
exceed 40% of gross income at the peak of population aging in 2035, if the 
accustomed pension levels and the indexation of pensions to gross income 
were maintained4• This led to a major pension reform in 1992. This reform 
abolished the indexation of pensions to gross wages in favor of net wages. 
While this is still more generous than indexation to costs of living ( as it is 
the case in the U.S.), it was an important move away from the destabiliz-
ing feedback loop in which pensions increased when taxes and contributions 
increased. In addition, the 1992 reform introduced benefits adjustments to 
early retirement and abolished the generous window of retirement for women 
and unemployed. These adjustments, however, are still being phased in and 
will only be fully implemented in 2017. 
It soon became clear that the 1992 reform was too little and too late to put 
the German system on a stable and sustainable path. Another parametric 
reform introduced by the conservative government and due to become law 
in 1999 failed after the change in government in 1998. Three years later 
in 2001, the secretary of labor, Walter Riester, successfully passed another 
major reform bill through parliament. This reform abolished the pure pay-
as-you-go system and introduced a multi-pillar pension system with small, 
but growing, supplementary pillars. In addition, it greatly cut future pension 
levels in favor of a more moderate rise in contribution rates. However, the Ri-
ester reform had been based on overly optimistic assumptions. In December 
2002, the government therefore established a 'Commission on the financial 
3See chapter 2. 
4See Prognos (1987). 
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Sustainability of the Social Security Systems', commonly referred to as the 
'Rurup Commission' after its chairman Bert Rurup. In its reform proposal 
in August 2003, the commission proposed further cuts in pension levels by 
introducing a' sustainability factor' into the benefit indexation formula, link-
ing the development of benefits to internal system parameters. As a second 
measure, an increase in the normal statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 
was proposed. The first proposition was legislated in 2004, the second with 
some delay in 2007. At the time of writing of this thesis, further (parametric) 
reform measures are still being debated. 
Assessing pension system reforms. This thesis looks at whether the pen-
sion reforms of the past quarter century have been successful enough to bring 
the system back onto a stable path. Pension reforms can be assessed ac-
cording to very different dimensions. At its Gothenburg Summit in 2001, 
the European Commission agreed on three principles of pension reform: (1) 
adequacy of pensions, (2) financial sustainability of pension systems and 
(3) modernization of pension systems in response to changing needs of the 
economy, society and individuals where modernization mainly refers to labor 
market compatibility, equal treatment of men and women and transparency5. 
The World Bank set up similar goals for pension systems in 2005. According 
to the bank, pension systems should provide (1) adequate, (2) affordable, (3) 
sustainable and (3) robust retirement income6• Schwarz (2005) extends these 
goals by two additional dimensions, namely (1) fairness and (2) redistribu-
tion. For the purpose of this thesis, I consolidate these different approaches 
to the following five dimensions that in my view are of particular relevance 
for the German pension system: 
Adequacy The adequacy of pension benefits can be judged according to at 
least two criteria7: (1) The level of benefits compared to the poverty 
level to determine whether benefits are sufficient to prevent poverty 
in old age and (2) the level of benefits compared to average wages 
to determine how benefits compare to the overall wage growth in the 
economy. In this thesis, I will focus on the second aspect. The key 
5See Council of the European Union (2001 ). 
6See Holzmann and Hinz (2005). 
7 See Council of the European Union ( 2001) as well as Schwarz ( 2005). 
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1. Introduction 
question is how future pension levels in the German public pension 
system will develop under the current state of the system, and to what 
extent this projected development has been driven by the past reforms. 
Affordability and Sustainability In view of population aging, financing of 
adequate pension levels has become increasingly difficult for many pen-
sion systems worldwide. Sustainability, in this context, refers to a stable 
financial situation of the pension system that allows for adjustments in 
contribution rates and pension levels in a balanced way. This princi-
ple has played a crucial role in the German pension reform process. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, pension systems can only be sus-
tainable if benefits and contributions are linked to the internal rate 
of return of the system, n + g with n as the population growth rate 
and g as the per capita economic growth rate. If the system's rate 
of return is higher, the system is unsustainable in that it transfers a 
growing burden to younger generations. This concept has been partic-
ularly relevant in the discussion on the transition of the PAYG system 
to a funded system8. In this thesis, I will thoroughly investigate the 
underlying balancing mechanism of the German public pension system 
that determines the development of pension benefits and contribution 
rates. In a second step, I will compare the German system to the much 
appraised Swedish notional defined contribution system (NDC), which 
also incorporates an automatic balancing mechanism. 
Fairness and Redistribution As mentioned above, increases in contribution 
rates and further cuts in pension levels have led to the problem that 
the system is no longer perceived to be fair. People tend to regard 
their contribution payments as taxes rather than contributions. This 
has negative incentive effects on system participation as a whole, which 
places the system at further financial distress in the short and medium 
term. The term fairness here alludes to whether individuals, once they 
retire, will get fair returns from the contributions they paid into the 
system. One possibility to measure the fairness of a pension system is 
8Here, the internal rate of return of the PAYG pension system is compared to the internal rate of return on 
the capital market which would apply in case of a funded system. See e.g. Biirsch-Supan (1998), Breyer 
(1989), Fenge (1995) and Raffelhiischen (1993) for different points of view in this debate concerning the 
transition of the German pension system to a fully-funded one. 
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to look at individual internal rates of return9• A key question here is 
whether rates of return will turn to zero or even negative, such that the 
system no longer can be perceived as being fair. In this thesis, I will 
point out two different approaches according to which internal rates of 
return can be calculated, and show the results for the German pub-
lic pension system for different demographic groups and across cohorts 
in order to look at the intergenerational redistribution. Due to the 
strict relation of benefits to lifetime earnings, intragenerational redis-
tribution, by contrast, only plays a minor role in the German pension 
system. 
Robustness Robustness also has become an important issue in times of high 
fluctuations at the capital markets and political interventions. While 
public pension systems face high political risks, private pension schemes 
are confronted to the rate of return risk on the capital markets. In this 
thesis, I discuss whether the shift from the former monolithic towards a 
multi-pillar system has turned the German pension system into a more 
robust one. 
Transparency Finally, particularly for Germany, the issue of transparency 
is crucial. Over the course of the repeated discretionary interventions 
of the past and its ongoing reform process, the German PAYG system 
has lost a good deal of its former credibility10 . Transparency here could 
help to re-establish some of this credibility and make the reform process 
more comprehensible. 
A simulation model of the German pension system. In order to analyze 
these questions, I construct a sophisticated simulation model of the German 
pension system that I will refer to as MEA-PENSIM throughout this thesis11 . 
Figure 1. 1 gives an overview of the structure of this model. 
In the first step, projections for Germany's future demographic and labor 
market development are computed. This is necessary in order to evaluate 
9Note that here, the internal rate of return does not refer to the system as a whole but to the individual 
that pays contributions to and receives benefits from the system. 
10See Pfeiffer, Braun, Grimm, and Schmidt (2007). 
"See chapter 3 as well as Wilke (2004) for a thorough description of the model. 
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Figure 1.1. - Modeling the German Pension System: Structural 
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Souru: Author's compilation. 
the effects of different demographic and labor market assumptions on the 
future German pension system. As will be shown, different underlying as-
sumptions can have a large impact on the results. The exact modeling of 
these projections will be described in chapter 2. In addition, assumptions on 
the future development of wages are necessary. These enter exogenously into 
the model12 . In a second step, based on the demographic and labor mar-
ket forecasts and wage assumptions, the future financial development of the 
German pension system is computed. This computation is composed of two 
parts. The first part refers to the financial development of the public PAYG 
system. The second part refers to the development of the state-subsidized 
supplementary Riester pensions. This illustrates the observable shift of the 
German pension system from the former monolithic to a multi-pillar system. 
The underlying conceptual approaches will be explained in chapter 3. The 
12This of course is a drawback of the model as feedback effects such as with the labor and capital market 
cannot be modeled. However, any model has its restrictions and for the purpose of this thesis, it seems 
more important to build a comprehensive model of the German pension system that allows a thorough 
evaluation of past and current reform measures. 
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model's calculation results are summarized in several pertinent system mea-
sures, such as the development of contribution rates and pension levels, the 
pension value and the value of supplementary pensions, as well as the total 
pension level of both public and private pension income. For the analysis of 
the NDC approach and the computations of cohort-specific rates of return, 
this basic setup of the model is extended. Additional underlying assumptions 
and the computational approach are explained in these chapters. 
Structure of this thesis. The remainder of this thesis is structured as fol-
lows. Chapter 2 presents demographic and labor market projections for Ger-
many, illustrating the demographic challenges Germany faces and the labor 
market potentials it can use in order to better cope with these challenges. 
Chapter 3 describes the basic principles of the German pension system and 
delivers a first assessment of past reforms, with respect to the adequacy of 
pension benefits, the long-term financial sustainability and the robustness of 
the system as a whole. Chapter 4 then looks at whether the NDC approach 
presents an alternative reform option for a more transparent German PAYG 
system, and compares the different outcomes of the two systems. In chap-
ter 5, cohort-specific internal rates of return are computed in order to assess 
the fairness and intergenerational redistribution of the system. Chapter 6 
summarizes the main findings and provides some concluding remarks. Over-
all, it can be said that past reforms have put the German pension system 
back onto a stable path and moved it towards a multi-pillar system. Some 
unresolved issues however remain and future reforms seem likely. 
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Market Potentials 
2.1. Introduction 
Similar to other industrialized countries, Germany too faces enormous de-
mographic challenges in the near future. Its population size is projected to 
decrease considerably, while the remaining population is projected to age 
rapidly. This process is driven by three (independent) factors, namely: (1) 
the great increase in fertility rates between the mid 1950s and mid 1960s 
(the so-called baby boom) followed by the sharp decline in fertility rates 
through the mid 1970s (the so-called baby bust), (2) the continuous rise in 
life expectancy, and (3) the subsequently low fertility rates. 
The first effect has led to fundamental changes in the age structure of the 
population, as aging baby boomers account for a large share of the graying 
population. This aging process is strengthened even further by the second 
and third factors as the increasing share of older people will continue to live 
longer lives with fewer younger people following. The low level fertility rate 
(approx. 1.4 births/woman) will eventually lead to a decline in the size of 
the population. At this fertility rate, each generation will only reproduce 
approximately two thirds of itself. In fact, since 1972, the number of deaths 
has outweighed the number of births in Germany. Until 2002 this was offset 
by positive net migration, however since then, net migration (though still 
positive) was not high enough, leading to a slow decline in the size of the 
German population. 
This change in the size and age structure of the German population will 
pose enormous challenges for society as a whole. It means that the old age 
dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of elderly to working age persons, will increase 
steeply within the next decades. This will affect the entire economic system 
and will lead to deep structural changes. The impact on financing social 
9 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
2. Demographic Challenges and Labor Market Potentials 
security systems, the topic to be analyzed in the remainder of this thesis, is 
only one dimension. Other dimensions include the effects on labor, capital 
and goods markets, on public finances, and foremost on per capita growth. 
The future development of the labor market is of particular importance. On 
the one hand, labor supply is directly affected by the described demographic 
change. On the other hand, it can mitigate the economic consequences of 
this process if the labor force decreases at a lower rate than the working age 
population, thereby facilitating for a less pronounced decline in the size of 
the economically active fraction of the proportion. If Germany succeeds in 
making use of its labor market potentials this will cushion the demographic 
burden and positively influence the prospect of all other dimensions. 
This chapter provides a detailed overview about how Germany's demo-
graphic situation may evolve in the future and which possible labor market 
developments may accompany it. It is based on an earlier version by Borsch-
Supan and Wilke (2007). The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 
presents current demographic projections for Germany that show how the 
population size and structure could develop over the next decades. Based on 
these scenarios, projections of the possible future development of labor sup-
ply are presented in section 2.3. Since labor supply depicts only one side of 
the labor market, assumptions for the future development of labor demand 
are added to the labor market projection model in section 2.4 in order to 
project future employment. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2. Demographic Projections 
This section presents current projections on the future development of the 
German population. I will refer to the latest German official forecasts and 
most current frequently applied projections as well as to my own projections, 
which I will name the MEA1 projections. Section 2.2.1 describes selected 
population scenarios and their underlying methodology and assumptions. 
Projection results are illustrated in section 2.2.2. 
1 MEA stands for the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging. 
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2.2.1. Methodology and Scenarios 
The MEA projections are based on the most recent 11 th coordinated pop-
ulation projections by the German Federal Statistical Office (GFS0)2. The 
objective was to build a population simulation model that is able to replicate 
the various variants of these official population projections. I will first briefly 
outline the basic methodology of these projections, followed by an explana-
tion of the GFSO variants and MEA scenarios. I compare these to the still 
widely used demographic scenario by the Riirup Commission3. 
Modeling demographic development. The most simple and commonly 
used projection approach is the cohort-component method4 • Based on initial 
age and sex-specific population data for a given country or region, age and 
sex-specific groups are adjusted according to assumptions on the three main 
demographic parameters: fertility, mortality, and migration. Each group sur-
vives and continues to the next according to assumed age and sex specific 
mortality rates. In general, five-year age groups are applied5. As data is 
available on an annual basis for Germany, the GFSO defines one-year-age 
groups. I follow this approach. Migration is accounted for by including age 
and sex-specific net migration rates that are adjusted according to the set 
migration assumptions while preserving the initial age pattern. The annual 
number of births is computed by applying age-specific fertility rates to fe-
males in the age groups between 15 and 50 (the reproductive age span). A sex 
ratio of 0.51 for males is applied to births in order to maintain the population 
sex ratio. 
The German 11 th coordinated population projections. The 'medium sce-
nario' of the GFSO population projections includes two variants: variant 
1 Wl, as a lower limit, and variant 1 W2, as an upper limit. Note that the 
2See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a) for the original German report and Statistisches Bundesamt (2006b) 
for an English summary. 
3See Kommission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003a) for 
the original German report and Kommission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen 
Sicherungssysteme (2003b) for an English summary. 
4See O'Neill, Balk, Brickman, and Ezra (2001) for a thorough overview of different population projection 
methods. 
5See e.g. the United Nations population projections (United Nations 2006). 
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2. Demographic Challenges and Labor Market Potentials 
first digit refers to the assumptions for life expectancy while the second digit 
refers to the assumptions for migration6 • Both variants assume a stagnant 
birth rate of 1.4 births/woman. With respect to life expectancy, both variants 
use the base assumption, according to which the life expectancy at birth will 
rise to 83.5 years for men and 88.0 years for women by the year 20507• With 
respect to migration, the two scenarios use different assumptions. Variant 
1 Wl assumes a net migration of 100,000 persons/year and thus follows the 
declining trend observed over the past few years. Variant 1 W2 is based on 
the observed long-term net migration for Germany of 200,000 persons/year. 
The MEA population projections. Based on the desire to create a 
'medium' migration scenario and to model life expectancy more realistically, 
I develop two additional population scenarios. My base scenario 3Wl.58 
assumes a stronger rise in life expectancy than the GFSO projections. In ad-
dition, I create a third variant for the 'medium scenario' which I call 1 Wl.5. 
Both scenarios use a constant birth rate of 1.4 births/woman and assume 
a medium net migration of 150.000 persons/year (hence the abbreviation 
'Wl.5'). 
Life expectancy assumptions for the base scenario (MEA 3Wl.5) presume 
a continuation of the observable increases of the past decades. By extrapo-
lating the quasi linear trend after the World War II separately for men and 
women, a life expectancy of 85. 7 years for men and 91. 7 years for women can 
be computed for the year 2050. Similar calculations by Schnabel, Kistowski, 
and Vaupel (2005) that apply more sophisticated extrapolation methods com-
pute 92.6 ± 3.8 years for men and 94.0 ± 2.8 years for women ( depending 
on the extrapolation method) for the year 2050. Compared to these calcu-
lations, the MEA 3Wl .5 scenario is still moderate, but life expectancies are 
clearly higher than in the case of the GFSO base assumption for the 'medium' 
scenario and also higher than in the GFSO 'steep rise' scenario. Considering 
that past GFSO life expectancy projections have repeatedly underestimated 
actual development, assuming a slightly steeper rise in life expectancy, as is 
the case in the MEA base scenario, seems appropriate. 
6The W stands for 'Wanderungen', German for 'Migration'. 
7The GFSO publishes another scenario called 'steep rise' with the variants 2Wl and 2W2 which assumes 
a life expectancy of 85.4 years for men and 89.8 years for women in 2050. 
8Note that I adopt the notation used by the German Federal Statistical Office explained above. 
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Table 2.1. - Overview of Population Scenarios 
Life Expectancy Net migration Birth rate 
Male Female [Thousands} [Births/woman} 
Rurup Commission 81.3 86.6 200 1.4 
GFSO 1W1 83.5 88.0 100 1.4 
MEA 1W1.5 83.5 88.0 150 1.4 
GFSO 1W2 83.5 88.0 200 1.4 
GFSO 2W1 85.4 89.8 100 1.4 
GFSO 2W2 85.4 89.8 200 1.4 
MEA 3W1.5 85.7 91.7 150 1.4 
Source: Author's compilation based on the 11th coordinated population projections of the German 
Federal Statistical Office (GFSO) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006a} and on the demographic scenario 
of the Rurup Commission {Kommission fii.r die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen 
Sicherungssysteme 2003a). 
Overview of population scenarios. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the 
GFSO and MEA scenarios and their underlying assumptions. It also in-
cludes the demographic scenario of the Rurup Commission, which was used 
for its 2003 reform proposal, and is still frequently applied. 
2.2.2. Simulation Results 
2005 was used as the base year for the projections as it is the last year for 
which historical population data is available. The projection period ends in 
2050. 
Development of the total population. Figure 2.1 shows the development 
of the total population between the years of 2005 and 2050 for the different 
population scenarios. Since the MEA base scenario 3Wl.5 is almost identical 
to the GFSO variant 1 W2, and the MEA 1 Wl.5 scenario closely reflects 
the GFSO variant 2Wl, the two variants 1W2 and 2Wl were omitted from 
Figure 2.1 to facilitate clearer illustration. 
Compared to a population of 82.4 million in 2005, the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario 
leads to a decline of about 8 million to 7 4.4 million in 2050. This corresponds 
to the Rurup Commission projections for the year 2050. However, in con-
trast to the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario, the Rurup Commission assumes additional 
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growth in the size of the total population through 2020. The MEA 1 Wl.5 
scenario shows a much stronger decline of 11.3 million to 71.1 million in 2050. 
The GFSO variant lWl produces a figure 2.3 million below this value (68.8 
million). The projected population decline is less pronounced in the GFSO 
2W2 variant because of the higher annual net migration. 
Changes in the age structure of the population. In addition to the pro-
jected decline in total population, the age structure of the German population 
will change considerably. Figure 2.2 illustrates this change by depicting the 
development of the old age dependency ratio (OADR) for the different pop-
ulation scenarios. Note that the OADR here is defined as the ratio between 
persons aged 65+ and persons aged 15 to 64. 
The percentaged change in the OADR is significantly larger than the per-
centaged population decline depicted in Figure 2.1. For the MEA 3Wl.5 
scenario, the OADR is projected to increase from 0.29 in 2005 to 0.65 in 
2050, meaning that there will be only 1.5 persons aged 15-64 compared to 
one person aged 65+ in 2050. This scenario is realistic and highlights the 
severity of the German demographic situation. For the MEA 1 Wl.5 sce-
nario, the rise in the OADR is more moderate and amounts to 0.58 in 2050. 
Through the year 2030 this increase is nearly identical to the projected in-
creases in the GFSO 1 Wl and 2W2 variants. Beyond 2030, the OADR in the 
GFSO 1 Wl and 2W2 rises a bit more rapidly and ends up a bit above the 
MEA 1 Wl.5 scenario in 2050. The Rurup Commission scenario shows the 
most optimistic development where the OADR will climb to 0.53 in 2050. In 
contrast to the development of the total population, the development of the 
OADR in the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario is now equivalent to the GFSO variant 
2Wl, while the projected OADR for the 1 Wl.5 scenario lies in between the 
GFSO 1 W2 and 2W2 variants. Changes in the total population thus do not 
necessarily translate one to one into corresponding changes in the age struc-
ture. Assumptions on future net migration have an especially considerable 
impact on the projected age structure of the population. 
It is important to note that it is this change in the age structure illustrated 
in Figure 2.2 that represents the core of the aging problem. As shown, the 
latter is far more severe than the projected population decline 9 
9Note that changes in the age structure do not always correspond to simultaneous population declines, as 
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2.3. Projections on Future Labor Supply 
The previous section showed that the working age population is projected to 
decline. How strongly this affects the actual size of the labor force ( employees 
+ unemployed) depends on the percentage of working age population seeking 
employment10 . This section will provide projections for the future labor 
supply. The projections are based on the demographic projections described 
in the previous section. The objective is to develop a realistic scenario for 
Germany that reflects the currently perceived future labor market prospects. 
The projections are based on the methodology applied by Borsch-Supan 
(2003a) for earlier projections on the German labor market. More recent 
supply side oriented projections for Germany were published in 2005 by the 
Institute of Labor Market and Professional Research11 and by the European 
Commission12 . A more demand side oriented projection was constructed by 
the Riirup Commission in 2003, based on the Commission's demographic 
projections which were presented in section 2.2.1 13. I will later compare my 
projection results with the results of these studies. 
In the following, I will first describe the underlying modeling approach 
of my projections in section 2.3.1. Selected scenarios are then explained in 
section 2.3.2. Section 2.3.3 shows the projection results. I conclude this 
section with a sensitivity analysis on the single parameter effects in the labor 
supply model in section 2.3.4. 
is the case in Germany. In the United States, for example, fertility rates have declined much less than in 
Germany while life expectancy has risen to a similar extent also provoking changes in the population's 
age structure without declines in the size of the population. 
10Note that this difference between the size of the working age population and the labor force size is called 
hidden reserve. Foreigners wanting to join the German labor market are included in the hidden reserve 
and implicitly incorporated in the migration assumptions of the underlying demographic forecast. 
11See Fuchs and Diirfler {2005b) and Fuchs and Diirfler {2005a) as well as Fuchs and Siihnlein {2007). 
12See Carone {2005). 
13See again Kommission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme {2003a) 
for the original German report and Kommission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen 
Sicherungssysteme { 2003b) for an English summary. 
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2.3.1. Modeling Labor Supply 
In a first step, future age and sex-specific labor force participation rates14 are 
determined by the development of the following three labor supply parame-
ters: 
1. Labor Entry Age. The mean labor entry age is assumed to decrease 
in the future. To simulate this effect, the age distribution of labor 
force participation rates below a certain age limit is shifted to the left. 
The age limit is the age that marks the current end of the educational 
period, which in Germany is around 27. After that age, participation 
rates usually reach the higher levels which are maintained until almost 
age 50. Participation rates between this initial age limit and the new 
(lower) age limit are set equal to former participation rates at the initial 
age limit. Since the youngest recorded working age in the microcensus 
is age 15, participation rates below this age are assumed to turn zero. 
The adjustment of participation rates over time from the initial to a 
specified target distribution is computed linearly. 
2. Female labor force participation. It is assumed that age specific 
female participation rates in the future will converge with today's male 
participation rates. This effect is modeled by reducing the difference 
between female and male participation rates by a specified factor be-
tween zero and one. Again, the adaptation over time for participation 
rates between the base and target years is done linearly. 
3. Retirement age. Finally, the mean retirement age is assumed to in-
crease further in the future. To simulate this effect, the age distribution 
of labor force participation rates above a certain age limit is shifted to 
the right. The age limit now is the earliest age that marks the be-
ginning of the transition period into retirement, which in Germany is 
14Participation rates describe the proportion of the labor force to the population. Labor force participation 
rates are based on the microcensus of the German Federal Statistical Office. The microcensus contains 
the official representative statistics of the German population and labor market, annually surveying 1 % of 
all households in Germany ( continuous household sample survey). However, marginal occupation in the 
microcensus is underrepresented and total labor force participation is therefore slightly underestimated. 
I correct for this by calibrating the microcensus-based labor force participation rates with the aggregated 
labor force participation rate provided by the OECD Labor Statistics multiplied by the size of the 
aggregate labor force of the base year. 
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around age 47. After that age, participation rates start to decline as 
people retire from the workforce. Participation rates between the initial 
age limit and the new (higher) age limit are again set equal to former 
participation rates at the initial age limit. Again, the adjustment over 
time is computed linearly. 
In a second step, these rates are multiplied with the age and sex-specific 
data from the population projections described in section 2.315 . 
2.3.2. Scenarios 
Using the parameters introduced in the preceding section, nearly all future 
development of the labor supply can be modeled, however, it remains to be 
seen which future development should be considered most realistic. I create 
four scenarios ('Status Quo', 'Best Case', 'Denmark' and 'Agenda 1005') in 
order to illustrate the range of possible future outcomes. The scenarios are 
described below. 
The 'Status Quo' scenario. This scenario defines the lower limit of possible 
future outcomes. It assumes that labor force participation rates will remain 
constant at current levels. This implies that the mean labor entry age will not 
decrease, that female participation rates will not converge with those of men, 
and that the current mean retirement age will not increase further despite 
the recent pension reforms which are explained in more detail in chapter 3. 
This scenario seems rather unlikely, but is intended to show the effects of the 
maximum demographic pressures on the labor supply. 
The 'Best Case' scenario. While the 'Status Quo' scenario marks the lower 
limit of potential future labor supply developments, the 'Best Case' scenario 
marks the upper limit. In this scenario, participation rates are assumed to 
increase as much as possible. This assumes that by 2040, the mean labor 
entry age will decrease by two years, that the gap between female and male 
participation rates will be closed by 90% while male participation rates will 
15Note that I do not differentiate between West and East Germany, not least because a projection of the 
corresponding parameters is very difficult. See e.g. Fuchs and Sohnlein (2007) regarding differences 
between East and West Germany concerning labor force behavior. 
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Figure 2.3. - A Comparison of Danish and German Labor Force Partic-
ipation Rates 
e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ro m m 
Age 
I-Men (DE)---Women (DE)-+-Men (DK)-<>-Women (OK)I 
Source: Author's compilation based on the microcensus data of the German Federal 
Statistical Office and Statistics Denmark (www.statbank.dk}. 
be lowered to 95% of current levels, and finally that the mean retirement 
age will increase by three years. This scenario is extremely optimistic. It is 
intended to illustrate the maximum possible labor supply which is achieved, 
for example, by US-American participation rates. 
The 'Denmark' scenario. In order to find a realistic scenario within these 
lower and upper limits, I use evidence from Germany's European neighbors. 
Denmark, together with Switzerland, records the highest participation rates 
for female and elderly workers in Europe. Figure 2.3 compares German par-
ticipation rates with the Danish ones. The Danish female participation rates 
are significantly higher than those of German women for all ages. For men, 
the participation rates are similar in both countries for younger workers, but 
diverge later as a significantly higher proportion of Danish men continues 
working at older ages. 
The 'Denmark' scenario assumes that German participation rates will even-
tually converge with the Danish rates. Convergence by the year 2040 results 
in: lowering the mean labor entry age by one year, the 90% convergence of 
female participation rates towards men's rates with a corresponding decrease 
in male participation rates to 95% of current levels, and an increase in the 
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Table 2.2. - Overview of Labor Supply Scenarios 
Labor entry age Female labor force Retirement age 
[years} participation [years) 
Status Quo unchanged unchanged unchanged 
Agenda 1005 -1 75% +1 
Denmark -1 90% +2 
Best Case -2 90% +3 
All projections have 2040 as target year. 
Source: Author's compilation. 
mean retirement age by two years. The 'Denmark' scenario seems very re-
alistic if current German reform efforts, such as 'Agenda 2010' which was 
founded by the former Schroder regime, are continued. This assumes that 
over the next 30 years Germany will be able to execute the necessary labor 
market reforms implemented in Denmark during the 1990s. A third of the 
Danish reform speed should thus suffice for this scenario to turn real. 
The 'Agenda 1005' scenario. Last, I choose a clearly less optimistic but 
also realistic scenario that takes into account the recent trend in German 
politics to undo some of the most recent important labor market reforms. 
This scenario will be called 'Agenda 1005' scenario, hinting at an only 'half 
hearted' implementation of the set Agenda 2010. For this scenario, assump-
tions include a reduction of the mean labor entry age by one year, an increase 
in female participation rates up to 75% of the different to men's, and an in-
crease in the mean retirement age by one year by 2040. 
Thus, the four selected scenarios show the possible range of future devel-
opments of the labor supply in Germany. Table 2.2 summarizes the different 
underlying assumptions for each scenario. Two of the scenarios define the 
lower and upper bounds, the other two are realistic scenarios, one geared to 
the current situation in Denmark and the other to current reform trends in 
Germany. 
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2.3.3. Simulation Results 
The base year for my projections is 2005. I assume constant labor force 
participation rates through 2008, as the reforms in the 'Agenda 1005', 'Den-
mark' and 'Best Case' scenarios will require time until fully implemented. 
Projections are run through the year 2050. However, since adjustments in 
participation rates are all assumed to take place by 2040, participation rates 
de facto remain constant after that. Thus, from the year 2040 on, changes 
in labor supply are only based on the underlying demographic development, 
for which I choose the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario presented in section 2.2.l. 
Development of the size of the labor force. While the labor force declines 
in all four scenarios (Figure 2.4), the extent of this decline varies greatly. 
While a large decrease of 9.6 million (about 22.7%) to 32.6 million in 2040 
is projected in the 'Status Quo' scenario, the labor force only decreases by 
2.8 million (about 6.6%) to 39.4 million in the 'Best Case' scenario. The 
decline in the 'Best Case' scenario thus only amounts to roughly a third 
of the decline in the 'Status Quo' scenario. In the 'Denmark' scenario the 
decrease is 3.9 million (about 9.2%) by 2040, one million more than in the 
'Best Case' scenario. In the 'Agenda 1005' scenario, the decline in the labor 
force amounts to 5.8 million (about 13.7%) in 2040, three million more than 
in the 'Base Case' and two million more than in the 'Denmark' scenario16. 
From the year 2040 on, the decrease in the labor force accelerates in all 
scenarios and declines at the same rate as in the 'Status Quo' scenario, namely 
according to the development of the working age population as projected by 
the underlying demography. The 'Best Case' and 'Denmark' scenarios, where 
the adjustment of participation rates is so high that it offsets the demographic 
trends, show a kink in 2040 when participation rates reach their target values 
while the population continues to decline further. Thus, even if the best 
possible usage of the labor force potential is assumed will the population 
decline be reflected in a smaller labor force in the long run. 
16For my projections I assume a convergence with Danish participation rates by the year 2040. If other 
transition periods are assumed, the resulting development obviously differs. Appendix A shows the 
different transitional patterns for different adjustment periods. 
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Figure 2.4. - Development of the Size of the Labor Force. 
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Figure 2.5. - Labor Force Development under Different Population Sce-
narios. 
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Consequences of a stronger population decrease. How strongly will these 
results vary if more pessimistic population projections are used? Figure 2.5 
compares the development of the labor force size in the 'Denmark' scenario 
for both MEA population projections (3Wl.5 and lWl.5) as well as the 
GFSO variant lWl. 
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Differences between the two MEA projections are minimal since these only 
differ with respect to life expectancy assumptions and hardly play a role with 
respect to development of the labor force. However, a difference between the 
MEA 3Wl.5 scenario and the GFSO 1 Wl variant of around 1.6 million by 
2040 results from differing assumptions of net migration (100,000 instead of 
150,000 per year) as lower annual net migration considerably reduces the 
size of the working age population. Analogously, a net migration of 200,000 
instead of 150,000 will lead to a labor force increase of 1.6 million. It should 
be noted that even though a higher net migration generally leads to a larger 
labor force, it cannot stop the long-term decline of the labor force 17. 
Changes in the age structure. In addition to the size, the age structure of 
the labor force will change considerably during the next decades. Figure 2.6 
shows the age structure of the labor force for the 'Denmark' scenario for 
the years 2010, 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. It can be seen that the peak of 
the distribution first shifts to the right and then disappears between 2020 
and 2030, when the baby boomers retire. Subsequently, the age distribution 
flattens and changes only slightly in the following years. 
Figure 2.7 shows the development of the average age of the labor force. 
In the 'Denmark' scenario, the average age will rise from 39.8 today to 41.7 
years in 2025. After that it will slightly decrease for 10 years and then rise 
again by half a year, finally peaking at 42 years in year 2050. In the 'Best-
Case' scenario the development is similar. In the scenarios 'Agenda 1005' 
and 'Status Quo' the decline of the average age is much stronger after 2025 
because a large part of the baby boom generation will have retired at that 
time already. 
The change in the age structure becomes even more evident when looking 
at the percentage of the labor force aged 55+. Figure 2.8 illustrates the tem-
porary rejuvenation of the labor force when the baby boomers have retired. 
It becomes evident that the change in the age structure of the labor force 
is not a temporary phenomenon but a longer lasting development. In the 
'Denmark' and 'Best-Case' scenarios, the percentage of the labor force aged 
17For the role of migration in the discussion about the effects of the demographic changes, see Bi:irsch-Supan 
(2002b). 
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Figure 2.6. - Age Structure of the Labor Force 
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Source: Author's computations. 
55+ nearly doubles. In the 'Agenda 1005' scenario increase in the percentage 
of the labor force aged 55+ is two thirds. 
These trends clearly illustrate that future labor supply will increasingly 
rely on older workers. If we do not succeed in better integrating the elderly 
population into the labor market and using their potential, we won't be able 
to offset much of the projected labor force decline under the 'Status Quo' 
scenario. 
2.3.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
The labor supply projections presented in the previous section were based 
on four scenarios which span the possible range of future developments. All 
scenarios make different assumptions regarding the labor entry age, female 
participation rates and retirement age, parameters which significantly influ-
ence the labor supply. This section looks at how strong the single parameter 
effects are. Computations refer to the differences to the 'Status Quo' sce-
nario. For this purpose, labor force development in the 'Status Quo' scenario 
is normalized to one. 
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Figure 2.7. - Average Age of the Labor Force 
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Figure 2.8. - Fraction of the Labor Force Aged 55+ 
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Increases in the labor entry age. Figure 2.9 shows the effects on the labor 
force participation rates and thus on the labor force size if the labor entry 
age (LEA) is reduced by 1 year resp. 2 years by 2040. A reduction by one 
year leads to an increase of the labor force size by 0. 7% by 2020 and 1.5% 
by 2040 compared to the 'Status Quo' scenario. Reducing the labor entry 
age by two years will double this effect, reaching 1.4% by 2020 and 3.0% by 
2040. 
Given the current discussions surrounding the introduction of an 8-year-
high-school system ( currently it is 9 years) and the introduction of a 
Bachelor/Master-system instead of the German diploma, a reduction of one 
year seems realistic. A reduction of two years seems to be a bit far-fetched, as 
it would place Germany in the group of countries with the shortest education 
times in the EU. The effects on the labor force size are rather small since 
cohort sizes are small. Note, however, that a lower labor entry age leads to 
a slight rejuvenation of the age structure of the labor force. 
Increase in female participation rates. A convergence of female partici-
pation rates to those of men may have a very large effect on the labor force 
as Figure 2.10 demonstrates. A convergence of 20% by 2040 will result in a 
labor force size increase of 1 % by 2020 and of 2% by 2040. A higher con-
vergence of 40%, 60% or 80% of the gap in participation rates of men and 
women will consequently lead to an increase of 2%, 3% and 4% in labor force 
size by 2020, and of 4%, 6% and 8% by 2040. 
The effects here are thus relatively large. Compared to countries like Den-
mark, Germany still reports relatively low levels of female labor force par-
ticipation (see Figure 2.3) and as such, there is an ample scope for future 
adjustment. While in Germany participation rates of women without chil-
dren are comparatively high, they are comparatively lower when mothers 
with children are included18 . A prerequisite for higher female participation 
rates corresponds to a policy which supports the reconcilability of family and 
work, diverging from traditional gender roles19 • 
18See Dressel, CorneliBen, and Wolf (2005). 
19See Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fiir Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2005). 
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Increase in the retirement age. An increase in the mean retirement age 
(RA) also has a relatively large impact on the labor supply as Figure 2.11 
shows. An increase in the retirement age by one year by 2040 results in 
growth of 1.2% in the labor force by 2020, and growth of 2.4% by 2040. An 
increase in the retirement age by 2 or 3 years leads to nearly proportional 
results. 
As a result of the past German pension reforms (see chapter 3), the average 
retirement age has increased during the last decade, from 61.2 years in 1995, 
to 62.7 years in 2003 20. If disability pensions are included (from age 50 
on), the average retirement age is lower (62.3 years in 2005) but its increase 
since 1996 is higher21 . In line with this development a further increase in 
the mean retirement age by one year is conceivable until the phase-in of the 
new regulations ends in 2017. With the implementation of the increase in 
the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67, a further increase of the mean 
retirement age by 2 or even 3 years also becomes more likely. 
Comparison of the effects. Figure 2.12 compares the different single pa-
rameter effects22 . It assumes a decrease in the labor entry age by one year, 
a convergence of female participation rates to those of men by 90% and an 
increase in the retirement age by two years. Together, these assumptions 
correspond approximately to the 'Denmark' scenario but are illustrated as 
separate effects here. 
The decline in the labor entry age by one year increases labor supply by 
2040 by 1.6%, higher female participation rates lead to a 8.6% increase and 
the higher retirement age to a 4.9% increase. Together this corresponds to 
an increase of 15.1% by 2040. However, this calculation underestimates the 
joint effects of simultaneous changes in the parameters. A higher retirement 
age, for example, will eventually also translate into higher female labor force 
participation if the target male participation rates increase. The single pa-
rameter effects thus strengthen each other if more than one parameter is 
20See Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004}. 
21 See Brussig and Wojtkowski {2006). 
221n the economic analysis, such comparisons are usually based on elasticities that allow to scale the single 
effects as percentage changes. However, in this case, the appropriate computational basis is unclear. An 
increase in the effective retirement age by one year, for example, cannot be related to the whole life span. 
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Figure 2.9. - Entry Age and Labor Supply 
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Figure 2.10. - Female Participation Rate and Labor Supply 
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Figure 2.12. - Comparison of the Single Parameter Effects 
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Source: Author's computations. 
adapted. This is an interesting aspect that should be taken into account in 
political incentives aimed to induce the desired parameter changes. 
2.4. Projections on Future Employment 
The labor force projections of the preceding section have illustrated the mag-
nitude of the demographic pressure and shown to what extent changes in the 
labor supply may mitigate these demographic effects. 
However, labor supply only reflects one side of the labor market. The other 
side is that of labor demand. If labor demand does not match labor supply 
(which is usually the case), not all members of the labor force who seek find 
employment, and thus remain unemployed. The size of employment, however, 
is the crucial parameter for economic development. It is the employed who 
contribute to production and economic growth and who pay taxes and social 
security contributions and also, partially, finance the unemployed. 
In this section, I will therefore extend my projection model to also consider 
the development of labor demand. Section 2.4.1 describes the new modeling 
approach and the additional assumptions for the four labor market scenarios 
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presented in section 2.2.1. Resulting projections on employment are depicted 
in section 2.4.2. 
2.4.1. Introducing Labor Demand into the Model 
While the long-term development of labor demand is mainly influenced by the 
cost of capital and labor as well as important job market characteristics, such 
as hiring and layoff costs, the short-term development is greatly influenced 
by business cycles. For my projections, I will purely focus on the medium-
and long-term trends, ignoring short-term fluctuations. 
Implicit assumptions. Labor demand is not modeled explicitly in my 
model23• Instead, it is modeled via the development of the long-term 
business-cycle independent unemployment rate UR = U / ( U + E), which 
is introduced into the model as an exogenous parameter. This requires two 
implicit assumptions: (1) Changes in the labor supply (U +E) are exclusively 
modeled by changes in UR and (2) if more people seek employment this does 
not affect the UR. The second assumption implies that the labor market 
absorbs all additional capacity with a rate of 1 - UR. 
Unemployment scenarios. This additional assumption regarding the de-
velopment of the unemployment rate is added to the four selected scenarios 
presented in section 2.2.1. Base parameter is the aggregated unemployment 
rate of 9.1 % for the year 2005 as defined by the German Federal Employment 
Office. Table 2.3 gives an overview of the assumptions regarding the future 
development of the unemployment rate for the different scenarios. 
For the 'Status Quo' scenario it is assumed that the unemployment rate 
remains at current levels and does not decrease despite a shrinking labor force. 
In the 'Best Case' scenario the unemployment rate is assumed to decline until 
2040 reaching the 'natural level' of an economy which the literature estimates 
at around 4%24 • For the realistic 'Denmark' scenario, a convergence with the 
current Danish unemployment rate of 4.8% is assumed. This seems possible 
23For a current projection of labor demand until 2020 for Germany see Schnur and Zika (2005) 
24 According to the theory of Friedman (1968) the unemployment rate in an economy fluctuates in the long 
term around this natural, positive rate. 
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Table 2.3. - Overview of Unemployment Scenarios 
Scenario 2005 2040 
Status Quo 9.1% 9.1% 
Agenda 1005 9.1% 7.0% 
Denmark 9.1% 4.8% 
Best Case 9.1% 4.0% 
Source: Author's compilation. 
as Denmark also reached a similar reduction after its labor market reforms 
in the last decade. In the case of the 'Agenda 1005' scenario, a long-term 
decline of the unemployment rate to 7% by 2040 is assumed. As the Agenda 
2010 targets the structural causes for persistent high German unemployment 
rates since the 1980s and is similar to the Danish labor market reform in the 
1990s, a partially implemented 'Agenda 1005' is likely to have a considerably 
lower effect. 
As for the participation rates in section 2.3, age and sex-specific unemploy-
ment rates are applied. Transitions over time are again computed linearly 
and the adjustment process begins in 2008 and ends in 2040. Beyond 2040 
the unemployment rate is kept constant. 
2.4.2. Simulation Results 
This section presents the projections of the size of the future employment 
in Germany. I will first show the projected absolute number of employees 
and compare it with the projection results from section 2.3.3. Subsequently, 
relative values, such as the support ratio and the pensioner ratio, will be 
discussed. 
Development of the number of employees. Like the labor force size, the 
number of employees decreases in all four scenarios (see Figure 2.13). In the 
'Denmark' scenario, the number of employees declines by over 2.5 million to 
36.2 million by 2040, while the 'Agenda 1005' scenario presents an additional 
decline of another 2.5 million. The 'Status Quo' scenario doubles the decrease 
to over 11 million down to 27.4 million employees by 2040, which is equivalent 
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to a drop of 30% compared to current levels. In contrast, in the 'Best-Case' 
scenario the number of employees decreases by only one million. 
Note also that the difference between the labor force size and the number of 
employees of today's approximately 3.5 million narrows down to 2.8 million 
for the 'Status Quo', 2.5 million for the 'Agenda 1005' and about 1.7 million 
for the 'Denmark' and 'Best Case' scenarios. This is due to two effects. The 
first effect is that the unemployment rate is based on a diminishing labor force 
over time. The second effect is the assumed decline in the unemployment rate 
itself as in the case of the scenarios 'Denmark' and 'Best Case'. 
Economic support ratio. We have seen that both the number of employees 
on the labor market and the total population are projected to decrease in 
the future. The relative decline in the number of employees, however can 
be shown to be less than the total decline. This is illustrated in Figure 2.14 
which depicts the development of the economic support ratio. The economic 
support ratio is defined as the ratio of employees to the adult population 
aged 15+. The latter is assumed to be approximately equal to the number of 
consumers creating the demand for the goods and services which are produced 
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Figure 2.14. - Development of the Economic Support Ratio 
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by the employees. 
With the exception of the 'Status Quo' scenario, the relevant decline starts 
after 2015. For the 'Denmark' scenario, the support ratio falls from current 
rate of 54.8% to 52.1 % by 2035, after which it will increase again until 2040. 
This is due to the assumed labor market adjustments which affect the num-
ber of employees more after 2035 than the increase in life expectancy affects 
the number of grown-ups. After 2040 the support ratio further decreases 
under constant labor market participation rates. For the 'Status Quo' sce-
nario where no labor market adjustments are assumed, the support ratio falls 
steeply and strictly monotonically. 
Consequences on growth and productivity. As it has been shown, the 
labor force size will not only shrink absolutely but also relative to the popu-
lation size. Relative to the current consumption level of goods and services 
and the corresponding investments, there will be fewer employees to produce 
these, and thus a lower standard of living. To consume and invest at current 
levels, Germany needs a greater increase in productivity than hitherto. 
For the 'Denmark' scenario, employees must produce by 2035 nearly 5% 
more than today to keep the current level of consumer and investment goods 
per capita as today. This corresponds to a yearly productivity increase of 
0.2 percentage points, in addition to the historical normal increase of about 
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1.4%25 per year. A yearly productivity gain of 1.6% is not impossible, for 
some countries it is even normal. It would enable Germany to keep its living 
standard on one level with its EU-neighbors. 
For the 'Status Quo' scenario, the employees would need to produce about 
20% more than today by 2035. This would correspond to an additional yearly 
productivity increase of about 0.63 percentage points. An increase in the 
current yearly productivity gain to more than 2% per year for the mid-term 
future does not seem realistic. This scenario implies, given no surprising 
jump in productivity, that the living standard compared with Germany's 
EU-neighbors will decrease. 
The projections show how important the current and future labor market 
reforms are to keep our living standard also in future, at least relative with 
Germany's EU-neighbors. 
Pensioner ratio. Even more serious than the decrease of the absolute resp. 
relative number of employees is the change in ratio of employees to pensioners, 
the so-called pensioner ratio26 . Figure 2.15 shows the development of the 
pensioner ratio for the different labor market scenarios. 
In all scenarios the pensioner ratio increases, but the range between the 
extremes is large. Assuming a very positive labor supply development, as il-
lustrated in the 'Best Case' scenario, the pensioner ratio reaches about 73.1 % 
by 2040. In the 'Status Quo' scenario, it nearly reaches 105% by 2040 which 
means that one employee needs to finance more than one pensioner. In the 
'Denmark' scenario, the pensioner ratio is about 4 percentage points higher 
than in the 'Best Case' scenario. This shows again that a good usage of the 
labor supply potential may not prevent the long-term trend completely but 
the inevitable increase of the pensioner ratio may be softened considerably. 
Consequences of a stronger population decrease. In order to see how the 
depicted increases in the pensioner ratio depend on the underlying population 
25See Buchheim (1994). The JAB (Institut fiir Arbeitsma.rkt- und Berufsforschung) calculates only with 
1.3% for their long-term projection of labor demand until 2020, see Schnur and Zika (2005). 
26Note that pensioners here a.re defined as all persons who retire from the labor market. Since self-employed 
persons as well as civil-servants are included in the employees, this definition leads to a lower pensioner 
ratio than the classical definition of the German pension insurance which takes only account of those 
retirees that can claim a public pension. 
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projection, Figure 2.16 compares the development of the pensioner ratio in 
the 'Denmark' scenario for both MEA population projections (3Wl.5 and 
1 Wl.5) as well as the GFSO 1 Wl variant. 
Assuming that life expectancy rises less rapidly (MEA lWl.5), the pen-
sioner ratio remains lower given the same amount of employees (see Fig-
ure 2.5) now faces fewer pensioners. If, in addition, lower annual net mi-
gration is assumed (lWl), the moderate assumptions with respect to life 
expectancy which generally flatten the increase of the pensioner ratio are 
offset partly by the lack of younger migrants. 
The pressure on the social security systems may, consequently, be cush-
ioned only partly by the labor market. Higher life expectancy may only 
be compensated to a certain degree by higher labor participation of seniors. 
Even under more pessimistic life expectancy assumptions, the pressure re-
mains high. Even in the 'Best Case' scenario, the pensioner ratio will rise by 
at least 15 percentage points until 2040. This means an additional burden of 
more than a fourth by 2040 alone for employees. 
35 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
2. Demographic Challenges and Labor Market Potentials 
Figure 2.16. - Development of the Pensioner Ratio Under Different 
Population Scenarios 
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter showed projected future developments of the German popula-
tion as well as the German labor market through 2050. It was shown that 
the extent to which the demographic pressures translates to the labor mar-
ket depends significantly on the success of the current labor market reforms 
in triggering the necessary changes with respect to labor supply and labor 
demand. 
After 2020, at the latest, both the labor force size and the number of 
employees will decline due to the population decline. Neither the best usage 
of the labor supply potential nor an increased net migration may stop this 
trend completely. In the 'Denmark' scenario, the labor force size will already 
slowly start to decline from 2015 onwards. Similar trends for Germany have 
been projected by the IAB (Institut fiir Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) 
in their labor market projections and long-term calculations of the labor 
force potential27 and the European Commission28 , although the projections 
differ in detail because of different population and labor market assumptions. 
27See Fuchs and Dorfler (2005b) and Fuchs and Dorfler (2005a) and Fuchs and Sohnlein (2007). 
28See Carone (2005). 
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It is an important insight, however, that targeted reforms that create the 
necessary incentives for an increase in labor force size may significantly reduce 
the projected labor force decline and cushion the demographic effects. 
In any case, the age structure of workers will change enormously. The 
average age of the labor force will increase over the next decades. Especially, 
the fraction of employees aged 55+ will increase considerably. This change of 
the age structure is inevitable and requires corresponding adjustments from 
both employers and employees. Nevertheless, large increases in the pensioner 
ratio seem inevitable. 
It was also shown that besides shorter education times and the result-
ing lower average labor entry age, higher female participation rates and an 
increase in the retirement age have large impacts on the labor supply. In 
addition, increasing the retirement age does not only positively affect labor 
supply, but also reduces the number of pensioners, thereby reducing the rise 
in the pensioner ratio. This also has significant positive effects on the finan-
cial situation of the social security systems. It is important for Germany's 
current labor market policy to set the right incentives in this context. 
Note however, that participation rates and the share of employed and 
unemployed persons do not reflect the labor market situation completely. 
One important aspect which was left out of the labor market projections 
presented in this chapter is labor volume, that is the total number of hours 
worked by the labor force. This is extremely difficult to model. For example, 
the increases in female participation rates during the 1990s in Germany were 
based nearly completely on part-time jobs29. In general, the work volume 
in Germany has decreased during the last decades because of fewer working 
hours per week, a higher vacation entitlement, a lower participation rate of 
seniors and last but not least because of a high unemployment rate30• But 
there is some evidence, that the work volume will increase when work patterns 
of women converge with those of men as expected31 . Across EU-countries a 
clear correlation between child care and the working hour difference of women 
and men can be found. The better the child care offer, the less the working 
hour difference32 • Thus, working volume needs to be kept in mind when 
29See Bothfeld, Klammer, and Klenner (2005) and Dressel (2005). 
30See Borsch-Supan (2000b). 
31See Allmendiger and Ebner (2005). 
32See European Commission (2000). 
37 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
2. Demographic Challenges and Labor Market Potentials 
political incentives are targeted at increasing the labor supply. 
Apart from this quantitative development, the future qualitative devel-
opment of the labor market plays an important role. This means foremost 
education. If education is not promoted enough, there will be a shortage 
of qualified persons in the future as the total labor force declines and the 
demand for highly educated workers cannot be filled33 . At the same time the 
problem of employing less educated persons will persist. A corresponding po-
litical focus on education and lifelong learning thus seems crucial in order to 
increase the share of the better educated in the labor force and prevent such 
mismatches. In any case, the accumulation of human capital will become 
increasingly important over the next decades. 
An active labor market policy, both quantitatively and qualitatively, will 
become essential for Germany to tap its full labor market potentials. If such 
a policy takes place it could mitigate the demographic effects on the labor 
market and the pressure on the remainder of the economy, including the 
social security systems. Halting current reforms or regressing, in contrast, 
will have clearly restrictive consequences for the future living standard as 
well as for the financing of social security systems. 
The demographic and labor market projections in this chapter will form 
the basis for the computations in the following chapters. However, I do not 
choose the MEA projection scenarios and corresponding labor market sce-
narios as the base scenario for subsequent calculations, but the population 
and labor market scenarios by the Riirup Commission. The reason is that 
these correspond most to the projections that are currently applied for of-
ficial pension system computations. In fact, a comparison of the calculated 
number of employees and ratios for the 'Denmark' scenario shows a strong 
correspondence to the results of the labor force projections of the Riirup 
Commission. This is surprising since the Riirup Commission's projections 
are based on much more optimistic population projections and also model 
explicitly the future development of labor demand, which has not been done 
in this chapter. However, it makes it easier for me to use their projections 
and interpret resulting effects correctly. 
33See Reinberg and Hummel (2003). 
38 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
3. A Quarter Century of Reforms: An 
Evaluation of the German Pension 
Reform Process 
3.1. Introduction 
Until recently, the German public pension system has been one of the most 
generous in the world. Today, the system is in great financial distress. On 
the one hand, expenditures have risen as pensions have to be financed for 
a longer time due to continuous increases in life expectancy and an early 
retirement age induced by generous early retirement options. On the other 
hand, revenues have not kept up as younger working cohorts have become 
smaller, thus accounting for fewer contributors. This situation is projected to 
deteriorate even further when the baby boom generation will enter retirement 
around 2015. 
A series of parametric reforms in the 1990s attempted to curtail the gen-
erosity of the system by imposing stricter retirement options narrowing down 
the retirement window. More fundamental reform measures were instituted 
in 2001, 2004 and 2007. Since then, the system has been subject to major 
changes, converting the once exemplary and monolithic Bismarckian pen-
sion insurance system into a complex, sustainable multi-pillar system. This 
chapter will give an overview of the German pension system and its ongoing 
reform process. Moreover, it will assess whether these reforms will solve the 
pressing problems of a prototypical pay-as-you-go system of old age provision, 
hopefully illustrating lessons for other countries to learn 1. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the basic prin-
ciples of the German pension system before past and current reforms from 
1This chapter is an update and extension ofBorsch-Supan and Wilke (2003}, Borsch-Supan, Reil-Held, and 
Wilke (2004) and Wilke (2004}. 
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the 1990s until today are described in section 3.3. In order to evaluate the 
long-term effects of these reforms, I develop a detailed simulation model of 
the German pension system which I introduce in section 3.4. Based on this 
model, section 3.5 presents projections on the future financial development 
of the public pension system. Further projections are presented in section 3.6 
which looks at the future role of supplementary pension income in Germany. 
Section 3. 7 concludes. 
3.2. Basic Principles of the German Pension 
System 
Pension systems can be best described in pillars. According to the definition 
of the World Bank five pillars can be distinguished2: 
0. Pillar The objective of the zero pillar is to prevent poverty in old age. 
In Germany, before 2002, retirees with no or low pension claims were 
covered by the same social assistance as a needy German of any age. 
Financial resources of the family had to be used first before state sub-
sidies were paid. As a consequence, older people who did not want to 
burden their children did not apply for social assistance. Until 2002, 
this had applied only to a small fraction of retirees, but in the face of 
the planned future cuts in public pension levels in the context of the 
2001 Riester reform, it was clear that this needed to be changed. The 
2001 Riester reform introduced a minimum social security guarantee 
( 'Grundsicherung') for old age as well as those, whose earning capacity 
is reduced. Effectively, this is a means-tested minimum pension at a 
level of around 15% higher than the German social assistance3• How-
ever, it is financed by taxes and contributions. Its purpose is to shield 
workers in the lowest income deciles from future benefit cuts in public 
pensions. 
1. Pillar The first pillar refers to public pension systems, financed on a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Public pension systems are usually mandatory 
2See Holzmann and Hinz (2005 ). 
3See Deutsche R.entenversichenmg Bund (DRV) (2007b) for a description of the new regulations. 
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and provide old age pensions in addition to disability and survivor pen-
sions. The German pension insurance ( 'Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung 
(GRV)') has provided extremely generous old age as well as disability 
and survivor pensions until recently, accounting for about 85% of re-
tirement income of current pensioners4 • This is changing slowly as the 
demographic transition and misled incentive effects of past reforms have 
set the German PAYG system under financial pressure. 
2. Pillar According to the World Bank, the second pillar comprises manda-
tory, private capital-funded pension schemes. For Germany, such a 
mandatory private coverage does not exist. Instead, voluntary com-
pany pension schemes embody the second pillar. They are offered by 
the employer and are capital-funded. Traditionally, company pension 
schemes have played a minor role in Germany (roughly 10% of old 
age income5), particularly when compared to other countries, such as 
the Netherlands. This will change as a result of the reforms described 
below. 
3. Pillar The third pillar comprises voluntary, private individual pension 
arrangements in the form of regular payments from some annuitized 
capital stock. In Germany, these were traditionally life insurance poli-
cies that comprised around 5% of old age income6. As the second pillar, 
the third pillar will play an increasing role for future retirees. 
4. Pillar Finally, real-estate assets, cheap access to health services etc. are 
comprised under the fourth pillar. In Germany, property plays a large 
role for pensioners. Access to health services is provided via the pub-
lic ( as well as additional private) health insurance system that in the 
past, similarly to the pension system, provided generous services but 
currently faces similar pressures to the public pension system. 
4See Borsch-Supan, Miegel, Bromhacher Steiner, Bovenberg, Mijdam, Disney, Wise, and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(1999). 
5See Borsch-Supan, Miegel, Brombacher Steiner, Boven berg, Mijdam, Disney, Wise, and Schmidt-Heb be! 
(1999). 
6See again Borsch-Supan, Miegel, Brombacher Steiner, Bovenberg, Mijdam, Disney, Wise, and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1999). 
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In the remainder of my thesis, I will focus on the first, second and third 
pillars. The basic features of the first pillar will be described in this section. 
Supplementary pensions (second and third pillar) will be discussed in the 
context of the German pension reform process discussed in section 3.3 and 
taken up again in section 3.6. 
3.2.1. Coverage and Contributions 
The German public pension system features very broad mandatory coverage 
of workers. Only civil-servants and the self-employed are not subject to 
mandatory coverage7. Contributions are administered like a payroll tax, 
levied equally on employees and employers. Total contributions are 19.9% of 
the first 4.550 Euro ( end of 2007) of monthly gross income ( upper earnings 
threshold, about twice the average monthly gross wage). The contribution 
rate has been steadily rising since the late 1960s, and the upper earnings 
threshold has been used as an additional financing instrument, increasing 
considerably faster than wage growth. 
These contributions finance roughly 70% of the budget of the German 
pension insurance. The remaining 30% are financed by subsidies from the 
federal government. These subsidies are also used to fine-tune the PAYG 
budget constraint because the system has a reserve of only 0.2 to 1.5 months 
worth of benefit expenditures. As opposed to a unified budget such as in 
the U.S., transfers can be made from the government to the public pension 
insurance, but not in reverse. 
3.2.2. Pension Benefits and Pension Levels 
The German public pension system provides old age pensions for workers 
aged 60 and older, disability benefits for workers below age 60 which are 
converted to old age pensions latest at the statutory retirement age ( currently 
age 65) and survivor benefits for spouses and children. In addition, pre-
retirement (i.e. retirement before age 60) has been possible through several 
channels (mainly unemployment) in the past and, until recently, women and 
7Until 1998, workers with earnings below the official minimum earnings threshold (15% of average monthly 
gross wage) also were exempted from the public pension system contributions. 
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3.2. Basic Principles of the German Pension System 
workers with a long service history were allowed to retire earlier than the 
statutory retirement age with full benefits. 
Benefit computation. Benefits are strictly work-related and are computed 
over the lifetime. They can be interpreted as the product of three elements: 
(1) the 'earnings points' (EP) which reflect the employee's relative earnings 
position in each year, (2) an adjustment factor (AF) according to the pension 
type and (since the 1992 reform) the retirement age, and (3) a reference pen-
sion value - the 'current pension value' (PV). The annual value of a pension 
Pt,i in year t for pensioner i can be computed as follows: 
(3.1) Pi,t = E~,RA X AFi,RA X P½ 
Earnings points (EP) The German point system dates back until 1957, 
when the PAYG system was introduced. Earnings points are expressed 
as a multiple of the average annual contribution (roughly speaking, the 
relative earnings position) in each working year: one EP corresponds 
to average earnings in that year, 0.5 EPs to 50% of average earnings, 
and 2 EPs to earnings twice as large as average earnings in that year. 
These earnings points are granted for each year of service life and are 
accumulated at retirement. Years of service life comprise not only years 
of active contributions but also years of contributions on behalf of the 
employee (e.g. during periods of unemployment) and years that are 
counted as service years even when no contributions were made at all. 
These include years of military service, some allowance for advanced 
education (only for older cohorts), three years for each child's upbring-
ing for one of the parents etc. Unlike in many other countries there is 
neither an upper bound of service years entering the benefit calculation, 
nor can workers choose certain years in their earnings history and drop 
others. However, a minimum number of service years (at least 5) has 
to be reached in order to become eligible for the different benefit types. 
Adjustment factor (AF) Before 1992, the adjustment factor took on values 
between 0.25 and 1 depending on the applicable benefit type (old age, 
disability or survivor pension). It is one for a normal old age pension. 
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Since the 1992 reform, the adjustment factor has an additional second 
element: it adjusts pension entitlements to the retirement age (RA), 
reducing the pension base in the case of early retirement and increasing 
the pension base in the case of retirement after the statutory retirement 
age. 
Current pension value (PV) This is the crucial link between worker's earn-
ings and pensioners' benefits. The current pension value is indexed to 
the annual changes in the level of wages and salaries net of pension 
contributions and thus enables pensioners to share in the rising pros-
perity generated by the economy. This link between changes in workers' 
earnings and pensioners' benefits is specified as a mathematical 'benefit 
indexation formula' in the law. 
The first two factors make up the 'personal pension base', while the third 
factor determines the income distribution between current workers and the 
stock of pensioners. The combination of the first three factors is unique to the 
German pension system and provides a strong link between lifetime income 
and pension benefits. Hence, differently from the U.S., redistribution plays 
only a minor role in the German pension system8• 
The current reform process will not change this. Rather, since 1992, the 
cost cutting reforms have largely concentrated on the fourth factor and re-
defined how changes in the average earnings of workers affect the size of 
pensions. Note the formula is applied to the entire stock of pensioners, not 
only to new entrants. Hence, the German system is time, not cohort, ori-
ented. This crucial difference makes reform easier, than in other pension 
systems (e.g. Italy and Sweden), if burden sharing is an agreed principle 
among voters. I will come back to this in chapter 4. 
8See e.g. Casmir (1989} for a comparison across countries. Note also that there have been elements of 
redistribution in the individual benefit indexation formula in the past. One such element was introduced 
in 1972 when earnings points could not fall below 0.75 for years of contributions before 1972 provided 
a worker had a service life of at least 35 years. A similar rule was introduced in the 1992 reform: for 
contributions between 1973 and 1992, annual earnings points below 0.75 are multiplied by 1.5 up to the 
maximum of 75, effectively reducing the redistribution for workers with relative wage positions below 50%. 
In 2001, this system has been abolished in favor of the guaranteed minimum pension ( 'Grundsicherung'} 
(see above). 
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Disability pensions. There are three ways to claim disability benefits ( 'Er-
werbsminderungsrente' (EM)). One has to (1) be physically disabled to at 
least 50%, or (2) pass a strict earnings test, or (3) pass a weaker earnings 
test. The strict earnings test is passed if the worker is unable to work at least 
3 hours a day. In this case the full old age benefits are paid. The weaker 
earnings test is passed if the worker can only work less than six hours a day. 
In this case, disability pensions are only half of the applicable old age pension 
unless the worker remains unemployed, then full benefits are also paid9• 
This definition of disability and the associated earnings tests are relatively 
new and were implemented as a part of the Riester Reform in 2001. Previ-
ously, the term disability applied not only to health but also to labor market 
reasons, meaning that a person could receive disability pensions when he 
was no longer capable to work at his job. Under these old regulations, the 
strict earnings test was passed if the earnings capacity was reduced below 
the minimum earnings threshold for any reasonable occupation ( 'Erwerb-
sunfahigkeit' (EU)). The weaker earnings test was passed when no vacancies 
for the worker's specific job description were available and the worker had 
to face an earnings loss of at least 50% when changing to a different job 
( 'Berufsunfahigkeit' (BU)). In the 1970s and 1980s, the rules were frequently 
used as a device to keep unemployment rates down and German jurisdiction 
interpreted both rules very broadly, especially the applicability of the first 
rule. Jurisdiction also overruled the earnings test during disability retire-
ment. This lead to a share of EU-type disability pensions for more than 90% 
of all disability pensions10. 
After average retirement ages had dropped considerably for more than two 
decades setting the system under financial stress, this generous interpretation 
was amended in the form of the 2001 Riester Reform. For cohorts born before 
February 1961, protection of confidence regulations still allow acquiring BU-
type disability pensions in form of the lower new EM-type pension if the 
person can only work less than six hours in his job but is capable of working 
at least six hours in another job. Under the new plan, persons who received 
a disability pension in December 2000 maintain their entitlements as long 
as the original reasons persist, regardless of whether these entitlements were 
9For a thorough description of these rules, see Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (DRY) {2007a). 
10See e.g. Riphahn (1995) for an analysis of German disability rules. 
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temporary or for an unlimited period. 
Survivor pensions. Survivor pensions are 55% ( 'large widow pension') of 
the deceased spouse's applicable pension, and given to surviving spouses aged 
45 and up, or if there children are in the household, otherwise 25% ( 'small 
widow pension'). These regulations have also only recently been adjusted 
following the 2001 Riester reform, as before, there was a large widow pension 
of 60%. Instead, there is now a bonus for raising a child under the age 
of three. Since 2002, the smaller widow pension has been restricted to a 
period of two years. Certain earnings tests apply if the surviving spouse 
has his own income or pension. However, this is only relevant for a very 
small (below 10%) share of widows among today's pensioners. Since 2002, 
upon retirement,couples can decide to split their total earnings points in 
half and each receive a pension which is continually paid if one spouse dies 
( 'Rentensplitting ') 11 . 
Pre-retirement. In addition to benefits from the public pension system, 
transfer payments (mainly unemployment compensation) have, until recently, 
enabled what is referred to as 'pre-retirement'. At the end of the 1990s, labor 
force exit before age 60 was frequent. About 45% of all men retired by the 
age of 59. Approximately half retired due to disability, whereas the other half 
made use of one of the many official and unofficial pre-retirement schemes. 
Unemployment compensation has been used as pre-retirement income in 
an unofficial scheme inducing very early retirement. Workers entered such a 
scheme much earlier than age 60 and were paid a negotiable combination of 
unemployment compensation and a supplement or severance pay, as pension 
for the unemployed could then start at age 60. As the rules of unemployment 
pensions and the duration of unemployment benefits changed, so did the un-
official retirement ages. Age 56 was particularly frequent in West Germany 
because unemployment compensation is paid for up to three years for elderly 
workers. It is followed by the lower unemployment aid. Earlier retirement 
ages could be induced by paying the worker the difference between the last 
salary and unemployment compensation for three years; and for further years 
11 An overview of these rules can be found in Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (DRV) (2007d). 
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the difference between the last salary and unemployment aid. This was de-
pendant on the social plan which a firm would negotiate with the workers 
before restructuring the work force. In addition, early retirement at age 58 
was made possible by an official pre-retirement scheme in which the employer 
received a subsidy from the unemployment insurance if a younger employee 
was hired. While the first (and unofficial) pre-retirement scheme was very 
popular and presented a convenient way to overcome the strict German labor 
laws, the (official) second scheme was less commonly used12 . 
Exceptional rules for women and long-time insured. Last, special regu-
lations apply for women as well as workers with a contribution history of at 
least 35 years. Both groups could retire earlier than the statutory retirement 
age (age 60 for women and age 63 for the long-time insured) with full benefits 
as a result of the 1972 reform13. However, this has been changed over the 
course of the 1992 reforms. 
Standard pension level. In Germany, the size of pension benefits is typ-
ically measured in relation to average wages. These pension levels in the 
official statistics are displayed for the so-called standard pensioner. The 
standard pensioner is a fictitious person who worked for 45 years, earned the 
average wage in each year and retired at the statutory retirement age of 65. 
He is thus credited 45 earnings points EPstrd, which multiplied by the cur-
rent pension value PVi in a specific year t gives his annual pension income14 . 
The pension level P L1 is defined as this standard pensioner's pension divided 
by average wages of the labor force of the same year.: 
(3.2) PL = (EPstrd x PVi) t AGWt 
The pension level is to be distinguished from the replacement rate or level 
that describes the individual pension income relative to the last or average 
12See Bundesministerium fiir Arbeit und Sozialordnung (BMA) (2002) for a description of the institutional 
rules as well as Backer (1999) for an assessment of the set incentive effects. 
13For a description of possible pathways to retirement for women, see Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund 
(DRV) (2007c). 
14Note that AF= I for the standard pensioner. 
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individual wage income during the working life15 . Pension levels generally 
can be expressed in gross or net terms. However, their precise definition has 
been changed repeatedly over the past decade16 . Currently, gross pension 
and (modified) net pension levels before tax are the two prevailing measures. 
The latter became important following the 2005 Old Age Income Act, which 
introduced deferred taxation for old age income. As this new regulation is 
phased in slowly with different applicable tax rates for different cohorts, net 
pension levels can no longer be displayed for the whole pensioner stock. As 
a result, net pension levels are now displayed before tax. 
Until recently, the German public pension system recorded comparably 
high pension levels (70% of net wages and approximately 48% of gross wages). 
These were maintained until the end of the 1990s, causing substantial in-
creases in the contribution rate. A main element of the latest pension reforms 
was to reduce pension levels and further limit increases in the contribution 
rate, as we will see in the next section. 
3.3. The German Pension Reform Process 
Since the 1972 reform, five dates have marked the pension reform process 
in Germany: the 1992/1999 pension reforms which introduced the first cost 
cutting measures after the overly generous 1972 reform, the Riester Reform 
in 2001 which pushed the system away from the former monolithic towards a 
multi-pillar one, the 2004 reform which further strengthened this paradigm 
shift, and finally, the 2007 reform which increased the statutory retirement 
age from currently 65 to 67. In this section, I will concentrate on these major 
reforms. An overview of German pension reforms since Bismarck until today 
is provided in Appendix B. 
15There is a vast literature on replacement rates. For the theoretical concept of replacement rates and 
alternative measures, see Hurd and Rohwedder (2006). See e.g. Hauser (1998) for a comparison of 
replacement rates on a household level for 14 OECD countries, including Germany. For replacement 
rates based on an individual level concept, see e.g. Burniaux, Dang, Fore, Forster, Mira d'Ercole, and 
Oxley (1998). 
16See appendix C for an overview of the different pension level concepts. 
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3.3.1. The 1992 and 1999 Reforms: Containing Early 
Retirement 
One of the main changes of the 1992 reform was to anchor benefits to net, 
rather than to gross, wages. This has implicitly reduced benefits since taxes 
and social security contributions have increased, reducing net relative to gross 
wages. This mechanism will become particularly important when population 
aging increases, as it implies an implicit mechanism of burden sharing be-
tween generations. 
The second important element of the 1992 reform was the introduction of 
'actuarial' adjustments of benefits to retirement age. Before 1992, adjustment 
of benefits to retirement age was only implicit via the number of service years 
accomplished. Since the 1992 reform, age 65 has been deemed to be the 
'pivotal age' for benefit computations. For each year of earlier retirement 
benefits are reduced by 3.6% (in addition to the effect of fewer service years). 
The 1992 reform also introduced rewards for later retirement in a systematic 
way. For each year of retirement postponed past the statutory retirement age, 
the pension is increased by 5% in addition to the 'natural' increase via the 
number of service years. There has been a discussion in the German pension 
literature on whether these 'actuarial' adjustments are truly actuarially fair 
in a mathematical sense. I will come back to this in chapter 4. 
The 1999 pension reform was supposed to lower pension levels according to 
a pre-specified 'demographic factor', which was a function of life expectancy 
and several correction factors. However, it was revoked after the change of 
government in 1998. A side effect of this reform, which was not revoked, was 
a gradual change of eligibility ages for pensions for women and unemployed 
from age 60 to age 65 and disability pensions from age 60 to 6317 . These 
changes are expected to be fully implemented by 2017, and effectively leave a 
'window of retirement' for healthy workers only if they have at least 35 years 
of service. This practically abolished early retirement options for women and 
the unemployed. 
These changes, together with the introduced actuarial adjustments, have 
effectively reduced incentives to retire early. As a result, average retirement 
17This increase in eligibility ages for all pension types actually had already been determined under the 1992 
reform. However, the 1999 reform greatly accelerated implementation of these changes. 
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ages for men have risen by 1.2 years, for women by 0.8 years between 1995 
and 200418 . Note that in the context of the 2007 reform, age limits have been 
modified once more and increased further. An overview of the cohort-specific 
eligibility regulations and adjustment paths for the various pension types is 
thus given later in Figure 3.1 on page 58, under the 2007 reform. 
3.3.2. The 2001 Reform: Shifting Towards a Multi-Pillar 
System 
On May 11, 2001, a new pension reform act was ratified in Germany, popu-
larly referred to as the 'Riester reform' after the then labor minister, Walter 
Riester. The key objective of the Riester reform was to stabilize contribution 
rates. The law actually states that contribution rates to the public pension 
system must stay below 20% until 2020 and 22% until 2030 ('Riester limits'). 
In order to reach these objectives, pensions were to be gradually reduced by 
a rather complex new benefit indexation formula from the level of 70% of 
average net earnings in 2000 to around 67% by the year 2030. The decline 
in public pensions was to be offset by supplementary (occupational and pri-
vate) pensions. In order to achieve this aim, supplementary pensions were 
subsidized, either by tax deferral and tax deduction, or by direct subsidies to 
individual and occupational pension plans. These supplementary pensions 
are, however, not mandated. Since many restrictions apply, it remains to be 
seen, how many workers actually start building up private pensions19. 
Changes in the benefit indexation formula. Before the 2001 reform, the 
objective of safeguarding standards of living in old age was considered to be 
met if pensions were worth 70% of average net wages. The system was es-
18Own calculations based on the results by Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004). For a further discussion 
about the effects of early retirement options on the retirement age also see Schmidt (1995), Riphahn and 
Schmidt (1997) and Siddiqui (1997). 
19The main restriction is on payment plans. Since additional private pension schemes are intended to 
supplement or replace benefits from the public pension scheme, the government decided that incentives 
will only be available for investment vehicles which guarantee payment of a life annuity, payable from 
the date of retirement. Investment vehicles which provide lump-sum disbursements are not subject to 
state subsidies. This restriction was met with considerable criticism in the public debate, as it excludes 
other forms of provision for old age (such as investments in old age or nursing homes). For a detailed 
overview of the restrictions, see appendix D. 
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sentially run by adapting the contribution rate to 70%, the standard pension 
level. Thus, pension benefits more than maintained their purchasing power 
over the entire retirement period. In 2001, the Riester Reform introduced a 
rather complex new adjustment formula, which relates changes in the current 
pension value (P½) to lagged changes in gross income (AGWt), modified by 
the actual contribution rate to public pensions ( Tt) and a fictitious contribu-
tion rate to the new private pension accounts (AV A1)2°, gradually increasing 
from 0.5% in 2003 to 4% in 2009. In addition, a somewhat awkward 'sensitiv-
ity factor' d1 was introduced. It was set to 100 until 2010 and was supposed to 
decrease to 90 in 2011 which effectively would have increased the sensitivity 
of PV to increases in T after 2010. 
AGWt-1 f&i -AV At-I - Tt-1 PVi = PVi-1--- X ~d=--------
AGWt-2 frJo -AV At-2 - Tt-2 
(3.3) 
The complex design of the formula reflects the balance between the two 
opposing aims of the reform: (1) to keep the contribution rate below a fixed 
level (20% until 2020, 22% until 2030), and (2) to keep the redefined standard 
pension level above 67% until 203021 • Both conflicting aims are now part of 
the German pension law. If either of these aims are violated, the law requires 
government action. Note that the awkward jump in the sensitivity factor d1 
reflects these aims since the system dependency ratio remains still flat until 
2010 and then quickly rises. 
Direct savings subsidy and tax deductible special expenses for individual 
Riester pensions. All employed and certain self-employed workers who pay 
personal contributions to a certified retirement pension policy are entitled to 
receive a direct retirement savings subsidy. The subsidy is paid directly into 
the beneficiary's saving account. A basic subsidy and a child subsidy for each 
child for which child benefits were received during the previous year is paid. 
Child subsidies are payable to the mother. In the case of married couples, 
both partners receive a basic subsidy if they have each taken out their own 
supplementary private pension policy. In addition, non-entitled partners 
20 AV A= 'Altersvorsorgeanteil'. 
21 See again appendix C for an overview of the various pension level definitions in Germany. 
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Table 3.1. - Direct Savings Subsidies 
From (year} on Savings rate Basic subsidy Child subsidy 
(€/year} (€/year) 
2002 1% 38 46 
2004 2% 76 92 
2006 3% 114 138 
2008 4% 154 185 
Source: Author's compilation based on current legislation. 
Table 3.2. - Minimum Savings 
Year Number of children 
2002 - 2004 







Two or more 
30 
60 
Source: Author's compilation based on current legislation. 
(such as mothers not in paid employment) are also entitled to receive the full 
subsidy for their own retirement pension policy provided that the respective 
married partner who is subject to compulsory insurance contributions has 
paid his minimum personal contribution to their supplementary retirement 
pension policy ( see below). 
Table 3.1 shows the maximum incentive subsidies available as of 2002. 
In order to qualify for the maximum subsidy, the beneficiary must invest a 
specified percentage of his gross earnings ( denoted as 'savings rate'). This 
percentage increases until 2008 in four steps ('Riester staircase'). The per-
centage is applied to the actual earnings level, capped at the same level as 
the PAYG contributions are (about twice average earnings). If less money is 
invested, the state subsidy is reduced accordingly. The scheme is complicated 
by the fact that the subsidy is included in the savings amount. Hence, the 
actual savings rate necessary for the maximum subsidy is lower than the 
percentages indicated in the second column of Table 3.1. In turn, certain 
minimum amounts are necessary, see Table 3.2. 
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Source: Author's compilation based on current legislation. 
Alternatively, qualifying retirement savings can be deducted as 'special 
allowances' from income taxes. This is usually more advantageous for work-
ers with higher than average earnings. Savings rates, caps etc. are the 
same as in the subsidy case. Table 3.3 shows the maximum tax-deductible 
contributions to private retirement savings accounts. 
As shown in Tables 3.1- 3.3, the subsidies for private old age provision are 
being phased in rather slowly. Together with the restriction in investment 
plans, this has led to a rather slow uptake of Riester pensions. The Riester 
reform did not produce the 'big bang' which a fundamental reform might 
need in order to change habits of old age provision. 
Note that while old age pension contributions will be tax exempt during 
the saving phase, pension payments during the benefit phase will be taxed in 
full as normal income. This applies to all benefits regardless of whether these 
accrue from contributions, subsidies or capital gains. One may regard this 
as another form of subsidy (an implicit tax credit), since taxes occur later in 
life and usually at a lower rate due to progressivity22 . 
Direct salary deduction for occupational pension schemes. The Riester 
reform remained largely undecided regarding the role of occupational pen-
sions versus individual accounts. Traditionally, occupational pensions have 
played a minor role in Germany, particularly compared to other countries. 
On the other hand, occupational pensions should not provide a psychological 
substitute for private pensions. In the end additional subsidies were intro-
22For a further discussion of taxation principles for pensions, see Biirsch-Supan and Liihnnann (2000). 
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duced with the Riester-Reform in order to strengthen occupational pensions. 
Arrangements may be based both on gross or net pay. If they are based on 
net pay, there is a large implicit subsidy since the converted salary may not 
only be subject to deferred taxation, but can also be exempt from social se-
curity contributions. If they are based on gross pay, contributions may enjoy 
the same direct subsidies or tax relief as contributions to individual accounts, 
as long as the occupational pensions meet certain criteria which are less re-
strictive than the criteria for individual pension plans. Which contribution 
rules apply depends on the chosen investment vehicle and the incentives they 
attract23. Collective bargaining agreements, however, have precedence over 
the right to convert salary. 
3.3.3. The 2004 Reform: Introducing the Sustainability 
Factor 
When it became obvious that the Riester reform measures would not suffice 
to meet the contribution rate and pension level targets, a new reform com-
mission, the 'Commission for Sustainability in Financing the German Social 
Insurance Systems', popularly referred to as the Rurup Commission after its 
chairman, Bert Rurup, was established in November 200224 . Its twin objec-
tives were those of the Riester reform: to stabilize contribution rates while 
ensuring appropriate future pension levels. 
The Rurup Commission met in 2003, and faced a very different situation 
than Riester had in 2001. Unexpectedly high unemployment rates, the poor 
performance of the German economy, and extremely low growth rates precip-
itated a short-run financial crisis of the pension system and created a sense of 
urgency for reform. Moreover, the electorate became increasingly aware that 
stabilizing social security contributions in total labor compensation would be 
essential to enhance future growth. This paradigm shift away from thinking 
about pension claims towards thinking about financing possibilities had a 
noticeable impact on the commission's work. 
23See appendix E for an overview of the various investment vehicles and how they are subsidized. 
24The commission was in charge of making reform proposals for the pension system, the health care and 
the long-term care insurance. In the following I will only refer to the pension proposals. 
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In 2003, the Riirup Commission published a reform proposal that com-
prised two major elements: a gradual increase of the normal retirement age 
from 65 to 67 years, and a further modification of the pension benefit index-
ation formula linking benefits to the system dependency ratio25 . Introduc-
tion of the 'sustainability factor' came into effect with the pension reform in 
spring 2004, while the shift in the retirement age was legislated three years 
later under the 2007 reform. 
The sustainability factor. The commission proposed to extend the Riester 
benefit indexation formula by a 'sustainability factor'. This factor reflects the 
development of the relative number of contributors to pensioners, the system 
dependency ratio (SDR), which is the most important long-term determinant 
of pension financing26 . The new benefit indexation formula looks as follows: 
(3.4) P½ = PVi-i AGW1-2 x 1 -AV At-2 - Tt-2 ((l _ SDRt-2) o: + l) 
AGWt-3 l - AV At-3 - Tt-3 SDRt-3 
It includes the sustainability factor in the inner brackets, weighted by o:, 
and replaces the one-time shift in the somewhat awkward 'sensitivity param-
eter' d1, see section 3.3.2. If o: equals zero, the former Riester pension adjust-
ment formula would remain unchanged. If o: equals one, the new indexation 
formula would imply a purely income-oriented pension benefit adjustment 
policy. A weighting factor o: of 0.5 would spread the additional financial bur-
den resulting from the demographic challenges somewhat equally between 
contributors and beneficiaries. The commission set the value of o: at 0.25 
by arguing that this would fulfill the Riester objectives to keep the contri-
bution rate under 20% until 2020 and under 22% until 203027 • I later show 
in section 3.5 that this is the case, however only under the underlying demo-
graphic, labor market and economic assumptions, and after both proposed 
25See Komrnission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003a) for 
the original German report and Kommission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen 
Sicherungssysteme (2003b) for an English summary. 
26Strictly speaking, the sustainability factor will link benefits to the 'equivalized system dependency ratio' 
in order to avoid distortions created by extremely low contributions and/or pension benefits. This ratio 
standardizes the number of pensioners by converting standard pensions into the number of 'equivalence 
pensioners'. The number of 'equivalence contributors' is likewise calculated by standardizing the average 
earner. 
27For a simulation analysis on the effects of alternative o see Borsch-Supan, Reil-Held, and Wilke (2003). 
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reform measures ( the sustainability factor and the increase in the statutory 
retirement age) have been implemented. 
The new pension formula led to further decreases in pension benefit levels 
vis-a-vis the path planned by the Riester reform. In contrast to the earlier 
proposed but never enforced 'demographic factor' in 1999, the sustainability 
factor considers not only the development of life expectancy but the entire 
demographic development (including changes in migration and notably in 
birth rates), as well as the development of the labor market. This is important 
as the inevitable reduction of the working-age population can be compensated 
by a higher labor force participation of women and elderly workers, as was 
shown in chapter 2. The introduction of the sustainability factor directly links 
pension adjustments to the crucial factors determining pension financing, 
namely the number of contributors and benefit recipients. This gives the 
new pension benefit indexation formula a self-stabilizing effect. 
Further strengthening of second and third-pillar pensions. In order to 
compensate for the larger decrease in pension levels, further strengthening of 
the second and third-pillars pensions was necessary. Since the uptake of the 
funded supplementary Riester pension had been modest in the first years after 
the introduction, the commission proposed a host of administrative changes 
to occupational and private pensions in order to make the system easier to 
handle, and thus more popular. Among these were the expansion of the group 
of entitled persons to all tax payers, dynamic pension benefits and increased 
transparency in the private pension provision. These administrative changes 
accompanied the proposed introduction of an EET-type ex post taxation of 
private pensions28 • 
3.3.4. The 2007 Reform: Raising the Statutory Retirement 
Age to 67 
The Riirup Commission had proposed a step-wise increase of the normal re-
tirement age from 65 to 67 by 2035. This increase would corresponded to 
roughly two-thirds of projected changes in life expectancy. The idea was to 
28 A parallel commission, also headed by Bert Riirup, proposed to keep pension contributions and capital 
gains tax exempt (symbolized by 'EE'), and to tax benefits (symbolized by 'T'). 
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offset future increases in the total value of accumulated benefits generated by 
a prolonged life span through later retirement. In order to prevent substitu-
tion into early retirement and disability pensions as a result of the increase 
in the retirement age, the commission also proposed an increase of eligibility 
ages for early retirement (at the same extent and schedule as the normal 
retirement age). These propositions were finally implemented in spring 2007. 
Increases in the statutory retirement age are phased in slowly, starting in 
2012 and ending in 203029 • Between 2012 and 2029, the statutory retirement 
age is adjusted first each year by one month from age 65 to 66, and then each 
year by two months from age 66 to 67. The phase-in is cohort-oriented, it 
will affect cohorts younger than 1947. For the 1964 and younger cohorts a 
statutory retirement age of 67 finally applies. 
In addition, eligibility ages for disability pensions are raised from age 63 to 
65 from 2017 to 2029 for handicapped persons. Early retirement with deduc-
tions is raised from age 60 to 62. Maximum deductions for early retirement 
are thus 10.8%. For long-time insured workers, disability pensions can still 
be received at age 63 without deductions if workers have at least 35 service 
years (until 2023) or 40 years (from 2024 on). 
Since there were additional worries about the coverage for workers subject 
to extreme physical wear and tear due to long years of hard work, a new 
pension type was introduced making it possible for workers with a service 
life of at least 45 years to retire two years earlier without any actuarial 
adjustments. Figure 3.1 summarizes the eligibility regulations for all pension 
types30 • 
3.4. A Simulation Model of the German Pension 
System 
In order to evaluate how the reforms described in the previous section will 
affect the long-term financial sustainability of the public pension system and 
which role supplementary pensions will play in the future, I develop a detailed 
simulation model of the German pension system. The model comprises two 
29See Fuchs (2007). 
3°For a thorough historical overview of the changes in eligibility regulations, see Kaldybajewa and Kruse 
(2006). 
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Cohort 
--Regular old-age pension 
- - - - - · Longterm insured (min. 35 years, without adjustments) 
--Longterm insured (min. 45 years, without adjustments) 
- - ·· Unemployed/Old-age parttime (without adjustments) 
- - - - Women (without adjustments) 
- - - - Disabled (without adjustments) 
- - - - Longterm insured (min. 35 years, preretirement With adjustments) 
- - Unemployed/Old-age parttime (preretirement with adjustments) 
- - -Women (preretirement with adjustments) 
- - - Disabled (preretirement with adjustments) 
Sov.rce: Author's compilations based on data by the German Pension Insv.mnce (DRV, 
'IUUJW.dev.t.cherentenversicherv.ng.de) and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (BMAS, www.bmas.de). 
parts. The first part models the financial development of the public PAYG 
system. The second part models the development of the state-subsidized 
supplementary Riester pensions under the assumption that workers will save 
the recommended (and subsidized) savings amount of 4% of wages (recall 
Figure 3.1). Both parts of the model are described below. 
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3.4.1. Modeling the German PAYG System 
This part of the model is based on an aggregate, macro level approach. Each 
year, the number of contributors and pensioners in the system is derived from 
the underlying population and labor market projections presented in chap-
ter 2. The system's revenues and expenditures are then computed according 
to the development of wages, social security contribution rates and existing 
pension claims. Pension claims are derived from accumulated cohort-specific 
earnings points that account for different labor force participation across co-
horts. The current pension value that determines pension levels and the value 
of pension claims is annually recalculated according to a specified benefit in-
dexation formula. Each year, revenues and expenditures have to match. If 
this is not the case, the contribution rate is adjusted up or down. This is 
done in an iterative process until the budget constraint is met. Note that 
changes in the contribution rate are reflected also in the development of the 
current pension value in subsequent years. 
Revenues 
There are three main sources of revenues for the German pension insurance: 
1. contributions by employees and employers 
2. contributions by the German Federal Employment Office for the cur-
rently unemployed and 
3. government subsidies. 
Contributions by employees and employers. The size of the mandatory 
contributions by employees and employers CfAB in a given year t can be 
derived from Equation 3.5: 
(3.5) cfAB = Tt x AGW1 x f3 x LABt 
Here, Tt is the contribution rate for the pension system and AGW1 is the 
average gross wage of the insured labor force in year t. f3 x LAB1 designates 
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the size of the insured labor force, with LAB1 representing the number of em-
ployed persons in year t and /3 representing the share of those with mandatory 
insurance. This share is approximately 8031 . In terms of the model, f3 can be 
chosen without restrictions, but must remain constant in the course of the 
simulation. 
Contributions by the German Federal Employment Office for the Un-
employed. Since 1995, the German Federal Employment Office has been 
paying contributions to the pension system for those unemployed receiving 
benefits. As a basis for the calculations, the office uses 80% of the wage 
compensation payments32 . In general, these will amount to 60%33 of the 
last overall net wage that the unemployed has earned. Therefore, the Ger-
man Federal Employment Office pays about 48% of the contributions that 
the individual would have paid if he were employed. I make the simplify-
ing assumption that unemployment lasts for one year, as this ensures that 
there exists an average net wage from the previous year that can be used as 
the basis for computations. This leads to the following Equation 3.6 for the 
payments by the German Federal Employment Office Cf into the pension 
system: 
(3.6) cf = r1 x 0.48 x ANW1-1 x u1 
ANW1_ 1 denotes the average net wage of the insured labor force in the pre-
vious year, and U1 is the number of unemployed in year t. 
Government Subsidies. In addition to the contributions by employees, em-
ployers and the employment office, the pension system receives a number of 
government subsidies. Since 1998 one has to distinguish between the regular 
and the additional federal subsidy. 
• The 'Regular Federal Subsidy' (RFS) is computed on a yearly basis, 
extrapolating according to the development of average gross wages and 
31See Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager (VDR) (2002), pp. 248-249. 
32Cf. §166(1) SGB VI. 
33Cf. §129 SGB III states certain conditions according to which receivers of unemployment benefits can 
claim an increased rate of 67%. Only the rate of 60% is applied for calculations in the model. 
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salaries as well as the contribution rate to the pension system, as de-
scribed by Equation 3. 734 . 
(3.7) 
AGWt-1 Tt 
RF St= RFS1-1 x AGW, x -
t-2 Tt-1 
• The 'Additional Federal Subsidy' (AFS) is an additional flat-rate pay-
ment to cover benefits that are not funded by contributions35 . It is 
adjusted to changes in the value added tax:36 Tv A on a yearly basis. In 
addition, it is raised by an additional supplement Sup, which is funded 
from additional revenues from the petroleum and electricity taxes and 
extrapolated according to the development of wages (Equation 3.8). 
(3.8) 
TtA AGWt-1 
AF St= AFS1-1 x VA+ Supt x AGW, 
Tt-1 t-2 
Besides the federal subsidies discussed above, the federal government 
provides additional contributions, in order to finance child support sup-
plements to pensions. These contributions are not included in the 
model. Consistently, the numerous rules and regulations concerning 
credits for child support will also not be portrayed on the expenditure 
side of the model. 
Other Sources of Revenues. In addition to these three main sources, there 
are further revenue items, e.g. the long-term care insurance contributions37 , 
contributions from sick-pay38, contributions from voluntarily insured persons 
and reimbursements from public funds. These items account for a very minor 
share of the total budget and are therefore not included in the model. 
34Cf. §213(2) SGB VI. 
35Cf. §213 SGB VI. 
36Note, that the value added tax is assumed to remain constant for the computations presented in this 
thesis. 
37Cf. §44 SGB XI as well as §166(2) SGB VI. 
38Cf. §166(1) SGB VI. 
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Expenditures 
The main expenditures of the system are the following: 
1. pension payments to pensioners, 
2. contributions of the pension insurance to the health insurance for pen-
sioners, 
3. expenditures for rehabilitation measures and 
4. administration costs. 
Pension Payments. The pension payments Pt to pensioners in year t are 
computed according to Equation 3.9: 
c=t-ama:i: 
(3.9) Pt= P½ X L (RETc,t X EPc) 
c=t-RA 
P½ designates the current pension value, i.e. the value of one earnings 
point in year t, RETc,t is the number of pensioners of a cohort c in this year 
and E Pc is the sum of earnings points for a cohort c. 
The current pension value P½ is updated yearly using the applicable ben-
efit indexation formula. The model allows to choose from various historical, 
current and potential alternative benefit indexation formulas. 
The group of pensioners receiving benefits through the pension system 
RETc,t is composed of members of different cohorts c that have retired. The 
earliest time of retirement is RA ( RA = retirement age) - therefore the 
youngest cohort whose members are among the current pensioners is the 
cohort c = t - RA. llmax designates the highest age that a pensioner can 
attain - therefore the oldest cohort whose members are among the current 
pensioners is the cohort c = t - llmax· 
To determine the pension claims of the current pensioners, i.e. the sum 
of earnings points over all cohorts, cohort specific earnings points EPc are 
computed. Each pensioner is assigned the cohort-specific earnings points of 
his cohort. The pension claims of each cohort are calculated on the basis 
of the cohort's specific employment history Hc,a· This history is derived 
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{2001). 
by calculating the share of employed men in the labor force (and women 
respectively) for each age a of a cohort c and multiplying it with the age 
and sex-specific wage profile W Pa,s which applies to all cohorts equally, see 
Equation 3.10. These sex-specific wage profiles are derived from estimated 
wage profiles for Germany by Fitzenberger, Hujer, McCurdy, and Schnabel 
(2001) and are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
(3.10) 
H _ ~ LABc,a,s ca - L.....,, ( ) X W Pa,s, with 
' max LABc,a,s 
s ao->RA-1 
AGWas 
w Pa,s = '""'"" AGW. L.J L.J a,s 
a s 
Thus, if a cohort used its full labor force potential, the cohort's earnings 
would correspond exactly to the age and sex-specific wage profile. Taking 
the sum of the employment histories over all years in which members of the 
cohort were potentially employed - starting from the earliest possible entry 
into the labor market at age a0 and ending with the latest possible exit from 
the labor market at age RA - l - yields the cohort specific earnings points 
EPc, see Equation 3.1139 : 
39Note that in addition, the accumulated sum of earnings points for members of the cohort that retire prior 
to their statutory retirement age is reduced by the applicable adjustment factor. 
63 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
3. A Quarter Century of Reforms 
(3.11) 
RA-I 
EPc= L Hc,a 
a=ao 
Contributions to the Health Insurance of Pensioners. In addition to the 
pension payments, the public pension insurance also pays half of pensioners' 
health insurance contributions. The contribution rate to the health system 
rt enters exogenously into the model. Therefore the payments to the health 
insurance E{1 in year t can be computed according to Equation 3.12: 
(3.12) 
Here, P1 designates the pension benefit payments (see Equation 3.9). 
Pensioners are also obligated to make a 1.7% contribution to the long-term 
care insurance, which exists since 1995. Prior to April 2004, the public pen-
sion insurance covered half of these contributions, since then the pensioners 
are solely responsible for these payments. Therefore the contributions to the 
long-term care insurance are no longer among the expenditures of the public 
pension insurance. 
Rehabilitation Measures. Rehabilitation measures include actions to 
maintain, improve and recover (reduced) earnings capacity. Their aim is 
to reduce the number of disability pensions. The amount of rehabilitation 
payments Ef"ha is updated according to the development of average wages 
on a yearly basis as shown in Equation 3.13: 
(3.13) eReha _ eReha AGWt-1 t - t-1 AGWt-2 
Administration Costs. The yearly adjustment of the expected adminis-
tration costs Efdmin takes both changes of the current wage level and of 
the amount of current pensioners into account. The costs are described by 
Equation 3.14: 
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(3.14) 
EAdmin = EAdmin X AGWt-l X (1 + 0 X 
t t-t AGWt-2 (
RETt-1 _ i)) 
RETt-2 
with O 5 0 5 1 
Clearly, there is no one-to-one relationship between changes in the number 
of current pensioners and the administration costs in reality. For this reason, 
the factor 0 is introduced to the model, which measures the relationship be-
tween changes in the number of pensioners and changes in the administration 
costs. For the calculations in the model, a value of 0.1 is used, which is the 
actually observed average value over the past decade40 • 
Other Expenditures. There are two additional expenditure categories 
which only play a minor role and are therefore not included in the model. 
These are reimbursements of contributions and payments between different 
sub-insurances within the public pension insurance. 
Budget Restriction 
From the revenue and expenditure items discussed above the following budget 
restriction can be derived: 
(3.15) 
This budget restriction entails that the expenditures of the public pension 
insurance in every year t must be financed from the revenues of the same 
year41 . In principle, there are three possible approaches to this: 
Defined benefit system In the defined benefit approach, pension levels are 
annually adjusted according to a fixed benefit indexation formula. In 
order to ensure an annually balanced budget, the contribution rate is 
40See Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstriiger (VDR) (2007). Note that in 2006, administration costs 
amounted to 3.7 Mio. euros, i.e. around 1.6% of the total budget. 
41 As the condition that revenues exactly correspond to expenditures in every year will generally not be 
satisfied in reality, the law (§158 SGB VI) provides that the contribution rate for the following year 
has to be set in such a way that the so-called sustainability reserve is worth no less than 20% and no 
more than 150% of the total monthly expenditures of the pension insurance (§216ff. SGB VI). This 
sustainability reserve is not included in the model since it has little impact on the long-term financial 
development of the pension insurance. 
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adjusted such that the new pension level can be financed given the 
budget restriction. An example of this approach is the German gross 
wage adjustment from 1957 to 1992. 
Defined contribution system In contrast to the defined benefit approach, 
the defined contribution approach assumes a fixed contribution rate 
and adjusts pension levels such that the budget restriction is met. An 
example of this approach are the so-called freezing scenario42 where the 
contribution rates is set constant. A similar approach also applies to 
notional defined contribution (NDC) systems that will be treated in 
more detail in chapter 4. 
Hybrid systems In addition to these pure system forms, one can think of 
hybrid forms that are a mixture of the defined benefit and defined 
contribution approaches since they incorporate elements of both ap-
proaches. 
The current German system can be described as such a hybrid system43• 
Even though pension levels are annually adjusted according to a pre-specified 
formula and contribution rates adjust in order to finance this adjustment 
('defined benefit'), the link in the benefit indexation formula to the develop-
ment of contribution rates and the sustainability factor introduce elements 
of 'defined contribution' that limit increases in the contribution rate at the 
expense of pension levels. For the projections in the remainder of this chap-
ter, I therefore use this third approach that represents the current situation 
of the German PAYG pension system. 
3.4.2. Modeling the State Subsidized Private Riester 
Pension 
In order to model the state subsidized private Riester pension a representative 
'Standard Riester Pensioner' is introduced, who is defined by the following 
characteristics: 
42See e.g. Bi:irsch-Supan (2002a) for a simulation analysis on a freezing 'scenario for Germany. 
43See Bi:irsch-Supan (2004b) for a discussion on the German pension system as a hybrid in between defined 
benefit and defined contribution systems. 
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1. The person is a standard pensioner who worked for 45 years, always 
earned the average wage and retired at the statutory retirement age of 
65. 
2. The person signs a 'Riester contract' either immediately upon entering 
the workforce (at the age of 2044 ) or in 2002 when the 'Riester pension' 
was introduced, if the person was older than 20 years at this point of 
time. 
3. The person pays the maximum contribution that receives subsidies by 
the state every year without interruption45 . 
Based on this 'Standard Riester Pensioner' the resulting savings in the 
course of the contribution phase and the resulting pensions are computed. 
Note that the underlying 'Standard Riester Pensioner' is different for every 
cohort, since each cohort enters the Riester savings scheme at a different 
point in time. 
Contribution phase 
The respective 'Riester savings' Sc,t of cohort c in year t are computed ac-
cording to Equation 3.16: 
(3.16) Sc,t = STt X AGWt-1 
St designates the savings rate in year t and AGW1_ 1 is the average gross 
wage of the previous year. This yearly savings amount of c is accumulated 
throughout all years of employment of this cohort until the end of the working 
period to total savings Sc, with the already accumulated capital each year 
earning the interest rater, which has to be chosen in the model. Therefore 
the following relationship results: 
(3.17) 
44 A standard pensioner, who retires at the legal pension age of 65, must have started working at the age of 
20 in order to have worked for 45 years. 
451n the course of the model, I assume that until 2008 savings are accrued according to the 'Riester staircase' 
and starting from 2009 4% of wages are saved annually. 
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Sc represents the accumulated value of the savings of the 'Standard Riester 
Pensioner' of cohort c over the entire working life. 
Pension phase 
The payments from the Riester savings scheme are calculated based on the 
accumulated savings Sc at the time of retirement. Cohort-specific 'Riester 
pensions' are either computed as constant or rising life-long annuities. The 
two approaches are described below46 . For the computations in this thesis, 
rising annuities are assumed. 
Constant life-long annuity. The constant life-long annuity R can be de-
rived from Equations 3.18 and 3.19: 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
. n-1 (1 + i) - 1 
A= AX Sc X (1 + i) X (l +if_ 
with nc ... conditional survival probability at age 65 of cohort c, 
i ... discount rate. 
To take the fact into account that the 'Riester products' provide (costly) 
annuities, the calculation is amended by the factor A, which represents risk-
and profit components, which are generally included in these products. For 
A = l the calculated pension is actuarially fair. Factoring in risk- and profit 
components as well as administrative costs, the value decreases to A < l. Von 
Gaudecker and Weber (2004) find in an empirical study that the resulting 
net present value of pension payments after controlling for these additional 
components in Germany is around 90% of the actual present value.47 In the 
model therefore A is set to 0.9. 
46Note that advanced payments are a.ssumed. For an overview of different calculation approaches regarding 
life-long annuities, see Gerber {1997), pp. 35ff. 
47See Von Gaudecker and Weber (2004), Table 10. 
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Progressive life-long annuity. In the case of progressive life-long annuities, 
the model assumes that pensions increase by a constant factor I each year. 
Therefore pensions grow geometrically, and the following relationship holds 
for the net present value Sc: 
(3.20) 
(-~-Ye -1 
Sc= ARA X (1 + i) X /~' (l + i) 
Rearranging Equation 3.20 yields the baseline pension in the first payment 
year ARA for cohort c - again taking heed of the factor A: 
(3.21) 
1 8 - (1 + i) 
ARA =AX Sc X (l + i) X ( 0 )nc 
(l+i) -1 
All later payments A1 result from increasing the previous year's pension 
by the factor 8: 
(3.22) At=c+64+z = ARA0z-l for z = 1, ... , nc 
3.5. Projections on the development of the 
German PAYG System 
We can now analyze to what extent the past reforms have stabilized the 
public pension system. The Riester reform was quite bold in writing into the 
law that the net standard pension level must not fall below 67% while the 
contribution rate at the same time must not exceed 20% until 2020 and 22% 
until 2030. This section looks at whether these promises can be kept. Are 
the past reforms sufficient in order to counteract the foreseen consequences 
of demographic change and stabilize the system? 
Based on the simulation model described in section 3.4 and the demo-
graphic and labor market forecasts used by the Rurup Commission depicted 
in chapter 2, this section presents projections of the future development of 
contribution rates and pension levels in the German public PAYG pension 
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system. Computations are based on the additional assumptions of a long-
term real wage growth rate of 1.5%, an inflation rate of also 1.5% and almost 
stable contribution rates to the unemployment, health and long-term care 
insurances48• Section 3.5.1 shows the projection results based on the current 
status quo after all the reforms of the past decades and looks at whether 
the Riester targets can be met. Section 3.5.2 then illustrates how the future 
development of contribution rates and pension levels has been affected by 
each of the described reforms. Finally, section 3.5.3 displays projections un-
der different demographic, labor market and economic growth assumptions 
in order to show to what extent projection results are affected by the set 
underlying assumptions. 
3.5.1. Future Contribution Rates and Pension Levels 
Figure 3.3 shows how contribution rates and pension levels are projected 
to develop after the latest pension reform in 2007. It can be seen that the 
contribution rate is slightly above 20% in 2020 but holds the set target of 
22% in 2030. Net standard pension levels decrease to 62% in 2030 and thus 
drop way below their 67%-threshold. 
However, as it was mentioned in section 3.2.2, net pension levels are no 
longer an appropriate measure since the introduction of deferred taxation for 
retirement income under the 2005 Old Age Income Act that will be phased-
in until 2040. Instead, a modified net pension level before tax was defined 
and Riester pension level targets were redefined accordingly to 46% in 2020 
and 43% in 2030. Another possible measurement is gross pension levels for 
which no target values were manifested by law but can be translated to 38% 
(2020) and 35% (2030) accordingly. As gross pension levels require the least 
additional assumptions and mirror best the core mechanisms of the German 
public PAYG pension system, I will refer to their development in the following 
as well as in most remaining parts of this thesis. Figure 3.4 displays projected 
pension levels according to these different definitions. Note that the original 
net pension level definition according to which pension levels under the old 
48Contribution rates to the unemployment insurance are assumed to remain constant at a level of 6.5% and 
contribution rates to the health system are assumed to remain constant at a level of 13.9%. Contribution 
rates to the long-term care system are assumed to rise from 1.7% to 1.95% from July 2008 on as it was 
decided by law. 
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Figure 3.3. - Development of Contribution Rates and Pension Levels 
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net wage adjustment remained stable at roughly 70% until the late 1990s 
and which was redefined in the context of the 2001 Riester Reform is also 
included in the graph. 
First, it can be seen that pension levels generally, independent of their 
specific definition, follow the same decreasing trend and run surprisingly 
parallel. Only between the old and new definition of net pension levels can 
the effect of the Riester staircase be observed. This postpones the decrease 
of newly defined net pension levels (section 3.2.2 and appendix C). Given the 
projections' underlying assumptions where total social security contributions 
other than to the public pension system quasi remain stable this pattern is to 
be expected. Worth noting, however, is that the modified standard pension 
level before tax remains above the set limits for both 2020 and 2030 while 
the set limits defined for net pension levels are violated (recall 3.3). The 
redefinition of the Riester targets from 67% of net pension levels to 46% 
(2020) and 43% (2030) of net pension levels before tax thus implicitly but 
considerably softened the Riester targets on pension levels. 
Under the assumed population, labor market, economic and (other) social 
security branches development and the status quo of the German PAYG 
pension system, the contribution and pension level targets codified in the 
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Figure 3.4. - Development of Pension Levels According to Different 
Pension Level Definitions 
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context of the 2001 Riester Reform and redefined with the introduction of 
the Old Age Income Act in 2005 can therefore be met. 
The scale of the reductions in pension levels also clearly demonstrates that 
public pension benefits will no longer be sufficient without supplementary 
pension provision, in safeguarding pensioners' standards of living in old age. 
We will come back to that in the next section (3.6). 
3.5.2. Stepwise Reform Effects 
If the Riester reform targets can now be met, to what extent did the different 
past reforms contribute to the development of contribution rates and pension 
levels? In the following, we will look at the stepwise reform effects. Figure 3.5 
illustrates the projected development of contribution rates and pension levels 
after each of the reforms. 
It shows that under the net indexation adjustment after the 1992 reform, 
contribution rates would have developed to roughly 30% by 2050, while gross 
standard pension levels would have not even dropped by 5% to a level of 
72 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
3.5. Projections on the development of the German PAYG System 





C: 26% 0 :c 
24% ::, 
.Q 





8 "' 0 "' 0 0 0 N 0 0 0 0 
N N N N N 
- after 1992 reform --o- after 2001 reform 









" :! 42% 
'" .., 40% C 







- after 1992 reform 
-<>- after 2004 reform 
Source: At1.lhor's computations. 
--o- after 2001 reform 




around 46% over the same time period49 . This clearly would not have been 
a sustainable system. The 2001 Riester Reform took a large step towards 
stabilization in that it reduced the projected increase in contribution rates 
49Recall that net pension levels (according to their original definition) would have remained roughly stable 
at a level of 70%. The reason that gross pension levels drop is that the wage gap between net and gross 
wages widens due to the increase in the contribution rate to the pension system. As for pensioners, the 
difference between gross and net pensions is much lower than the gap between gross and net wages, gross 
pensions decrease relative to average gross wages. 
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by roughly half. This came at the expense of pension levels that in return 
dropped by almost 9% by 2050. However, as Figure 3.5 shows, the Riester 
Reform itself would have not been sufficient to meet its own targets. Con-
tribution rates still rise to 21% by 2020 and 24% by 2030, while the gross 
pension level of 42% corresponds to a net pension level of 63% to 64% and 
thus would have remained above the set lower threshold50. 
The apparent failure of the Riester reform to reach its main objectives was 
not accidental. As mentioned earlier, overoptimistic demographic and eco-
nomic assumptions as a projection basis had been chosen in a fragile political 
compromise between reformists and unions that enabled the Riester reform 
package to pass the parliamentary hurdles. When the Rurup Commission 
took up its work in winter 2002, it was clear that more realistic population 
and labor market forecasts were needed. Recall that these are the ones most 
projections in this thesis are based on. But as only half of the commission's 
proposed reform package was put into law under the 2004 reform, namely 
the introduction of the sustainability factor, it can be seen from Figure 3.5 
that this still proved not to be sufficient in order to reach the set targets. 
Only when the second part of the reform package, the proposed increase in 
the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67, became law in 2007 did projected 
contribution rates and pension levels finally meet the targets51 . 
3.5.3. Demographic, Labor Market and Economic Growth 
Effects 
To what extent are these results driven by the underlying assumptions? Fig-
ure 3.6 depicts the projected development of contribution rates and gross 
standard pension levels under different population assumptions52 . 
50See also Bonin (2001) and Prognos (2001) for similar projection results at that time. 
51 Note that the computations in this subsection are all based on the same demographic and labor market 
projections. Whether a rather optimistic labor market forecast, for example, with presumed increases 
in the mean retirement age by two years until 2040 would have been realistic before the 2007 reform 
is questionable, though. The presented projections here neglect these potential behavioral effects. For 
future projections on the development of the German PAYG pension system that explicitly take such 
behavioral effects into account, see Bucher-Koenen and Wilke (2008). 
52Note that a different population forecast also implies different labor market outcomes as the labor market 
projections are based on the demographic input. In order to be able to show how different population 
assumptions affect the simulation results, I therefore replicate the Riirup Commission's labor market 
forecast with the labor market simulation model illustrated in chapter 2 and underlying Riirup Commis-
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Figure 3.6. - Development of Contribution Rates and Pension Levels 
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Compared to the Rurup Commission's projections, the GFSO lWl and 
MEA 3Wl.5 population scenarios both lead to a higher level of contribution 
rates. For the GFSO lWl scenario, a difference of 1.5 contribution points 
results by 2050, while in the case of the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario the difference 
sion 's population projections. It shows that the Riirup labor market forecast is equivalent to a scenario 
where until the year 2040, the female labor force participation rises to 0.7, the mean retirement age 
increases by 2 years, the labor entry age is reduced by 1 year and unemployment rates fall to 4.8%. 
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turns out even larger with approximately 2.5 contribution points. Pension 
levels in turn drop by 2 percentage points more under the GFSO lWl sce-
nario, and 3 percentage points more under the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario. This 
development is a result of the higher old age dependency ratios (OADR) in 
both the GFSO lWl (around 60% in 2050 in contrast to around 54% under 
the Riirup Commission's projections) and the MEA 3Wl.5 scenario (OADR 
of 65% in 2050). 
What are the effects if the labor force responds differently? Figure 3. 7 
shows how contribution rates and pension levels develop under the 'Status 
Quo' and 'Agenda 1005' scenario that were presented in chapter 2. Note that 
the Riirup scenario can be considered to be less optimistic than the Denmark 
scenario but more optimistic than the Agenda 1005 and status quo scenario 
that were presented in chapter 2. It can be seen that a more optimistic 
labor forecast, given the same underlying population assumptions, leads to 
lower contribution rates and higher pension levels. Under the 'Agenda 1005' 
scenario, contribution rates would turn out 0.6 contribution points higher, 
under the 'Status Quo' scenario even 2.5 contribution points higher. Pension 
levels in return drop by 0.7 percentage points more under the 'Agenda 1005' 
and 2.8 percentage points more under the 'Status Quo' scenario. 
Last, we examine the effects of different wage growth. Figure 3.8 illustrates 
the projected development of contribution rates and pension levels for real 
wage growth rates of g = 0% and g = 3%. Higher wage growth rates thereby 
lead to lower contribution rates and also to lower pension levels. A 1.5 per-
centage points higher wage growth rate decreases the rise in the contribution 
rate by 0.5 and increases the drop in pension levels by 0.3 percentage points. 
Note that the effects of a lower wage growth rate are symmetric. The ex-
planation for this level effect is as follows: A higher wage growth rate leads 
to higher contribution revenues that allow the contribution rate to decrease 
in the following year. Pension levels are then adjusted to this higher rise 
in wages and lower contribution rate, however, only partly. Since the pure 
adjustment to wages now would be higher (pension levels would decrease 
less), the sustainability factor is applied to a larger basis and exerts a larger 
effect on pension levels. The net effect is negative as can be seen from Fig-
ure 3.8. Thus, even if higher wage growth more easily allows to stabilize the 
contribution rate, the effect on pension levels is the opposite. 
76 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
3.5. Projections on the development of the German PAYG System 
Figure 3.7. - Development of Contribution Rates and Pension Levels 
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Overall, the sensitivity analysis of this section shows that the Riester tar-
gets will be met only under very few restrictive population, labor market 
and economic growth assumptions. Higher increases in life expectancy, only 
moderately increasing labor force participation rates or lower wage growth 
can shift the Riester off target. If this happens, further reforms are likely53. 
53Note however, that potential behavioral effects as well as economic feedback effects such as between labor 
market participation and wage growth have been neglected here in order to show the simple demographic, 
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Figure 3.8. - Development of Contribution Rates and Pension Levels 
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3.6. Projections on the Future Role of 
Supplementary Pensions 
The previous sections made clear that deductions in future pension levels 
are inescapable. Thus, if people want to maintain their standard of living 
labor market and growth effect. 
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in retirement they have to make supplementary private savings. With the 
state-subsidized Riester pension the government has tried to set an incentive 
for people to build up these necessary additional private old age provision. 
But is a savings rate of 4% sufficient to fill the upcoming pension gap? And 
how large will the share of supplementary pension income compared to public 
pension income then be? These questions will be addressed in this section. 
3.6.1. Can the Riester Pensions Fill the Public Pension 
Gap? 
The main point of introducing the Riester pensions was to compensate for the 
reductions in the public pension system. Figure 3.9 illustrates the growing 
pension gap (defined as the difference between today's and forecasted future 
gross pension levels) and the level of additional benefits provided by the 
Riester pension based on different assumptions regarding rates of return. 
The model calculations show that an envisaged savings rate of 4% of gross 
wages is sufficient to close the gap which will open up in old age provision as 
a result of the cuts in state pensions54 . 
While the Riester pensions can fill the pension gap in the long run, they 
are not sufficient for older cohorts. These cohorts will need to save more 
than the envisaged maximum savings rates in Table 3.1 in order to close this 
gap entirely during their lifetime. Younger cohorts born after 1970, in con-
trast, will be in a position to build up even higher pension entitlements than 
current pensioners if supplementary pension savings are taken into account. 
Obviously, rather than a slow increase to a fixed 4% savings rate such as the 
Riester staircase, initial savings rates have to be high and tailored to each 
cohort if pension gaps are to be closed. 
3.6.2. Future Share of Public and Private Pension Income 
Given the projections illustrated in Figure 3.3 on page 71, the future compo-
sition of retirement income will be quite different from the current monolithic 
54 Note that it is assumed that individuals have started to save these additional 4% directly in 2002 (first 
year of Riester pensions) or their first year of work respectively if they were not yet a part of the labor 
force in 2002. Moreover, as for the standard public pension level, a retirement age of 65 is assumed so 
that remaining life expectancy at this age is uaed for the annuity transformation. 
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Figure 3.9. - Development of the Total Pension Level 
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one. Figure 3.10 outlines this development by birth cohort in the year of their 
retirement. As for the standard pensioner, retirement is again assumed to 
be at age 65. Note that the increase in the statutory retirement age to 67 
is not taken into account here55 . Moreover, it is assumed that cohorts have 
adhered to the recommended Riester savings rates of Table 3.1 on page 52 
from the beginning of 2002 or their working life, respectively. 
Figure 3.10 shows that the German public pension system will remain the 
dominant pillar for old age provision also in the future. Riester pensions 
will make up about 35% or 40% of state organized retirement income by 
2050. Should other income sources ( currently about 15% of total retirement 
income)56 stay as they are, this would yield a share of PAYG pensions in 
total retirement income at about 55 to 60%. Some crowding out of existing 
occupational pensions and other private pensions by the new Riester pensions 
seems likely, however. First evidence on this is found by Cornea, Keese, and 
55!f this increa.se was considered, the composition would shift even more towards the supplementary private 
pensions since the saving period would be prolonged by two years and remaining life expectancy at age 
67 would form the basis for the annuity computations. Public pensions would also rise, however not to 
the same extent as returns on the capital market are higher. 
56See Borsch-Supan, Miegel, Brombacher Steiner, Bovenberg, Mijdam, Disney, Wise, and Schmidt-Hebbel 
{1999) as well as Borsch-Supan and Schnabel {1999). 
80 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
3.6. Projections on the Future Role of Supplementary Pensions 










-Public pension c::::::J Riester Pension (4% interes 
--o- Riester Pension (6% interest) 
Source: Author's computations. 
Schroder (2007). However, the study is based on very rough savings data that 
in addition tends to underestimate contractual savings. A study by Coppola 
(2008) on much more detailed savings data in contrast shows the opposite 
results, namely a crowding in of savings. 
3.6.3. Rate of Return Risk 
It could be argued that the capital rates of returns of 4% and 6% nominal 
(corresponding to a real rate of return of 2.5% and 4.5%) illustrated in Fig-
ures 3.9 and 3.10 are too optimistic. One cause of concern among critics is 
the asset meltdown hypothesis according to which demographic developments 
will result in an oversupply of financial assets thus leading to decreasing cap-
ital returns on such assets. However, model calculations have shown that 
the demographically-induced fall in rates of return will not be as dramatic as 
often predicted in the popular press57 . Nonetheless, the situation on capital 
57See e.g. (Biirsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006} and Ludwig and Kriiger (2007) who find that the 
capital market rate of return, owing to demographic factors, will fall by merely one percentage point if 
diversification within the EU region is assumed. For the asset meltdown hypothesis, see also Poterba 
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markets since 2001 provides an unmistakable warning that lengthy periods 
of below average, or even negative capital returns are certainly a risk that 
needs to be considered. Calculations by Essig and Reil-Held (2003) have 
shown however, that this rate of return risk is less important if capital re-
turns do not fluctuate more than during the past 40 years. 
3.6.4. On the Voluntary Nature of Riester Pensions 
As said before, the projection results presented in this chapter are based 
on the assumption that individuals save the subsidized 4% of their wage. 
However, it is by no means certain that households, particularly low-income 
households, are willing and/or able to set aside additional savings for old 
age on a consistent basis. Empirical findings confirm that lower income 
groups are less willing and able to make additional savings for their old 
age pensions, and that this is exacerbated by these groups being less well 
informed about financial matters58• The especially high Riester incentives 
for the lowest income group are meant to overcome the first problem, that 
low-income earners are not able to save. Non-willingness is more difficult to 
overcome. 
Thus, an important question is whether the new voluntary Riester pen-
sions will be accepted by the German workers who have been used to the 
generous German public pension system. How many will build up supple-
mentary pensions? At this point, seven years since their introduction, a first 
assessment can be done. 
The depth of Riester incentives. Two aspects need to be taken into ac-
count when assessing the benefits offered by the Riester incentives. First, 
the subsidies/tax exemptions during the contribution phase and second, any 
tax-related advantages or disadvantages which arise during the disbursement 
phase. The direct subsidies during the contribution phase are very deep for 
those who have relatively low income and those who have children. The 
reverse is the case for the tax-deductible special allowances, due to the pro-
gressive tax system. Here, households with higher incomes benefit more. 
(2001) as well as Abel (2001) who investigates the role of bequests in this context. 
58See e.g.Bulmahn (2003) on this topic. 
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plementary pensions. Source: Oum illustration based on Deutsche Bundesbank {2002). 
This results in a U-shaped relationship between subsidies and income, visible 
in Figure 3.11 which shows the subsidy as a percentage of savings in form of 
the new supplementary pensions59 . 
For lowest income households, the subsidy is almost as large as the contri-
bution itself. Even for the well-to-do, subsidy rates are high around 40-50%. 
Given these deep subsidies, uptake is likely to be high. The picture of Fig-
ure 3.11, however, is misleading insofar as this U-shaped curve is flattened 
out during the disbursement phase when pension benefits will be taxed. This 
flattening effect is due to the impact of progressive taxation. Taxation will 
not affect pensioners in the lower half of the income distribution because their 
pension income is below a generous exemption for retired households. It will, 
however, considerably reduce the effective lifetime subsidy to households with 
incomes above average. 
The form of the Riester incentives. While the depth of the Riester in-
centives makes the Riester pensions rather attractive, the Riester pension 
is less flexible than other retirement investment products. One of the main 
59Note that the word 'subsidy' here refers to both the direct subsidy and the tax-deductible special allowance. 
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complaints is that most of the capital has to be annuitized and can therefore 
not be used as collateral or bequeathed. The argument lacks a certain logic, 
as the very objective of the Riester pensions is to provide annuity income in 
order to fill the pension gap emerging from the reduced PAYG pillar. This 
widely voiced argument thus rather is a clear indication that most work-
ers have not yet realized that they will depend on supplementary Riester 
pensions for a reasonable retirement income. 
The extensive certification requirements which severely restrict private 
providers' scope to develop new private insurance products and which lead to 
higher costs are also disadvantageous. Certain cost items can result in total 
costs of up to 20%, compared with around 10% for a normal capital sum life 
insurance policy60 . However, this has been improved when the certification 
requirements were redefined under the 2004 reform. Still, the certification 
rules merely serve to create a formal product standard without creating the 
transparency needed in order to compare different investment vehicles and 
the relative rates of return they offer. As a result, customers are often not 
in a position to make truly informed private investment decisions. 
Last, the guarantee of the nominal value of contributions does ensure that, 
upon retirement, at the very least the nominal capital saved is available as 
pension capital. However, there are no rules which prescribe the sort of 
pension dynamisation which is needed in order to ensure that the value of 
pension benefits paid out from the saved capital can be maintained over the 
long term. Non-dynamised Riester benefits will very quickly lose their value, 
even at very modest rates of inflation. 
Evidence on take-up rates. First survey results shortly after the intro-
duction showed that demand for Riester products was sluggish: only around 
9% had actually taken out a policy by mid 2002; a further 16% planned to 
conclude a policy by the end of 2002 (Schnabel (2003)). This came during 
a growing trend for workers to enroll in supplementary pension plans. Only 
around half of those planning to enroll in such plans are considering doing so 
in the framework of a Riester policy. The other half prefer other savings and 
insurance products, and/or occupational pensions61 . By the end of 2006, 
60See Stiftung Warentest (2002). 
61 See Leinert (2002}. 
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however, a total of more than 8 million pension plans eligible for subsidy 
support had been concluded corresponding to a coverage of about 23% of all 
eligible workers62 . 
Still, so far the direct and tax subsidies of Riester pensions are still far 
from providing universal coverage. Moreover, many households, especially 
in the higher income brackets, merely may restructure their existing pension 
plans in order to reap Riester subsidies. At this point, we do not have much 
hard evidence on such substitution. Should these households have a fixed 
pension target, financing state subsidies via general taxation can actually 
have perverse effects which lead to a lower savings rate63 . 
Do we need mandatory private pensions after all? Surveys have shown 
that a large section of the population would actually welcome the introduc-
tion of mandatory supplementary private pensions64 . This preference may 
be explained by savers' lack of confidence in their ability to exercise the dis-
cipline needed to build up additional old age provision by themselves and the 
fiscal externality imposed by those who speculate on general social assistance 
or now the minimum pension rather than save. 
The arguments generally cited in favor of mandatory supplementary old 
age provision are poverty in old age and adverse selection on the insurance 
market65. Poverty in old age, however, is currently not an important problem 
in Germany. This may change in the future because of the benefit cuts in 
public pensions, but has been addressed by the 2001 Riester reform through 
the introduction of the new minimum pension. As far as adverse selection 
is concerned, compulsory provision could lead to a monopoly position being 
established by a single provider if this product and the offers it generates 
proves to be unattractive for smaller competitors in which case coercion would 
bring about even less rather than more product variety. 
62See Bundesministerium fiir Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung (BMGS) (2005) and Sommer (2004} for a 
detailed overview of take-up rates so far. 
63See Borsch-Supan and Liihrmann (2000). 
64See Boeri, Borsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2001), Boeri, Borsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2002b) and Boeri, 
Borsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2002a). 
65See e.g. Borsch-Supan (2000a). 
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Another strong argument against mandatory old age provision is the tax-
like character it gives to savings and the resulting negative incentive effects66 . 
The very idea of reducing the tax and payroll-tax-like contribution burden 
in order to stimulate economic growth would be jeopardized. 
As an alternative to mandatory old age provision, opting-out contracts, 
in the context of company pension plans have been discussed extensively in 
Germany in the past few years. These are old age provision savings contracts 
that automatically start with employment in the firm if the worker does not 
explicitly refuses. In the U.S., such provision plans have increased coverage 
to over 85% while opting-in contracts where individuals have to actively 
to decide to participate only lead to coverage rates of a third. However, the 
detailed design of such opting-out contracts is more difficult than at first sight 
thought. Providing an opting-out option implies the existence of a standard 
product, and thus drags again the argument of a monopoly position behind 
it that was already pointed out above67• 
3. 7. Conclusion 
This chapter described the basic principles of the German pension system and 
its current reform process. Moreover, it presented projections on the long-
term financial development of the public PAYG pillar as well as on the future 
role of supplementary private pensions. The main findings are that the past 
reforms have turned the system from a monolithic into a more sustainable 
and more robust multi-pillar system that still seems to allow for adequate 
pension benefits - at least if the anticipated demographic and labor market 
developments come true. 
In terms of adequacy of pension benefits, the projections showed that the 
Riester targets of 46% in 2020 and 43% in 2030 for (modified) net pension 
levels before tax can be just met if the demographic and labor market pro-
jections by the Rurup Commission are assumed. However, it was also shown 
that higher increases in life expectancy, only moderately increasing labor 
force participation rates or lower wage growth already can quickly shift the 
66Summers (1989). 
67See Leinert (2003), Ruprecht (2004), Ippolito (2001) and Gunderson and Luchak (2001) for a discussion 
of the opting-out concept. 
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Riester targets out of sight. The scale of the reductions in pension levels 
also clearly demonstrates that public pension benefits will no longer be suffi-
cient alone - that is without supplementary pension provision - to safeguard 
pensioners' standards of living in old age. The introduction of the minimum 
pension guarantee under the 2001 Riester reform is to be seen in this context. 
The introduction of the sustainability factor into the German benefit in-
dexation formula in 2004 linked the development of benefits to the devel-
opment of the pensioner ratio, the most crucial internal system parameter. 
Depending on the size of a, the system now technically can either follow a 
defined benefit approach (a= 0) or a defined-contribution approach (a= 1). 
With the setting of a = 0.25 the German public pension system thus was 
effectively shifted from the formerly defined-benefit to a defined-contribution 
oriented system. In the next chapter we will see that it now provides a similar 
self-stabilizing mechanism as the so much promoted NDC schemes. 
Finally, thanks to the shift from the former monolithic to a multi-pillar 
system, the robustness of the German pension system has increased as risks 
are better diversified. Public pension benefits of course are still subject to po-
litical risk even though the introduction of a somewhat automatic balancing 
mechanism with the sustainability factor has reduced this risk considerably. 
However, several ad hoc rulings with regard to benefit adjustments since 2004 
as well as the current debate on an intermission of the Riester staircase for 
2008 and 2009 in favor of a higher pension adjustment in these years show 
that even such an automatic balancing mechanism provides no guarantee 
against further discretionary interventions. Supplementary private old age 
income in contrast is subject to the rate of return risk on the capital mar-
ket. However, as it was discussed, pertinent model calculations show that 
the demographically-induced fall in rates of return will not be as dramatic 
as often predicted in the popular press. 
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Reform Alternative? 
4.1. Introduction 
Notional defined contribution (NDC) systems have been debated at length 
in the worldwide pension literature in the past years. They can be regarded 
as a new wave of pension reform following the wave of pre-funded systems 
that were promoted by the World Bank in the mid-eighties1. In contrast to 
these pre-funded systems, the NDC approach does not require a transition 
to a fully funded system, but can be regarded as a complementary strategy 
that aims at restructuring the first, PAYG financed pillar. It thus preserves 
existing PAYG systems, offering a reform alternative to those countries that 
wish to keep a substantial public PAYG pillar, as it is the case in Germany. 
Still, the conversion of an existing PAYG pillar to an NDC system does not 
exclude a partial transition to pre-funding. Indeed, both reform options may 
complement each other in a multi-pillar approach. 
The NDC approach is based on two main ideas. (1) Intragenerational re-
distribution within the PAYG pillar is to be minimized by establishing a set 
of individual accounts where contribution payments are recorded and from 
which individual pension benefits can be directly derived at the time of retire-
ment, accounting for individual life expectancy. (2) In order to ensure the 
long-run sustainability of the PAYG system, demographic and labor mar-
ket changes are directly reflected in the interest accrued on the accumulated 
contribution payments on the individual account. 
This chapter looks at whether such a NDC system would be a reform al-
ternative for the German public pension system. In fact, the German public 
pension system already bears some resemblance to an NDC system2• Thanks 
1See World Bank (1994). 
2See Biirsch-Supan (2004b). 
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to its point system, which goes back to the introduction of the PAYG system 
in 1957, the German public pension system is based on a similar concept of 
individual accounts. Furthermore, the actuarial adjustments depending on 
the time of retirement entry, that have been phased in following the 1992 and 
1999 reforms, mimic the automatic adjustment to changes in life expectancy 
in an NDC system. Finally, the sustainability factor proposed by the Riirup 
Commission and implemented with the 2004 pension reform, introduces a 
self-stabilizing feedback mechanism that responds to changes in demogra-
phy and labor market development, similar to the one in an NDC system. 
However, there remain crucial differences between the two systems. 
An NDC system, in principle, could have some valuable advantages over 
the present German PAYG pension system3• First, the NDC system provides 
great flexibility regarding the choice of the retirement age, which could set an 
end to the ongoing eligibility discussion in the German PAYG system. A sec-
ond advantage would be the enhanced transparency of an NDC system. This 
could be extremely helpful for Germany, where the public pension system is 
composed of a very complicated set of numerous regulations, which obscure 
the actual size of pension benefits that can be expected from the system 
as well as the need for private old age pension. Moreover, increased trans-
parency might help to re-establish some of the credibility that the German 
PAYG system has lost over the course of the repeated discretionary inter-
ventions of the past. Another advantage would be that such discretionary 
interventions would no longer be easy in an NDC system. 4 
Thus, a conversion of the German PAYG system to an NDC system in 
principle could bring about some crucial benefits. Moreover, such a conver-
sion should be relatively easy due to the existing analogies between the two 
systems. This chapter analyzes the effects a hypothetical introduction of an 
NDC system would have on the financial situation of the German PAYG 
system. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 gives an introduc-
tion into the NDC concept before section 4.3 describes the parallels between 
the two systems. Section 4.4 presents a thorough simulation and sensitivity 
3These advantages are partly due to the individualization achieved by the underlying concept of individual 
accounts. For a general discussion of this concept, see Holzmann and Palacios (2001). 
4These are only some selected aspects of NOC systems. A thorough discussion of advantages and disad-
vantages of NOC systems can be found in Barr (2003). 
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analysis of the effects such an introduction would have on pension levels and 
the budget of the German pension insurance. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2. Notional Defined Contribution Systems 
The NDC concept was first designed in Sweden, where the system passed 
legislation in 1994, and was introduced in 2001 with a 16 years transition 
period5• However, it can be argued that the basic underlying principles 
of the NDC system were already present in earlier concepts like the one 
presented by Buchanan in 19686 or the German and French point systems 
respectively7• Soon after the system had been legislated in Sweden, Latvia 
and Poland took up the concept and integrated it into their ongoing pension 
reform processes8• They thus became the first countries to introduce an NDC 
system for the first pillar in 19959. At the same time, Italy also legislated an 
NDC approach for its first pillar in the context of the Dini reform. However, 
the system will not become effective before 2040, due to an extremely long 
transition period 10. Apart from these European countries, NDC systems have 
also been introduced in Brazil and the Kyrgyz republic11 . 
In the literature, NDC systems remain disputed. While they are perceived 
quite positively by those who have experienced and accompanied their in-
troduction (e.g. Palmer (2000); Chlon, Gora, and Rutkowski (1999)), they 
receive some serious criticism from other economists observing the process 
from the outside (e.g. Disney (1999); Valdes-Prieto (2000)). 
This section gives a brief introduction to the NDC system approach. The 
basic concept is explained in section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.2 provides a mathe-
matical description. Last, section 4.2.3 and section 4.2.4 discuss some selected 
aspects of system design and system behavior. 
5See Sunden (2000} for a brief overview of the Swedish NOC system. A thorough description of the system 
can be found in Palmer (2000). 
6See Valdes-Prieto (2000). 
7See Disney (1999} and Valdes-Prieto (2000}. 
8See Disney (1999} and Valdes-Prieto (2000}. 
9 A first assessment on the Polish pension reform can be found in Ch Ion ( 2003}. 
10See Franco and Sartor (2003} and Brugiavini and Galasso (2004} for an evaluation of the Italian pension 
reform process. 
"See Brooks and Weaver (2003) for a description of the NOC system in Brazil and Palmer (2003) for a 
brief description of the NOC system in the Kyrgyz republic. 
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4.2.1. Basic Concepts 
The NDC system is a PAYG system that in principle is based on a defined 
contribution (DC) instead of the conventional defined benefit (DB) approach 
that has been the basis for PAYG systems in most countries until recently. 
Defined benefit (DB). In the conventional DB based PAYG system the 
size of pension benefits is determined annually via a specified benefit index-
ation formula, such that a predefined desirable ( often stable) pension level 
for a reference pensioner12 can be maintained. Pension benefits thus are not 
directly linked to the amount of previously paid contributions but depend to 
a large extent on the shape of the benefit indexation formula. In order to 
ensure an annually balanced budget, the system's contribution rate is raised 
accordingly if estimated revenues under the present rate are not sufficient 
to cover arising pension claims. Given the increasing demographic and eco-
nomic pressures, this has led to continually rising contribution rates in many 
countries in the past decade. 
Defined contribution (DC). The DC approach, commonly used in the 
capital market for private pension arrangements, derives pension benefits 
directly from the amount of previously paid contributions by converting 
the accrued pension wealth into a lifelong pension annuity. This happens 
only once at the time of retirement. The contribution rate is hereby set 
exogenously13 . 
An NDC system combines this DC approach with the basics of a PAYG 
system. Contributions to the pension system are recorded on individual 
accounts so that subsequent pension benefits can be calculated as a lifelong 
annuity on the basis of the accumulated capital stock at the end of the 
12Recall that for Germany, the reference pensioner is the so-called standard pensioner who worked for 45 
years, always earned the average wage and retired at the statutory retirement age of 65. In the German 
point system he is thus credited 45 earnings points. 
13Note that the distinction between defined benefit and defined contribution systems can be made from 
different perspectives. In the range of PAYG systems, a defined contribution approach can also refer to 
a PAYG system, where the contribution rate is exogenous while benefits are determined endogenously 
under the annual budget constraint, see e.g. Lindbeck and Persson (2003). However, in this chapter, 
the notion 'defined contribution' refers solely to the annuity mechanism used on capital markets that 
establishes a tight link between contribution payments and pension benefits. 
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working period. However, since contributions in a PAYG system are needed 
to finance current pension expenditures, they can only notionally be recorded 
on the accounts, without any real money transfer, which is why the system 
is referred to as a notional defined contribution (NDC) system. There is no 
annual budget constraint in this system as is conventional for PAYG systems. 
The contribution rate enters exogenously, and thus can be held constant or 
follow a predetermined, desired path. 
4.2.2. Mathematical Description 
As it was explained above, in an NDC based PAYG system annual contribu-
tions are accumulated on notional individual accounts ( contribution phase) 
such that, at the time of retirement, a lifelong pension annuity can be calcu-
lated from the accrued notional capital (pension phase). 
Contribution phase. Given the annual gross wage income AGW;,t of an in-
dividual i, contributions to the pension system C;,t in year t by the individual 
i can be determined as follows: 
(4.1) ci,t = Tt x AGW;,1 
The contribution rate to the pension system Tt can either be fixed (r1 = r) 
or follow a predetermined ( desirable or acceptable) path, since the system is 
no longer subject to an annual budget constraint as under the conventional 
PAYG system approach. 
The individual's working life covers the period from a0 to RA-1, where the 
first working year is t = 1 = a0 and the last working year is t = RA - 1 ( e.g. 
40 years). At the time the individual retires (at time RA), its accumulated 
notional pension wealth PW; amounts to: 
(4.2) PW;= II ( C;,t Rfi\1 + rv)) 
The chosen interest rates Tt are crucial for the calculation. This issue will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
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Pension phase. Pension benefits P;,t for an individual i in year t can be 
calculated from the accrued notional pension wealth at retirement PW; as 
an annuity: 
(4.3) 
p. _ PW; 
,,t - G 
Most simply, the annuitization divisor G14 can be set equal to remaining 
life expectancy at retirement nRA: 
(4.4) 
Subsequent changes in life expectancy after the time of retirement do not 
have effects on the size of pension benefits. However, Equation 4.4 only holds 
if no interest is granted on the remaining capital on the notional account at 
any time t > RA and if pension benefits are assumed to be equal for all years 
t. Loosening the first restriction and assuming that some form of (constant) 
interest r* is accrued on the remaining notional capital, the annuity divisor 
G changes as follows: 15 
(4.5) G = (1 + r*)l-nRA (1 + r*tRA - 1 
(1 + r*) - 1 
In order to calculate this annuity, the notional interest rate r has to be 
defined a priori, and therefore can only depend on estimated future values of 
r* .16 Again, the interest rate chosen is crucial. 
If the second restriction is also lifted, pension benefits may rise over the 
course of the retirement period, i.e. they can be indexed to a certain reference 
rate. This can be captured by introducing an indexing factor fJ into the 
formula of the annuity divisor G: 
(4.6) 
( J+6 )nRA l 
G = (1 +r*) T+r-" -
(J - r• 
141n the literature this annuity factor is also referred to as G-value. See e.g. Chlon (2003). 
15It is assumed that pension benefits are paid in advance, at the beginning of the year or month respectively. 
16It therefore is sufficient to assume a constant interest rate r since even if changes in r are expected in the 
future, it is reasonable to take an average value of r for the calculation of the pension annuity. 
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For simplicity, 8 is assumed to be a constant percentage (0 < 8 < 1). 
Possible indexing factors will be discussed in the following section. 
4.2.3. System Design 
If the contribution rate to the pension system is fixed and pension benefits 
are determined from accrued pension wealth according to the annuity mech-
anism, how can the system be stabilized? The answer to this question refers 
to the chosen system design. There are numerous design features for an NDC 
system17. As it was already pointed out in the previous section, the interest 
rate rt that is accrued on the accumulated contributions and the parameters 
llRA, r* and 8 that are applicable for the calculation of the life-long pension 
annuity are crucial to the essence of the system. The same applies for the 
choice of the contribution rate. However, this is an issue that is highly coun-
try specific and will therefore be dealt with in the context of the simulation 
analysis in section 4.4. The other aspects will be discussed below. 
Interest rate on contributions. Borsch-Supan (2004b) points out that from 
a macro-economic perspective, the NDC system can only be sustainable if 
the chosen interest rate rt is the internal rate of return of the PAYG system, 
i.e. the growth rate of the contribution bill. This internal rate of return can 
be measured as the change in the number of contributors and their labor 
productivity growth18 . In this case, changes in demography, employment, 
and productivity are accurately reflected in the rate of return. So far, this 
approach has not been implemented in any of the countries that introduced 
an NDC system. In Latvia and Poland, contributions are granted interest 
according to the ex-post growth rate of the covered wage bill, thereby only 
accounting for changes in productivity and neglecting changes in the number 
of contributors. Italy follows a similar approach by using a moving aver-
age of nominal GDP growth19 as an index. As long as it is assumed that 
17See Palmer {2003} for a comprehensive list and discussion of possible design features. 
18This corresponds to the Samuelson-Aaron condition, where the internal rate of return of the system is 
given by n + g with n = population and g = productivity growth (Samuelson (1958} and Aaron (1966)). 
A description of possible calculation methods of the rate of return of PAYG systems can be found in 
Settergren (2003). For an evaluation of the internal rate of the German PAYG system, see Schnabel 
{1998}. 
19The moving average is computed over 5 years of GDP in order to smooth business cycle effects. 
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the productivity growth of the economy is closely mirrored by the develop-
ment of earnings, these approaches are basically identical. Sweden indexes 
contributions to a moving average of ex-post per capita wage growth20 , but 
established an automatic adjustment mechanism in case the financial stabil-
ity of the system is threatened21 . Brazil in turn does not grant any interest 
on contributions22 . 
Pension annuity. The life-long pension P;,1 is derived on the basis of the 
accumulated pension wealth PW; considering three parameters: 
Remaining life expectancy (nRA) The remaining life expectancy at the 
time of retirement differs for men and women, but in general unisex 
survival rates are applied, so that the annuity is equal for men and 
women23 . In order to obtain the appropriate life expectancy data, co-
hort specific life tables must be available. So far, cohort life tables are 
still not freely disposable in many countries, which creates potential 
sources of political manipulation. 
Interest rate (r*) The choice of the interest rate that is accrued on the 
notional pension capital follows the same rule as the interest rate on 
contributions. However, in order to calculate the annuity, the applicable 
interest rate r• has to be defined a priori, and therefore can only depend 
on estimated future values and not on actual ex-post values, as in the 
case of the interest rate r1 on contributions. In Sweden, a real rate of 
return of 1.6% is used, which is in accordance with both the projected 
long-run rate of return as well as the economy's expected real growth 
rate. 
Indexing factor ( 8) The indexing factor allows for increases in pension ben-
efits over the retirement period. The decision whether benefits shall 
be indexed to a reference rate over the course of the retirement period 
or not has to be made at the time of retirement (t = RA) when the 
20The moving average is computed over 3 years of wage growth. 
21 For a thorough description of the automatic balancing mechanism, see Settergren (2001a). 
22For a description of the so-called 'accumulation factor' applied in Bra.ii, see Brooks and Weaver {2003). 
23This e.g. is the case in Sweden. In contrast, private pension funds on the capital market usually apply 
sex specific survival rates. 
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lifelong pension P;,t is calculated. There are three options as to how to 
set the indexing factor o: 
• o = 0 means that pension benefits during the retirement period 
remain constant, but only in nominal terms24. 
• o = 1r indexes pension benefits to the (projected or actual) infla-
tion rate 1r, so that benefits remain constant in real terms. This 
approach is used in Sweden. 
• o = g indexes pension benefits to the (projected or actual) annual 
rise in nominal wages or productivity respectively, so that pension 
benefits remain a constant fraction of wages. 
The fact that the computation of the pension annuity heavily depends 
on estimated values introduces a certain level of uncertainty for political 
discretion. If benefits are indexed to actual rates and projected rates are 
higher, pension benefits become cheaper than initially calculated. Whereas, 
if pensioners live longer than estimated, pension expenditures become more 
expensive than initially calculated and if the ex-post increase of the interest 
rate r• is lower (higher) than the estimated increase, pension benefits are 
harder (easier) to finance with the available contribution revenues. However, 
these are uncertainties that every private insurance business has to cope with. 
4.2.4. System Behavior 
Although the NDC system maintains the PAYG system approach, it behaves 
quite differently compared to conventional PAYG systems regarding both the 
development of pension levels and the pension insurance's budget. 
Cohort-specific and total cohort pension levels. In contrast to conven-
tional PAYG pension systems, where pension levels are annually readjusted 
by the benefit indexation formula25 and where this readjustment equally af-
fects the size of benefits of all pensioners, pension levels in the NDC system 
are cohort-specific. Thus, the future development of cohort-specific pension 
24In this case, Equation 4.5 instead of Equation 4.6 is then applied for the calculation of the annuity. 
25See chapter 3 for an explanation of the current German benefit indexation formula. 
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levels in an NDC system therefore highly depends on the past and forecasted 
demographic and labor market development as well as the country's historic 
and future economic performance. In order to reflect the development of pen-
sion levels across as well as for specific cohorts, an annual universal pension 
level can thus no longer be applied. Instead, two separate measures have 
to be considered. Pension levels for specific cohorts can be illustrated by 
displaying for each year t only the pension level of the cohort whose respec-
tive reference pensioner retires in that year26 . This will be referred to as the 
cohort-specific pension level at retirement in the remainder of this chapter. 
An annual pension level reflecting the situation across reference pensioners 
of all cohorts can then be calculated as the average of reference pensions over 
all cohorts weighted with the respective cohort sizes. In the following, this 
will be referred to as the total cohort pension level. 
Short-term and long-term budget effects. In each year t the public pen-
sion system receives revenues Rt in form of contributions by the labor force 




Rt = L Tt X AGW;,t and Et= L P;,t 
i=l i=l 
with LAB1 • •• size of labor force in year t and 
RET1 • •• size of stock of pensioners in year t. 
For the short term, the crucial question is whether revenues R1 match 
expenditures Et, i.e. whether the annual pension budget is balanced. In 
conventional PAYG systems, the contribution rate to the pension system Tt 
is recalculated each year such that estimated revenues R; equal estimated 
expenditures E;. Alternatively, the contribution rate Tt can be fixed (Ti = T) 
so that pension levels have to be adjusted in order to balance the budget. 
In each case, the annual budget balance can be achieved by the appropriate 
adjustments. In an NDC system this annual (short-term) budget balance is 
26For the standard pensioner in Germany that retires at age 65 the cohort-specific pension level for e.g. the 
year 2005 would thus correspond to the pension level of the 1940 cohort. 
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no longer assured. The reason is that the contribution rate is given, while at 
the same time, pension benefits cannot be adjusted freely since their value 
is no longer recalculated annually is determined only once at the time of 
retirement as a lifelong pension. In the short-run, there are no possibilities 
to balance the system unless ex-post adjustments are made to the applicable 
interest rate r* or the indexing factor J. 
As a result, the existence of an appropriate reserve fund is crucial for the 
introduction of an NDC system. Sweden for example disposes of a large 
reserve fund that amounts to about 4 years of expenditures27 • In contrast, 
the German system's reserve fund only amounts to several days28 . 
Although NDC systems cannot ensure the short-term balance of the pen-
sion budget, one of their main characteristics is said to be balancing the 
budget long-term. In other words, NDC systems are supposed to make the 
pension system financially sustainable29 . This is disputed in the pension lit-
erature, though30. In principle, this only holds if the system operates with its 
internal rate of return. In this case, demographic and labor market changes 
are directly reflected in pension benefits, allowing the systems restoration 
from demographic or economic shocks and thereby ensuring a balanced sys-
tem in the long run31 . 
In general, short and long term balance cannot coexist in an NDC system. 
If e.g. the annual budget constraint was to be maintained within an NDC 
framework, this would mean that the contribution rate could no longer be 
predetermined but would instead result as a residual from the annual budget 
calculation as it is the case in conventional PAYG systems. This, however, 
would affect subsequent pension levels. Thus, depending on the country-
specific case, pension expenditures as well as contribution rates of such a 
system might just explode. 
27See Settergren (2001b), p.4. 
28In 2000, the buffer fund of the German pension system amounted to 14 billion Euros in relation to total 
annual system expenditures of 214 billion Euros (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstriiger (VDR) 
(2002)). Under the 2004 reform, this reserve was turned into a so-called sustainability reserve that 
amounts to 0.2 to 1.5 of monthly pension expenditures and is supposed to be built up in 'good' years 
and is melted down as soon as the upper 1.5 limit is reached. 
29Financial stability in this context can be defined as 'the ability of a pension plan to adjust to financial 
shocks without legislative intervention' (Valdes-Prieto (2000)). 
30See e.g. Valdes-Prieto (2000) for a mathematical analysis of the system's long-run effects. 
31 On the issue of financial sustainability see also Gronchi and Aprile (1998). 
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4.3. Parallels to the German Public Pension 
System 
It was already mentioned several times that the German pension system in 
fact is quite similar to such an NDC system described above. These parallels 
are discussed in the following. 
4.3.1. The German Point System 
In Germany, the point system dates back until 1957, when the PAYG system 
was introduced. Point-based systems, as they are also present in France, 
can be regarded as an indirect source of the NDC approach32 . There is an 
analogy of accumulated earnings points in the German and currency-based 
contributions in an NDC system: 
• Both relate to the entire working life (in contrast to PAYG systems, 
where only some selected years of the earnings history are considered). 
• Redistributive features (e.g. special acknowledgement for child bearing) 
can be easily embodied in both systems by a transfer of additional 
earnings points/ notional contributions by the pension insurance. 
The German earnings point system however differs in the following aspects: 
• At a fixed contribution rate, all earnings points of an individual count 
equally while in the NDC system equal contributions in percent of 
salary are valued higher in earlier periods of the working life due to 
compound interest. 
• At a rising contribution rate, earnings points count equally but in fact 
are cheaper for earlier contributions. In the NDC system, later earnings 
may overweigh earlier contributions despite of compound interest. 
We will see later that these differences play a crucial role regarding the 
development of cohort-specific pension levels and distributional as well as 
budgetary effects. 
32See Disney (1999) and Valdes-Prieto (2000). 
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4.3.2. Actuarial Adjustments to Retirement Age 
Adjustments of benefits to retirement age for early and late retirement entry 
respectively were introduced in Germany with the 1992 pension reform and 
have been phased in since 199733 . 0.3% are deducted from pension benefits 
for every month an individual retires before and 0.5% are granted for ev-
ery month an individual retires after the statutory retirement age. These 
adjustments shall prevent that people actually gain from early retirement 
and receive the same pension as later retirees but for a longer pension pe-
riod. Whether these adjustments are also neutral in terms of labor supply 
(dis)incentives, however, is highly disputed in the literature34 . 
In an NDC system, such adjustments are implicit. Since the individual 
pension is calculated as an annuity taking into account the remaining life 
expectancy at the time of retirement, the system is automatically actuarially 
neutral. Thus, in contrast to the German system, no discretionary adjust-
ments are necessary, which avoids potential sources of manipulation. More-
over, while the current German system needs to set a statutory retirement 
age, the retirement age in an NDC system can be flexible35. In addition, 
changes in life expectancy have a direct impact on pension benefits in an 
NDC system36 while in the German system they can only be accounted for 
via unpopular moves in the statutory retirement age. 
4.3.3. The Sustainability Factor 
Finally, the sustainability factor introduces a mechanism similar to the long-
run sustainability of an NDC system that uses the internal rate of return. As 
in such an NDC system, pension benefits are adjusted downwards once the 
system dependency ratio worsens. However, in contrast to the NDC system, 
these adjustments affect all pensioner cohorts alike. In this regard, the Ger-
man PAYG pension system is time not cohort-oriented. Another difference 
33Refer to Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004) for details of the transition process. 
34See Ohsmann, Stolz, and Thiede (2003) who justify the current rates, versus Borsch-Supan (2000b) who 
argues they should be higher. The German Reform Commission on the Sustainability of the Social 
Security Systems (2003) takes a neutral view. 
35In practice, a minimum retirement age is recommended as soon as some form of guaranteed pension is 
provided that may create labor supply disincentives. In Sweden, the minimum retirement age is 61. 
36 At least to the extent they can be projected at the time of retirement when the pension is calculated. 
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is that changes in the benefit indexation formula are politically more easily 
possible than changes to the size of pension benefits in the NDC system, 
where pensions are directly attributable to the individual pensioner. Such 
discretionary interventions of course are not desirable but provide a tempting 
policy option to short-term oriented politicians. In fact, since the introduc-
tion of the sustainability factor in 2004, several discretionary interventions 
have already been made. 
4.4. Simulating a Hypothetical Introduction of 
an N DC System for Germany 
In the previous section it could be seen that the German public pension sys-
tem already incorporates some of the basic characteristics of an NDC system. 
However, if it was replaced completely by the genuine NDC mechanisms such 
as described in section 4.2, what would be the effects on pension levels and 
the pension insurance's budget? Would it have been an alternative to the 
2004 and 2007 reforms that maybe would have achieved an even better and 
more robust financial sustainability than the past reforms have? This ques-
tion is addressed in this section. The subsequent simulation analysis covers 
the period from 2005 to 2050, assuming that an NDC system replaces the 
current German public pension system in 2005. 
In the following, I first briefly describe how I model the transition of the 
German public pension system towards an NDC system in section 4.4.1. Sec-
tion 4.4.2 presents the underlying assumptions for my projections. Projection 
results are illustrated in section 4.4.3. Last, sections 4.4.4 looks at what hap-
pens if the underlying assumptions are altered and points out some exclusive 
aspects. 
4.4.1. Modeling an NOC system 
In order to model the transition towards an NDC system, I modify the under-
lying benefit indexation formula and budget restriction of my model on the 
German pension system that I described in chapter 3. Now, the contribution 
rate enters exogenously into the system and the annual budget constraint 
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does not hold any longer. The computation of revenues and expenditures is 
done as explained in section 3.4 but simplified as follows. 
Revenues. In each year t all cohorts c that are part of the labor force pay 
a certain amount of contributions Cc,t depending on the contribution rate 
Tt, the level of average wages AGW1 and their respective age-specific wage 
profile W Pa: 
(4.8) Cc,t = Tt X AGWt X WPa 
The age-specific income profile W Pa is expressed as a ratio of average wages 
AGWt37 and is the same for all cohorts but varies across age so that in each 
year t a different income profile W Pa=t-c is ascribed to each cohort c. Total 
revenues Rt in one year t are thus: 
LAB, 
(4.9) Rt = L Cc,t X LABc,t 
c=l 
with LABc,t . . . number of members of cohort c in year t and LAB1 .•• here: 
number of cohorts in year t where members are still in the labor force. 
Expenditures. Similarly, total system expenditures Et result from the ex-
isting pension claims Pc,t of all cohorts c that are part of the pensioner stock: 
RET, 
(4.10) Et = L Pc,t X RETc,t 
c=l 
with RETc,t . .. number of members of cohort c in year t and RET1 • • • here: 
number of cohorts in year t where members are retired. 
37It is assumed that cohorts have reached the average wage income at age 35 and that subsequent wage 
income will be higher than the average wage. Thus for a=35 the income profile is set equal to one, while 
it is set to values larger than one for a > 35. This income profile is derived from an empirical study for 
Western Germany by Fitzenberger, Hujer, McCurdy, and Schnabel (2001). 
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4.4.2. Scenarios and Underlying Assumptions 
For the subsequent simulation analysis, I consider two scenarios: 
• The reference scenario corresponds to the post-reform 2004 scenario 
that was presented in section 3.5.2 and that accounts for the introduc-
tion of the sustainability factor but not yet for the rise in the statutory 
retirement ages to 67. 
• The NDC scenario assumes a transition of the German public pension 
system under its status quo after the 2004 reform to a genuine NDC 
system. 
Both scenarios are based on the demographic and labor market projec-
tions by the Riirup Commission presented in chapter 2 that also served as 
the basis for the projections on the long-term development of the German 
pension system in chapter 3. Since the labor market forecast here already 
assumes a further shift in the mean retirement age for the future, I refrain 
from explicitly modeling the retirement entry behavioral effects that result 
from the automatic adjustment of pension benefits to life expectancy in the 
NDC model. This is also the reason why I chose to use the 2004 post-reform 
instead of the 2007 post-reform scenario as the reference scenario. I thereby 
also implicitly abandon the potential retirement entry behavioral effects in 
response to the increase in the statutory retirement age under the 2007 re-
form38. 
For the NDC scenario, a number of additional assumptions are necessary 
in order to specify the system's design which will be explained below. 
Contribution rate T1• As it was explained in section 4.2, the contribution 
rate enters exogenously into the system. For the simulation analysis it is 
assumed to develop as under the reference scenario. This way, resulting 
38So far, no data is available that quantifies how this new regulation will influence retirement behavior 
nor is the outcome straightforward and clear. For the following simulation analysis I therefore do not 
consider the effects of the 2007 pension reform. For an assessment of the reform's effects on the future 
development of contribution rates and pension levels where behavioral effects are explicitly taken into 
account, see Bucher-Koenen and Wilke (2008) 
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pension levels for the NDC scenario can be more easily compared to those 
projected for the reference scenario39 . 
Interest rate Tt on contributions. Contribution payments accumulated on 
the notional accounts are assumed to receive annual interest equal to the 
internal rate ofreturn40 of the German PAYG system, i.e. the annual growth 
rate of the contribution bill, in order to allow for a balanced system in the 
long-run. Since this rate has been widely fluctuating over the past decades, 
annual actual nominal values are smoothened by taking a 5 years moving 
average41 . In addition, rates are capped at an absolute nominal level of 6%, 
so that extremely high rates - as they occurred in Germany in the 1960s and 
1970s - are given less weight. The difference between adjusted and actual 
(nominal and real) values is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Remaining life expectancy nRA• Life expectancy at the time of retirement 
is assumed to develop in accordance with the demographic projections by 
the Riirup Commission presented in chapter 2. This means an increase from 
15.8 in 2000 to 19.3 years in 2050 for men and from 19.5 to 23.6 years for 
women. 
Interest rate r* on notional pension capital. In analogy to the interest 
accrued on contributions, the internal rate of return is chosen as the applica-
ble interest rate for the annuity calculation. Since the future long-run rate is 
unknown at the time of the annuity calculation, the rates average value over 
the last ten years previous to the respective retirement date is used as an 
approximation of the projected long-run rate, that is to be used if the system 
shall achieve long-run sustainability. Ten years are necessary if business cycle 
effects shall be smoothened out. If the rate was averaged over five years only, 
people would have an incentive to retire earlier in periods of economic slow 
39Note that a stable contribution rate as it is implemented in many NOC systems provides no serious reform 
option for the German public pension system. Such a freezing scenario would lead to a too large drop in 
pension levels. See e.g. Borsch-Supan (2002a) for a discussion of this issue and corresponding projections 
for Germany. 
40Note that the concept of the internal rate of return is a long-term concept. However, for the purpose 
of the analysis in this chapter, the internal rate of return will be calculated on an annual basis and in 
nominal terms. 
41 This follows the Italian approach, where the applicable interest rate is also smoothened over 5 years. 
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Figure 4.1. - Past and Future Development of the Internal Rate of 
Return of the German PAYG System 


















.....,.... Actual real values 
--Actual nominal values 
- Moving average (5 years) • capped (6% nominal) 
Source: Author 's computation.,. Historical values are based on data by the Germa11c 
Fedeml Statistical Office (www.destatis. de). 
down and later in periods of economic boom. This might be a valuable policy 
tool, but shall not be further evaluated at this point. 
Indexation factor o. It is assumed that pensions are indexed to annual 
nominal wage growth, so that pension benefits remain a constant fraction 
of wages during the whole retirement period. In accordance with the labor 
market projections presented in chapter 2 this means an indexing factor o 
equal to 3% nominal. 
Transition. A transition period of 10 years is assumed so that the system 
is fully established once the German baby-boomers start to retire around 
2015. Those pensioners who were already retired before the introduction of 
the NDC system continue to receive their pensions according to the status 
quo of the German PAYG system. Those who retire during the transitional 
phase receive a part of their pension benefits according to the current German 
system and the other part according to the NDC system, starting at a ratio of 
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'old' to 'new' pensions of 90% in 2005. Cohorts that retire after this transition 
period receive their full pension according to the new NDC system42 . 
4.4.3. Simulation Results 
Given the same contribution rate development as projected for the reference 
scenario, which pension levels can be achieved in the NDC scenario? The 
results are shown below. However, since the annual budget constraint is 
abandoned in the NDC scenario, it is no longer sufficient to solely consider 
pension levels. Thus, in a second step, additional attention is directed to the 
development of the pension insurance's budget. 
Pension Levels 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the development of the cohort-specific pension level 
at the respective retirement entry in the NDC scenario compared to the 
development of annual pension levels in the reference scenario. As it was 
explained in section 4.2, the cohort-specific pension level for a year t only 
represents the pension level of the cohort that retires in the same year, at 
the statutory retirement age of 65. In Figure 4.2 this means that the 2005 
pension level depicts that of the 1940 cohort in its first pension year, while the 
2015 pension level corresponds to that of the 1950 cohort in its first pension 
year. In contrast, in the reference scenario, pension levels in one year t apply 
to all pensioners, not only to those that retire in that year. 
It can be seen that cohort-specific pension levels in the NDC scenario 
develop quite close, with a maximum deviation of about 5%, to the pension 
levels projected for the reference scenario. This astonishes since pension 
levels in the current German system are determined to decline due to the 
sustainability factor in the benefit indexation formula, that limits the annual 
rise in pension levels in favor of a less rising contribution rate under the 
budget constraint of the system. In contrast, the cohort-specific pension 
levels in the NDC system do not depend on the short-term budget situation 
of the pension system, but solely on past values such as the cohort-specific 
earnings history, applicable interest rates and annuity parameters. 
421n principle, this approach follows the transitional rules applied in Sweden. For a description of the 
Swedish transition process, see e.g. Sunden (2000). 
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Figure 4.2. - Cohort-Specific Pension Levels in the NDC Scenario versus 
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Source: Author's computations. 
Cohort-specific pension levels. Even though internal rates of return have 
been high in the past compared to today's values, pensions for the 1940 
cohorts turn out to be lower in the NDC scenario than in the reference 
scenario. If no transition period was assumed, the pension level of the 1940 
cohort would even be lower than that shown in Figure 4.243 • This can be 
explained by relatively low contribution rates around 14% at the start phase 
of the German PAYG system in the early 1960s, which applies for more 
than the first fifth of the working period of these cohorts and in addition is 
weighted more heavily due to effects of compound interest. Cohorts of the 
1950s in contrast achieve much higher pension levels under the NDC scenario 
than under the status quo. They still profit from high internal rates of return, 
but contributed a significantly higher amount to the pension system due to 
average contribution rates around 18%. For the 1960 and 1970 cohorts, the 
decline of the internal rate of return of the system becomes noticeable in 
generally lower pension levels. The slight rise in pension levels for the 1980 
cohorts can be attributed mainly to the assumed increase in the contribution 
43The effects of the length of the transition period on resulting pension levels are further discussed in the 
sensitivity analysis in section 4.4.4. 
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rate to over 23% in 2040. 
Benefit indexation. As it is assumed that pensions in the NDC scenario are 
indexed to nominal wage growth, the cohort specific pension levels remain 
a constant fraction of wages over their respective retirement period. This is 
illustrated for selected cohorts in Figure 4.3. Note that this is not the case 
for pension levels in the reference scenario - the decline of pension levels in 
the reference scenario shown in Figure 4.2 affects all cohorts equally. 
Cohort-specific reform gains and losses. Given the fact that cohort-
specific pension levels in the NDC scenario turn out to be lower for some 
and higher for other cohorts than their respective pension levels at retire-
ment entry in the reference scenario but that they remain constant over the 
whole retirement period while pension levels in the reference scenario decline 
further, what are the cohort-specific reform gains and losses? The answer is 
given in Figure 4.444 . 
As could be expected from the development of pension levels depicted 
in Figure 4.2, cohorts of the 1940s lose, while cohorts of the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1980s win. However, in contrast to the results from Figure 4.2, cohorts 
from 1946 on until 1967 actually win, even though some of their cohort-
specific pension levels are lower than their initial pension levels depicted in 
the reference scenario. This is the case if it is assumed that their respective 
retirement period equals the cohort-specific remaining life expectancy at the 
time of retirement. Over the course of the retirement period, the cohort's 
return from an initially lower, but stable pension level (recall Figure 4.3) is 
then higher than that of an initially higher, but declining pension level. Of 
course, this does not apply to the individual that lives for a shorter period 
than the average remaining life expectancy for the respective cohort. 
'Average' pension levels across all cohorts. If in the NDC scenario, at one 
point in time, pension levels across different cohorts vary so significantly from 
44The reform gains and losses illustrated in Figure 4.4 were determined by calculating the differences in 
the rates of return, between the reference and the NDC scenario for each cohort. The rate of return was 
thereby computed as the ratio of total pension benefits to total paid contributions, where the length of 
the retirement period was set in accordance with the average remaining life expectancy of the respective 
cohort. 
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Figure 4.4. - Reform Gains and Losses of Affected Cohorts 
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!• gains and losse3 
Source: Author's computations. 
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Figure 4.5. - Total Cohort Pension Levels in the NDC Scenarios versus 
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Source: Author's computations. 
each other, what can be said about the average situation of all retired cohorts 
in one specific year? Figure 4.5 shows the development of total cohort pension 
levels in the NDC system, i.e. the average of all cohort-specific pension levels 
across cohorts weighted with the respective cohort size45 , in comparison to 
the pension levels in the reference scenario. 
In contrast to the development of the cohort-specific pension levels dis-
played in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, total cohort pension levels in the NDC 
scenario turn out to be continuously higher from 2020 on than pension levels 
in the reference scenario. This means that in the NDC scenario, the annually 
changing average standard pensioners across all cohorts achieves a higher 
pension level in each year than the respective standard pensioner in the ref-
erence scenario who is the same for all cohorts and years. However, this does 
not mean that the same necessarily applies for the average pensioner46 in the 
two scenarios. For example, differences in pension levels between high-wage 
and low-wage earners might generally be larger in the NDC scenario than in 
the reference scenario due to compound interest effects. 
Altogether, regarding the development of pension levels, the NDC scenario 
45Recall the definition of total cohort pension levels given in section 4.2 
46The average pensioner represents the average across all pensioners, taking account of differences in earnings 
history, time of retirement entry and age among pensioners. 
110 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
4.4. Simulating a Hypothetical Introduction of an NDC System for Germany 











I{) OJ "2" a a 0 0 a a 





a (T) (0 Ol N 
N N N N (T) a a a 0 0 
N N N N N 
I ---contribution rate as in status quo 
Source: Author's computations. 
-~ 
lO CO ,- ~ t- 0 
(T) (T) "2" "2" "2" I{) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
NNNNNN 
--o- Balanced Budget I 
can be said to be economically feasible. Even though cohort-specific reform 
losses occur, they are significantly smaller than the gains of the reform. How-
ever, this implies a redistribution mainly from the early 1940 cohorts to the 
baby-boom generation. Given the fact that the baby-boom generation partly 
induced the demographic challenges the system now has to cope with, this 
cannot be a political objective. 
Budget development 
What does the development of pension levels in the NDC scenario displayed 
in Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.5 imply for the budget of the German pension 
insurance? In contrast to the reference scenario, an annually balanced budget 
is no longer ensured in the NDC scenario. Instead, the budget develops as 
illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
Under the given assumptions, revenues turn out to cover pension expendi-
tures throughout the simulation period. At the beginning of the introduction 
of the NDC system, pension levels for the first cohorts that retire in the NDC 
scenario, the 1940 cohorts, are lower than pension levels projected for the ref-
erence scenario - and they stay at this level over the whole retirement period 
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of these cohorts - so that revenues are larger than pension expenditures. 
Note also, that the early cohorts of the 1940s in absolute numbers ar almost 
as large as the baby boom cohorts of the 1960s, which is the reason for this 
effect being rather large. For 2015, additional revenues of about 30 billion 
Euros can be calculated. This amount is equivalent to roughly 40% of the 
state subsidies the pension system receives in that year. With the rise in 
pension levels for the 1950s cohorts, the surplus in revenues declines as these 
cohorts start to retire from 2015 on. Once the 1970s cohorts with much lower 
pension levels retire from 2035 on and thereby reduce the average pension 
level across all cohorts, the amount of additional revenues increases again. 
The question remains, whether the generated revenue surplus also suffices 
in order to build up the buffer fund that becomes necessary in the NDC 
scenario in order to cope with short-term budget deficits. According to Heiss 
(2003), the German pension system could have overcome past recessions with 
a buffer fund amounting to two months, that is about 17%, of total annual 
expenditures. In the NDC scenario, this amount would be reached by means 
of the accumulated surplus revenues by 2010, which would be early enough 
in order to countervail potential cyclical effects induced by the retirement of 
the baby-boom generation from 2015 on. 
Thus, from a purely budget oriented perspective, the NDC scenario would 
be feasible for Germany. However, it should be noted, that the budget sur-
pluses only can be accumulated at the expense of specific cohorts whose 
pension levels in the NDC scenario is lower at the time of retirement than in 
the reference scenario. 
4.4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
The results presented above only apply under the assumptions underlying 
the NDC scenario. What happens if some of these assumptions are altered? 
A thorough sensitivity analysis was conducted on this question. This section 
points out some selected aspects. Focus is put on the development of pension 
levels, while budget effects are deliberately excluded, since they are rather 
straight forward: higher (lower) cohort-specific pension levels in the NDC 
scenario have a negative (positive) impact on the overall size of the budget. 
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Figure 4.7. - Development of Pension Levels for a Fixed Contribution Rate 
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Source: Author's computations. 
Altering the contribution rate Tt- In the literature, it is somet imes claimed 
that one aim of NDC systems is to stabilize the contribution rate. So far, the 
simulation analysis only took account of a rising rate, such as in the reference 
scenario. Figure 4. 7 illustrates the effects on pension levels if the contribution 
rate instead is fixed at 20%. Note, that in this case, pension levels for the 
reference scenario are no longer calculated via the benefit indexation formula 
that comprises the sustainability factor but are determined entirely via the 
annual budget constraint. In contrast, in the NDC scenario, pension levels 
are determined precisely the same way as before with the only difference being 
that different contribution amounts are paid onto the individual accounts. 
For the reference scenario, a fixed contribution rate of 20% leads to higher 
pension levels in the short-run as long as the endogenously determined con-
tribution rate would still be lower. As a consequence, in the NDC scenario, 
cohort-specific pension levels during the transition period also turn out to 
be higher than before. However, once demographic pressures call for higher 
contribution rates, pension levels in the reference scenario fall faster than un-
der rising rates. The same effect can be perceived for the NDC scenario from 
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2030 on. However, while this effect signifies pure intergenerational redistri-
bution in the case of the reference scenario, where the working population 
pays less contributions thus provoking lower pension levels under the budget 
constraint of the system, cohorts in the NDC scenario receive lower pen-
sion benefits due to the fact that they have acquired lower pension claims 
as a result of lower contribution rates. In this case, no intergenerational re-
distribution takes place. Instead, the pension system simply generates less 
redistribution of income over each individual's life cycle. 
Altering the interest rate rt. In section 4.2 it was stressed that the proper 
rate of return of an NDC system is the internal rate of return of the system 
itself. If other interest rates are chosen, the results for the NDC scenario be-
come very different. Figure 4.8 illustrates the development of cohort-specific 
pension levels in the NDC scenario for alternative interest rates on contri-
butions, i.e. the rate of nominal wage growth and the rate of inflation, that 
do not take account of changes in demography. It can be seen that, as long 
as the labor force grows in size, the nominal wage growth rate is smaller 
than the internal rate of return of the system so that pension levels for co-
horts that worked during this time period are smaller than if the internal 
rate of return was used as the applicable interest rate. However, once the 
labor force declines, the nominal wage growth rate becomes larger than the 
internal rate of return and higher pension levels are generated for the respec-
tive cohorts. Since projected future nominal wage growth is assumed to be 
3% and thus higher than during the nineties, pension levels turn out to be 
higher for younger cohorts. If interest on the accumulated notional capital 
is accrued solely according to the inflation rate, resulting pension levels are 
considerably lower for all cohorts. In this case, no real interest is accrued on 
the notional capital. Instead, the value of the accumulated capital stock is 
simply maintained in real values. 
Altering the indexing factor J. So far, pension benefits were assumed to 
be indexed to nominal wage growth, so that pension levels of specific cohorts 
remain constant over their respective retirement period (recall Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.9 shows how cohort-specific pension levels change, if pensions are 
solely indexed to the inflation rate or are not indexed at all respectively. 
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Figure 4.8. - Pension Levels in the NDC Scenario Under Different In-
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Figure 4.9. - Trade-off of Cohort-Specific Pension Levels in the NDC 









., .. ,_ 0 ., "' 0 0 0 0 "' N "' 0 0 0 0 
N N N N N "' N "' 
~ NOC scenario- indexed to nominal wages ---1950 cohort - indexed l o nominal wages 
._NOC scenario - indexed to inflation - - - - 1950 cohort - indexed to inflation 
~ NOC scneario- no indexation ~ 1950 cohort - no indexation 
~ 1970 cohort - indexed to nominal wages ~ '1970 cohort - no indexation 
• • • 1970 cohort - indexed to inflation 
Source: Author's computat,ons. 
115 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
4. An NDC System far Germany - A Reform Alternative? 
In both cases, cohort-specific pension levels at the time of retirement are 
significantly higher since lower future annual increases have to be anticipated 
at the time of retirement when the pension annuity is calculated. This trade-
off in an NDC system, between higher initial cohort-specific pension levels 
decreasing over the retirement period and lower pension levels decreasing 
less or remaining constant in fraction of wages is illustrated more explicitly 
for the 1950 and 1970 cohort respectively (see again Figure 4.9). As long as 
pensions are indexed to inflation, pension benefits in fact remain equal in real 
values until the end of the retirement period - the resulting gap to a stable 
pension level throughout the retirement period thus can be ascribed solely 
to the difference between nominal wage growth and inflation. If pensions are 
not indexed at all, they significantly loose in purchasing power. 
An important question is whether the decision to index pension benefits 
to a reference rate or not should be left to the individual pensioner or should 
be made by the state. It should be noted at this point, that this freedom 
of choice may not always be affordable in an NDC system if debt financing 
is to be avoided. This is because the accumulated capital in the system is 
only notional, while the system itself is still run on a PAYG basis. Thus, 
if no buffer fund is (not yet) available, existing pension claims have to be 
financed by sources from outside the system. In the case of Germany, if 
pension benefits of the 1940 cohorts are not indexed and thus would be a lot 
higher than in the reference scenario, a large deficit would arise while at the 
same time it would no longer be possible to build up a buffer fund for future 
potential crises. 
Altering introduction and transition times. For the results in section 4.4 
it was assumed that the NDC system was introduced from 2005 on. Whether 
the NDC system is introduced earlier or later only affects the cohort-specific 
pension levels of those cohorts that retire during the transitional period. 
Generally, later introductions lead to lower cohort-specific pension levels for 
the respective cohorts (see Figure 4.10). This is due to the fact that those 
cohorts with higher pension levels in the NDC scenario than in the reference 
scenario now fall into the transition period and receive lower pensions than 
they otherwise would have. 
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Figure 4.10. - Transitional Pension Levels in the NDC Scenario for 
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Similarly, a longer transition period would lead to lower cohort-specific 
pension levels for those cohorts whose pension is higher in the NDC scenario 
than in the reference scenario and which then fall into the transition period. 
On the other hand, for cohorts of the 1940s that receive lower pensions under 
the NDC scenario, a longer transition period would align their pensions closer 
along the levels of the reference scenario. In general, it can be found that, 
for Germany, differences in cohort-specific pension levels across cohorts are 
leveled off the more the longer the transition period. 
Thus, with regard to the size of the reform burden that is carried by the 
early cohorts of the 1940s in the NDC scenario under the assumptions pre-
sented in section 4.4.2, a later introduction or a longer transition period could 
be suggestive. Respective simulations show the budget would still remain on 
surplus, even though the prospective to build up a buffer fund diminishes 
the later the introduction or the longer the transition period. However, this 
simulation analysis is based on the rather optimistic demographic and labor 
market forecasts presented in section 2.2. If the labor market develops dif-
ferently in a way that even more pressure is exerted on the pension system, 
a delay of the reform or an extension of the transition period may make it 
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impossible to carry out the necessary measures in sufficient time. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the question whether the introduction of an NDC sys-
tem could be a feasible reform alternative for the German PAYG pillar. The 
simulation analysis conducted in the main part of this chapter showed that a 
German NDC system would indeed provide (adequate) pension levels above, 
equal or only slightly below those that can be forecasted for the standard 
pensioner under the present German P AYG pension system that comprises 
the sustainability factor. However, in terms of affordability it was shown 
that an NDC system may require large buffer funds which are currently not 
available under the current German pension system and can only be built up 
under very restrictive assumptions. 
Furthermore, the distribution of pension income among cohorts would be 
very different than under the current system, favoring cohorts of the 1950s 
and 1960s while disadvantaging cohorts of the 1940s that paid lower contribu-
tion rates to the system, and cohorts from the 1970s which are affected by the 
decreasing growth rate of the contribution bill. This clearly is a result that 
cannot be politically motivated. It illustrates quite clearly the differences be-
tween the German time-oriented and the cohort-oriented NDC system where 
cohort-specific pension levels are largely driven by the past and forecasted 
demographic and labor market development as well as a country's historic 
and future economic performance. This issue will play a central role in the 
next chapter47• 
However, in one point the NDC system still better ensures long-term sus-
tainability than the German system: benefits are automatically actuarial 
fairly adjusted to the retirement age - accounting for future developments in 
life expectancy. In the German system, in contrast, the adjustment factors 
are not linked to the future development of life expectancy. This remains 
47Note that there are also additional redistributive effects in an NDC system. In the earnings points based 
German system, pension levels are proportional to the amount of accumulated earnings points. In the 
NDC system in contrast, this is no longer the case as pension claims that are collected early during the 
working life profit from a compound interest effect from which flat income profiles profit more than steep 
income profiles. 
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a weakness of the German PAYG pension system, especially in the light of 
continuous further increases in life expectancy48 • 
Regarding the robustness of the system, the many ad hoc rulings with 
regard to benefit adjustments since 2004 as well as the current German debate 
on an intermission of the Riester staircase for 2008 and 2009 in favor of 
a higher pension adjustment in these years show that even an automatic 
balancing mechanism (be it in form of the sustainability factor or be it the 
automatic balancing mechanism of an NDC system) provides no guarantee 
against further discretionary interventions. 
Finally, in terms of transparency, account based systems such as NDC sys-
tems naturally provide a larger degree of transparency than defined-benefit 
based systems where benefit levels change over time49 • However, the tradi-
tional earnings points system along with the recent introduction of so-called 
'pension briefs' ( Renteninformation) that provide insight into peoples ac-
cumulated earnings points as well as the earnings points' projected value 
at retirement may create a similar transparency as that expected from an 
account-based system 50 . 
48See e.g. Clemens (2006) for an illustration of the past and projected future rises in life expectancy and 
past and projected future retirement ages. 
49 An interesting discussion of an account-based reform approach of the entire social security system is 
provided by Orszag, Orszag, Snower, and Stiglitz (1999). 
50See Borsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Reil-Held (2004) for a description and thorough investigation of these 
pension briefs. 
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5. Internal Rates of Return of the 
German PAYG System: A Comparison 
of Deterministic and Stochastic Rates 
5.1. Introduction 
The internal rate of return is one measure for evaluating the proportion of 
benefits to contributions in a P AYG pension system 1. It is the rate at which 
the net present value of benefits received equalizes the net present value of 
contributions paid. It thus allows to measure the fairness or intergenerational 
redistribution of the system2• In the literature as well as in politics, internal 
rates of return are therefore frequently used for pension system and policy 
evaluations. 
Intergenerational fairness is a highly disputed issue in the German pen-
sion debate3• In summer 2004, this issue triggered a public discussion when 
the chair of the Federal Constitutional Court, Hans-Jurgen Papier, made an 
official statement that the constitutional conformity of the German public 
pension system would be threatened should future rates of return become 
negative for entire cohorts4• The statement referred to the previous public 
debate which had reflected fears that the newly introduced sustainability fac-
tor of the 2004 reform would decrease pension levels to such an extent that 
future cohorts would receive benefits that were smaller than their contribu-
tions. 
1Other so-called money's worth measures are the payback period, the benefit/contribution or benefit/tax 
ratio and the lifetime transfer. See Leimer (1995) for an overview of these measures. 
2Other possible measures are the implicit tax rate (see Thum and von Weizsiicker (2000)) or the method 
of generational accounting (see Boll, Raffelhiischen, and Walliser (1994)). 
3See e.g. Biicker and Koch (2003), Biirsch-Supan (2003b) and Riirup (2004). 
4Die Welt (2004). 
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This raises two questions. First, how high are future rates of return essen-
tially going to be? Several projections based on the 2004 reform are avail-
able, however, their results are ambivalent. Clearly positive rates of return 
are calculated by Ohsmann and Stolz (2004), by the Sozialbeirat (2004) in 
the context of the 2004 pension insurance report of the government and by 
the Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Ent-
wicklung (2004) in its Annual Report. In contrast, Raffelhiischen (2005), as 
well as Ottnad and Wahl (2005), calculate (partly) negative rates of return 
for certain cohorts, based on very different assumptions. 
Given these different calculation outcomes, another more fundamental 
question arises: What is the appropriate calculation method to obtain cohort-
specific rates of return? The common approach in the German pension liter-
ature is to calculate rates of return for different demographic groups (single 
men, single women and married couples) and different scenarios (retirement 
at the statutory retirement age, retirement at earlier ages etc.)5. This de-
terministic approach was used in all of the studies named above. Since it 
allows only to look at one scenario at a time, the whole range of risks that 
is covered by the German pension insurance cannot be taken into account 
adequately. Apart from the longevity risk (covered by old age pensions) and 
the risk of widowhood (covered by survivor pensions), this is most notably 
the invalidity risk. Papier (1998) emphasizes that potential benefits from 
invalidity pensions must be included in the calculation of the rates of return. 
Moreover, he points out that the constitutional conformity of the system 
would only be questioned if future rates of return became negative for the 
average pensioner6• But what would be an appropriate invalidity scenario 
for such an average pensioner under the deterministic approach? If rates of 
return are to be used as a measurement of system fairness, all potential risks 
need to be considered. 
This chapter presents an alternative calculation method based on a stochas-
tic rather than the scenario-based, deterministic approach. It computes the 
rate of return of the expected payment flows ( where the expectation includes 
longevity, survival and invalidity risk as well as the time of retirement) rather 
than the rate of return of a specific deterministically defined scenario. The 
5This approach is widely used in the pension literature, see e.g. also Myers and Schobel ( 1992) for the U.S. 
6See also Sozialbeirat (2004). 
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hypothetical and non-representative figure of the standard pensioner here 
is replaced by the (weighted) average of pensioners in each cohort. This 
approach is closer to the micro-based approaches based on administrative 
data and lifetime profiles from longitudinal data7• For Germany, it was first 
introduced by Schnabel (1998). 
In the following, internal rates of return will be computed according to 
both approaches. As in the above named studies, projections are based 
on the 2004 reform. For the 2007 reform, so far, no data is available that 
quantifies how the increase in the statutory retirement age will influence 
retirement behavior nor is the outcome straightforward and clear8• For the 
rate of return computations in this chapter I therefore do not consider the 
2007 reform. 
This chapter is an updated version of Wilke (2005) that takes account of 
the new population and labor market projections presented in chapter 2 as 
well as the new projections on the long-term financial development of the 
German PAYG system presented in chapter 3. The chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 5.2 describes how rates of return can be measured according 
to the two approaches. The results from the deterministic approach are 
illustrated in section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the results from the stochastic 
approach. Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2. How to Measure Rates of Return 
This section describes how cohort-specific rates of return of the German 
PAYG pension system can be measured. Section 5.2.1 explains the underlying 
internal rate of return concept. For the computations in this chapter, I 
differentiate two approaches: the deterministic and the stochastic approach. 
They are presented in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 respectively. 
7See e.g. Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenless (1996) or Leimer (1999) for the US. 
8See Bucher-Koenen and Wilke (2008) for a first assessment of the long-term effects of the reform that 
accounts for the behavioral effects. 
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5.2.1. The Internal Rate of Return 
In general, rates of return describe the size of gains or losses of an investment. 
In the context of a PAYG pension system, the investment consists of the 
contributions paid to the system whereas the benefits received during the 
pension phase represent its pay-off. The rate of return can thus be measured 
as the proportion of the size of benefits to the size of contributions. 
Since contribution payments and pension benefits occur at different points 
in time, the flow of positive and negative payments has to be discounted 
to a common date in order to make the different values of the payments 
comparable. A natural choice for this point in time is the starting point of 
the payment flow. Here, this is the date of entry into the labor force9. The 
rate of return can then be calculated as the so-called internal rate of return 
at which the net present value of benefits received equalizes the net present 
value of contributions paid10: 
(5.1) 
amaxc p (-l ) a-ao L c,a l+r 
a=aRA 





... Age index, 
... Age of entrance into the labor force, 
... Retirement age, 
... Maximum age/ end of pension period of cohort c, 
... Pension payments to cohort c at age a, 
... Internal rate of return, 
... Contribution payments by cohort c at age a. 
9For selected questions such as on early retirement incentives, it makes sense to discount the values of the 
payment flow to a point in time that is close to potential retirement, at which the individual can be 
assumed to be confronted with the decision on when exactly to retire. Such calculations can e.g. be 
found in Schnabel (1998). For the rate of return, however, the point in time chosen as to is irrelevant as 
it does not change the results. 
10Note that in the calculations in this paper, neither the state subsidy to the pension system nor non-
insurance benefits are considered. While they have a different impact on the rate of return for certain 
individuals which makes the following calculations even more complicated ( e.g. mothers, and in the past 
low wage earners and the highly educated) the aggregate effect is neutral because the state subsidy is 
meant to exactly cover the non-insurance benefits. Ottnad and Wahl (2005) drop this assumption and 
calculate rates of return for a scenario where tax-financed government transfers are used to subsidize 
ordinary insurance benefits, including the additional tax burden on the contribution side. As expected, 
the resulting rates of return turn out considerably lower and partly even turn negative. 
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The advantage of this internal rate of return method is that there is no 
need to determine an appropriate discount rate that otherwise had to be 
specified in advance. The results are therefore independent of any reference 
rate. 
Gross versus net rates of return. Due to the gradual transition to deferred 
taxation of old age income which will start in 2010 and will be fully completed 
by 2050, net values loose their importance within the German public pension 
system as they will be differing across cohorts. The rates of return projections 
in this chapter are therefore based on gross values where tax reductions of 
pension benefits and health and long-term care insurance contributions are 
not accounted for. Overall, the transition to deferred taxation will have a 
positive effect on the size of the rates of return. Due to the German tax 
progression, the transition to deferred taxation will mostly lead to a larger 
tax relief during the working life than the additional tax burden it creates 
during the retirement phase as long as retirement income is lower than labor 
income. From this point of view, the following projections thus will tend to 
underestimate the true rates of return. 
Nominal versus real rates of return. Past as well as current calculations 
of the rates of return of the German public pension system mostly have been 
presented in nominal terms11 • This is typically justified by the fact that 
most people are more familiar with the concept of nominal rates of return 
since they know it from the capital market. However, nominal rates of return 
are strongly biased by inflation. In Germany, inflation reached high rates in 
the 1970s which deeply affects the real value of contribution payments made 
during this period. Figure 5.1 shows the development of past ( and future) 
nominal and real average gross wages in Germany. For obvious reasons, real 
rates are the economically interesting concept. In the following, nominal 
rates of return are mainly displayed for comparison. 
11Exceptions are Schnabel (1998, 2001) and the Sozialbeirat (2004) which present both nominal and real 
rates of return. 
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5.2.2. The Deterministic Approach 
The deterministic approach takes the view of one selected (fictive) pensioner, 
who is attributed a certain earnings history, a certain retirement age and the 
applicable pension benefit over a certain pension period. Different attributes 
allow looking at different pensioner types. Internal rates of return for the cho-
sen pensioner type are computed for all cohorts. This deterministic approach 
is predominant in the German pension literature12 and has also been used for 
the most recent cohort-specific rate of return calculations by Ohsmann and 
Stolz (2004), Ottnad and Wahl (2005),Sozialbeirat (2004) and Sachverstandi-
genrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2004). 
The standard pensioner - male, single. The most frequently used pen-
sioner type is that of the standard pensioner13• The size of his pension is 
12See e.g. Eitenmiiller (1996) and Hain, Eitenmiiller, and Barth (1997), an earlier paper by Ohsmann and 
Stolz (1997} or Gliesmann and Horn (1998}. 
131n reality, income usually rises over an individual's working life. This has an effect on the resulting rates 
of return, since the internal rate of return method weighs earlier contribution payments higher than later 
ones. I evaluated this effect by introducing an age-specific earnings profile that allows for a rise in wages 
over the working life but equally results in 45 earnings points. The profile was derived from the medium 
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derived by multiplying the 45 earnings points he acquired during his working 
life with the current pension value of the respective year. Since he retires at 
the statutory retirement age, the adjustment factor is one. Contributions are 
simply average gross wages times the contribution rate of the same year. The 
length of the pension period is determined by the remaining life expectancy 
at age 65. For the female, single standard pensioner, the only difference to 
the male, single standard pensioner is the higher remaining life expectancy14. 







a:%~65 CJ~.20 EPa) X PVc+a (1lrr-ao 
64 
I: AGWc+a X Tc+a Llrr-ao 
a=a0 =20 
... Now: Remaining life expectancy of cohort c at age 65, 
... Acquired earnings points at age a, 
... Current pension value in year t = c + a, 
... Average gross wages in year t = c + a, 
... Contribution rate to the pension system in year t = c + a. 
The standard pensioner - male, married. If pensioners are married, their 
spouses obtain survivor benefits if they outlive the pensioner and do not 
have considerable own pension income. While this is still relevant for many 
married men, it so far plays a minor role for married women since their hus-
bands mostly have own substantial pension income that is deducted from the 
survivor pension15 . Note also that under the deterministic approach there 
profile of an estimation of wage trajectories by Fitzenberger, Hujer, McCurdy, and Schnabel (2001) for 
West Germany. These test calculations showed that for a typical individual this effect is only marginal 
and thus can be neglected. The result for the stochastic approach is the same. 
14It could be argued that different earnings points should be considered for different demographic groups 
(e.g. less earnings points for women than for men). However, since the German pension system ensures 
relative equivalence, such intra,-cohort effects are not subject of this thesis. 
15 A widow pension for the man incurred for less than 25% of all pensioner couples in 2004 and less than 
15% of these widow pensions were fully dispensed due to the reduction of existing pension income by the 
husband (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager (VDR) (2004). 
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are no additional benefits from survivor pensions for the female, married 
standard pensioner since husbands can never outlive their wives due to their 
lower remaining life expectancy. Under the deterministic approach, rates of 
return for single and married women (as standard pensioners) are therefore 
equal. The subsequent calculations therefore focus on married men. Wives 
are assumed to be 3 years younger and not to have considerable own pension 
income. For cohorts before 1962, the adjustment factor for survivor pensions 
AFSurv is 60%, for younger cohorts it has been lowered to 55% (see also sec-
tion 3.2). The survivor pension is simply added to the benefit payment flow 
of the rate of return calculations for the standard pensioner (Equation 5.2): 
(5.3) 
Omaxc Omaxspouae L 45 x PVc+a L!rr-ao + L AFSurv x 45 x PVc+a (-1!-r)a-ao 
a=RA=65 a=amazc+l 
64 
L AGWc+a X Tc+a L!rr-ao 
a=ao=20 
with amaxs"°"" ... Remaining life expectancy of the spouse. 
Early retirement. In addition to the standard pensioner, types of early or 
later retirement entry can be considered if the assumption of retirement at age 
65 is dropped. Equation 5.4 gives an example of rate of return calculation for 
pensioners retiring at age 63. Note that the sum of earnings points is reduced 
to 43 and annual pension benefits are further reduced by an adjustment factor 






1 + r 
62 ( 1 )a-ao L AGWc+a X Tc+a --
l + r a=ao=20 
16Theoretically, life expectancy then would also have to be adjusted to the age of 63. Due to data restrictions 
this is typically not done and will not be done here either. 
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Limits of the deterministic approach. There are several reasons why the 
deterministic approach is less than satisfactory. First, the use of the remain-
ing life expectancy leads two distorting effects: 
1. It is assumed that the pensioner reaches the retirement age with cer-
tainty. The probability to decease earlier is not taken into account. 
2. It is assumed that the standard pensioner lives exactly according to 
the cohort's average remaining life expectancy. However, the rate of 
return for the cohort as a whole is not equal to the rate of return for 
a person of this cohort with exactly the average life expectancy due 
to Jensen's inequality17: the rate of return is a concave function of its 
stochastic ingredients such as life length and life-time earnings. The 
linear approximation implicitly applied in the conventional approach 
therefore overestimates the true value of the rate of return. 
Second, disability benefits are difficult to capture in the deterministic ap-
proach since the notion of a 'typical' invalidity scenario is hard to define. On 
an annual, cross-sectional basis, the share is roughly 80%18. The remaining 
20% finance rehabilitation and disability expenditures. In the standard cal-
culations, annual contributions are scaled with a correction factor of 80%. 
However, this contribution correction factor suffers from aggregation bias 
since the cross-sectional computation of the average budget impact does not 
represent the true longitudinal payment flow for a specific cohort. Moreover, 
the bias from Jensen's inequality applies again since different individuals of 
a certain cohort face different disability risks which do not result in the same 
rates of return if an average risk is included in the calculations instead. 
Finally, the deterministic approach cannot capture the fact that the public 
pension system insures against all three risks simultaneously. The calculation 
only captures the pay-off for those risks that apply for the chosen scenario, 
i.e. a typical person receiving an old age pension, a typical disabled person, 
or a typical beneficiary of a survivor pension. 
17 According to Jensen's inequality, the expected value E() of a non-linear function g() of a random variable 
xis not equal to the non-linear function of the expected value of this variable: E(g(x)) c/ g(E(x). For a 
concave function g(), E(g(x)) < g(E(x)). See also appendix F. 
18See Schneider (1997) for a discussion of this ratio. 
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Figure 5.2. - The Stochastic Approach in a Nutshell 
p,, (working) x Comrib111io11Par111m1.,, ... (/ = 1) 
PF, = p,(ahve)x + p,,(di.,ah/ed) x Di.,abi/1tyPensio11Be11eji1.,,, .. (j = 2) 
+ A,l1Wired) x O/d~gePe11s io11Ben~{i1s,, ... (j = 3) 
+ p.,(dernl) x p,, (Spo11se/.,A/iw) x S111viorPe11.1io11Be11efi1s, ... (j = 4) 
PF• ... Pa~·mcnl tlow al a~c t.J 
r, .. Probabili~· of a certain 11\:enario lo be lruc at a~c u 
Source: Author's compilation. 
5.2.3. The Stochastic Approach 
The stochastic approach considers the whole range of scenarios simultane-
ously instead of looking at one particular case at a time. Every possible 
scenario is weighted with its probability to occur. This section describes how 
rates of return are calculated under such a stochastic approach and how this 
approach differs from the deterministic approach presented above. 
Expected cohort-specific payment flows. The deterministic payment 
flow is turned into a stochastic payment flow by including the probabilities 
for each possible event j to occur. It comprises the expected values of the 
net payments for each age a of the life cycle of a cohort c19. Four cases 
are distinguished at any age and may occur with a certain probability: the 
individual is paying contributions (j = 1 ); the individual receives a disability 
pension (j = 2); the individual receives an old age pension (j = 3); the 
individual's spouse receives a widow pension (j = 4). The four cases are 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
Note that in the stochastic approach there is no fixed retirement age aRA 
like in the deterministic approach. Instead, contribution payments as well as 
19Note that the rate of return calculated on the basis of the expected payment flow for a certain cohort is 
not the same as the expected cohort-specific rate of return. Appendix G explains the differences and the 
reasons for choosing this approach. 
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pension benefits are recorded for all years although certain event probabilities 
may be zero20 . 
The calculation of pension benefits under this approach has to account for 
path dependencies since the size of the applicable pension in a specific year 
depends on the age at which the individual became disabled or retired. The 
calculations of the cohort-specific payment flows will therefore be derived 
step by step as further extensions to the deterministic approach presented 
above. 
Step 1: Introducing probabilities of survival. In the deterministic ap-
proach, the individual was assumed to live exactly to his life expectancy. 
Now it is assumed that the individual survives each year with a certain prob-
ability Sc(ala = ao) < 1. The survival rate Sc(ala = 20) determines the 
probability for a member of the cohort c to reach age a given that he reached 
age 20. Accounting for this probability of survival, the formula for the inter-
nal rate of return for a single person who retires at the statutory retirement 




}: Sc (a lao = 20) x Pc,a C!rr-ao 
a=RA=65 
64 
= }: Sc (a lao = 20) x Cc,a L!rr-ao 
a=ao=20 
amaxc ... Now: Maximum possible age that can be achieved by cohort c, 
P ... and 
C ... as defined in section 5.2.2. 
In the case of married couples, the different respective survival probabilities 
of the husband and his (younger) wife are used. 
20The calculations in this thesis ignore the relatively rare events of retiring before age 54 or after age 71. 
Hence, it is assumed that the probability to receive a pension becomes positive at age 54 (namely in the 
form of disability pensions) while the probability to pay contributions turns zero after age 70. amax is 
the maximum age that can be achieved which is assumed to be 100. These boundaries are derived from 
the underlying empirical data, see Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004). The assumed time of entry into the 
labor force ao is age 20. 
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Step 2: Introducing probabilities of disability. Until recently, eligibility 
regulations for disability pensions were rather weak in Germany and often 
used as an early retirement option. These eligibility criteria were tightened 
considerably in the 1992/1999 and 2001 pension reforms (recall chapter 3). As 
a result of these reform measures, probabilities of retirement due to disability 
differ not only by age but also across cohorts, depending on whether cohorts 
are already affected by the reform or not. It is assumed that there is no 
return to the labor force once a disability pension is received. Accounting 
for the probability of receiving disability benefits, Equation 5.5 is modified 
as follows:: 
(5.6) . ~t: [sc(ala = 20) x [(1-Pc,a(Disab)) x Pc+a +Pc,a(Disab) x pc~:ab] x (i :r r-ao] 





... Probability of cohort c to be disabled at age a, 
... Old age pension of cohort cat age a, 
... Disability pension of cohort c at age a. 
Note that introducing the probability of invalidity affects both the contri-
bution and the pension phase21 • Also, while Pc+a and Cc,a are here equivalent 
to Pc,a and Cc,a from section 5.2.2, the calculation of P?;; is more complex. 
For a given disability retirement age, the size of the disability pension is 
derived from (1) the sum of earnings points that was collected up to inva-
lidity, (2) additional earnings points that take into account the remaining 
years until the age of 60 and are granted in the case of disability, (3) an 
adjustment factor AF/~-~ab which works the same way as the one for early 
retirement and (4) the current pension value. However, in this stochastic 
approach, each possible disability retirement age applies with a certain prob-
ability Pc,a ( DisabEntry). All potential possibilities of disability retirement 
21 Recall that for now the pension phase is still assumed to start at age 65. This assumption will be changed 
in the next step. 
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entry at and before age a therefore have to be considered in the calculation 
of P/:}•ab: 
(5.7) 
P,f.;•ab = Pc,a (DisabEntry) x C~o EPc,k) x (I+ Max { ( (a :OJ)~ 20); 0}) x AFct:•b x PVc+a 
+ ~ [Pc,i (DisabEntry) X Ct. EPc,k) X (I+ Max { ((i ~)~ 20) ;O}) X AFc';,'/"b x PVc+•] 
with Pc,a(DisabEntry) ... Probability to become disabled at age a 
AFc~~ab ..• Adjustment factor in case of disability at time 
t=c+a 
Pc,i(DisabEntry) ... Probability to become disabled at any age i 
before age a 
AFc~~sab ... Adjustment factor in case of disability at any 
age i before age a 
Step 3: Introducing a stochastic retirement age. So far, it was assumed 
that the individual retires at the statutory retirement age of 65 unless he 
becomes disabled before that age. However, people may retire before age 
65 also because of any of the explicit early retirement options described in 
chapter 3. The strict confinement of contribution and pension phase pursued 
above is therefore no longer possible. Equation 5.8 demonstrates how prob-
abilities of invalidity and retirement entry are included in the rate of return 
calculations: 
(5.8) 
°f:' Sc (a lao = 20) x (-1-)a-ao 
a=20 l+r 
X [ Pc,a ( OldAge) X Pc,a + Pc,a ( Disab) X Pc~;sab ] = O 
- (1 - Pc,a (Disab) - Pc,a (OldAge)) x Cc,a 
with Pc,a(OldAge) ... Probability of cohort c to be retired at age a 
Note: Pc,n(Disab) + Pc,n(OldAge) = 1 
While the calculation of Pf,,,isab and Cc,a remains unchanged, Pc,a now is 
determined similarly to Pc~;sab: 
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(5.9) Pc,a = ~ [Pc,i (OldAgeEntry) X (t EPc,k) X AF;] X P\1c+a 
with AF; 22 ... Adjustment factor in case of old age retirement at age i 
The case of married couples. For the reason of simplicity, the above equa-
tions solely referred to the demographic group of single men or women. For 
married men the probability of their spouse's survival after their death has 
to be taken into account - as it was already shown for the deterministic ap-
proach. Adding this probability to the Equation 5.8 gives us equation 5.10: 
(5.10) 
aEc Sc (a lao = 20 ) X [ Pc,a (OldAge) X Pc,a + Pc,a (Disab) X Pf,j•ab] 
a=20 - (1 - Pc,t (Disab) - Pc,t (OldAge)) x Cc,t 
( _I )a-ao X l+r 
Oma:rsp01ue 
+ E [(1 - Sc(a lao = 20)) X Scspau .. (aspause lao = 20) X P!,:rvJ = 0 
a=20 
with Scs"""" ... Survival probability of the spouse 
Pc~:rv ... Survivor pension the spouse of cohort c receives at age a 
Pt:rv is calculated according to the same concept applied for pcD;sab and , , 
Pc,a above. The size of the survivor pension is determined as 60% (or 55% 
respectively) of the old age pension in the case of death after old age retire-
ment and as 60% (or 55% respectively) of the respective disability pension 
in the case of death before old age retirement. 
5.3. Deterministic Projections on Future Rates 
of Return 
This section presents projections on the future rates of return of the Ger-
man public pension system based on the deterministic approach as described 
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above. The projections cover cohorts from 1940 to 1980. Thus, data is needed 
on the past and future development of wages, contribution rates, pension 
levels and life expectancy. Data and scenario assumptions are explained in 
section 5.3.1. Section 5.3.2 presents the projection results. In section 5.3.3 
it is evaluated to what extent these results depend on the underlying demo-
graphic, labor market and growth assumptions. 
5.3.1. Data and Scenario Assumptions 
2005 is the base year for the projections, the historical data starts in 1950 
and the last year of my future projections is 210023 • Data on the histori-
cal development of annual average gross wages, contribution rates and the 
current pension value is taken from the statistics provided by the German 
Pension Insurance24 . Projections on the future development of contribution 
rates and pension levels basically depend on the underlying demographic, 
labor market and growth assumptions as it was explained in chapter 3. I will 
refer to three different scenarios that cover a wide range of possible future 
outcomes: 
Riirup scenario The Rurup scenario forms the base case scenario for the 
following rate of return projections. It is based on the Rurup Commis-
sion's population and labor market projections as discussed in chap-
ter 2. 
Denmark scenario The Denmark scenario is based on the MEA population 
forecast 3Wl.5 and the Denmark labor market scenario (see chapter 2). 
It results in approximately the same absolute labor supply as the Rurup 
scenario above. However, decreases in the size of the population are 
larger and population ageing is stronger as it was explained in chapter 2. 
23Such a long projection period is necessary in order to allow rate of return computations for cohorts up to 
the 1990 cohort. Note however, that such long-term forecasts are difficult, especially with respect to the 
future development of the labor market. In order to better understand how results are driven by these 
underlying assumptions, a sensitivity analysis at the end of this chapter looks at how results change if a 
different development of the population, the labor market and growth rates is assumed. 
24See (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (DRV) 2007e) and www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de 
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Status quo scenario The Status Quo scenario is also based on the MEA 
population forecast 3Wl.5 but assumes no further adjustments on the 
labor market, see again chapter 2. 
Additional demographic assumptions. Note that in contrast to chapter 2, 
projections are now needed until 2100. Some additional assumptions thus 
have to be made. With regard to migration, I assume the same constant 
annual net inflow as assumed until 2050 (150,000 for the MEA 3Wl.5 and 
200,000 migrants per year for the Rurup scenario). Fertility rates are assumed 
to remain at a constant level of 1.4 until 2050 and thereafter increase linearly 
to 1.74 in 2100 for all scenarios25 . The development of life expectancy follows 
its previous trend in all three scenarios. As the underlying life expectancy 
assumptions are crucial for the following rate of return projections, Figure 5.3 
shows the past and projected development of the remaining life expectancy 
for both men and women for the Rurup and the MEA 3Wl.5 population 
projections. 
Future development of wages. It is important to note that future real 
gross wages are assumed to continue to increase at a rate of 1.5%, which 
means in its economic essence that annual long-run economic growth remains 
positive26 . Contribution payments to the pension insurance (in real terms) 
thus do not remain constant but rise over a cohort's life cycle. This effect is 
strengthened even more by the projected increases in the contribution rate 
itself. Due to the compound interest effects in the internal rate of return 
calculations, the earlier, lower contribution payments are weighted higher 
which has a favorable effect on the resulting rates of return. If this effect is 
neglected and constant payments in real values of today are assumed over 
the entire contribution period, the true rate of return is thus underestimated 
for those cohorts with a contribution history in the past. Studies that choose 
a simplified approach based on constant payment flows, such as the one of 
Raffelhuschen (2005) should therefore be interpreted with care. 
25For this longer projection horizon a long-term constant fertility rate of 1.4 seems very low and rather 
unlikely. Therefore, I use the projected fertility rate of 1.74 in 2050 from the medium scenario of the UN 
population projections for Germany as the target value in 2100 (see (United Nations 2006)). 
26Even though it is unlikely that future real net growth will turn zero, some studies use this assumption as 
a worst case scenario, see e.g. Ottnad and Wahl (2005). 
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Figure 5.3. - Development of the Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 65 
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j--Rorup (men)-Rarup (women)" • •3W1.5 (men)· • • ·3W1.5 (women)! 
Source: Author's compilation based on historical data taken from the German Fed-
eral Statistical Office (www.destatis.de} and the SWJ .5 MEA population projections. 
Note that the remaining life expectancy at age 65 is added to the latter for illustrative 
purposes and does not represent life expectancy at birth. 
Future development of contribution rates and pension levels. Figure 5.4 
shows the projected past and future development of contribution rates and 
pension levels of the German PAYG system for the three selected scenarios. 
It can be seen that rates of return of future pensioner cohorts will be affected 
both by rising contribution rates during their contribution period and declin-
ing pension levels during their pension phase. For the Riirup scenario these 
changes are least pronounced. 
5.3.2. Simulation Results 
Since I use the same methodology as Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) in my pro-
jections based on the deterministic approach, the results for the nominal 
rates of return are quite similar to theirs. Resulting real rates also roughly 
correspond to those calculated by Sozialbeirat (2004). 
Results for the standard pensioner. Table 5.1 summarizes the results for 
the standard pensioner and compares them to the results by Ohsmann and 
Stolz (2004) and Sozialbeirat (2004). Recall that the demographic groups 
here only differ with regard to their remaining life expectancies at retire-
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Figure 5.4. - Development of Contribution Rates and Pension Levels 
(1950 to 2100) 
35% >-----<o---tt--+------------t 55% 1 
I 30% 1--~ ...... ,______.----------- 50% -I a ------------ !. ~- -· ~ 2 io_ • u -! 
i 
15% t--;;~-------"""'----=;;;;l 35% I 
- • • 3W1.5+ 
Denmark 




- • 3W1.5+ 
Denmark 




Source: Author's computations. Note that since there is no data on the development 
of current pension values before 1960, pension levels are displayed only from 1960 on. 
ment entry (age 65) and thus the length of their pension phases, while the 
contribution phases of all three groups are identical. Hence, single women 
record higher rates of return than single men (roughly 0.6 percentage points) 
thanks to their higher life expectancy. Likewise, married men record the 
highest rates of return because of their younger wife whose life expectancy 
obviously is higher than that of women of the same cohort as the man. Note 
that the three-years difference is just sufficient in order to compensate for the 
reduced pension benefits in form of the widow pension. This of course is a 
co-incidence of our underlying assumption that wives are three years younger 
than their husbands. With each year the age difference gets smaller, rates of 
return for married men turn out approximately 2% lower. Husbands with a 
wife of the same age thus record lower rates by around 6%. 
Across cohorts, it can be seen that the rates of return of the younger 1980 
cohort turn out lower than those of the 1940 cohort (about 1.1 percentage 
points in nominal and 0.4 percentage points in real terms). This result is not 
surprising taking into consideration the development of contribution rates 
and pension levels depicted in Figure 5.4. Note that the 1940 cohort also 
is affected by this, since the projected decline in pension levels already fully 
affects their pension phase. 
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Notes: Deviations between the author's calculations and Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) and Sozialbeirat (2004)are mainly due to differences in the underlying 
projections. Whereas Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) refer to separate external demographic, labor market and pension system forecasts, my calculations are based 
on a consistent set of projections. Note that health care contributions by the pension insurance are not included in the calculation. If they were this would 





















































5.3. Deterministic Projections on Future Rates of Return 
However, the decline in the rates of return cannot completely be attributed 
to the demographic burden and its future negative effects on contribution 
rates and pension levels. The rates of return for today's retiring cohorts are 
also higher thanks to the relatively low contribution rates of 14% until 196727 
that lead to comparably low contribution payments during this period. The 
sheer development of contribution rates in the past28 already induces a de-
cline in the rates of return of those cohorts that have entered the labor force 
at later points in time. In fact, compared to today's older pensioner cohorts, 
already today's retiring cohorts record lower rates of return since their con-
tribution history also comprises the past 20 years where higher contribution 
rates around 18% were the case. 
Thus, the trend of a decline in the rates of return is not new and can 
already be observed today - both due to the past institutional and projected 
future demographic development of the system. However, while for the past 
the decline in the rates of return can be ascribed solely to the development 
of the contribution rate, future rates of return will be affected by both the 
development of contribution rates and that of pension levels. For the 1940 
to 1980 cohorts the resulting trend is depicted in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5 also displays the difference between nominal and real rates of 
return. While nominal rates turn out considerably higher for the cohorts of 
the 1940s due to high and strongly fluctuating inflation particularly in the 
1970s, their distance to the real rates reaches a stable 1.5 percentage points 
for cohorts from 1965 on when the largest part of the contribution phase is 
solely based on projected wage development. However, note that rates of 
return clearly remain positive under both terms. 
Early retirement. As explained in section 3.3.1 early retirement was possi-
ble without reductions before the 1992/1999 reforms. Figure 5.6 shows the 
results of these reforms for single men of the 1930 to 1950 cohort. For c<>-
horts unaffected by the reforms, rates of return under early retirement at 
age 63 turned out 0.4 PP higher than under regular retirement at age 65. 
Likewise, later retirement at age 67 led to lower rates of return in equal mea-
27Only in 1973 did the contribution rate reach the 18% mark (recall Figure 5.4). Until the mid 1950s the 
contribution rate was below 14%. 
28Note that, in contrast to the projected future rise of the contribution rate that can be attributed to 
demographic factors, rises in the 1970s and 1980s mainly allowed an increasing generosity of the system. 
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- - • - Female, single (real) --o-Female, single (nominal) 
Source: Author's computations. 
sure. After the reforms, it can be seen that rates of return for early and 
regular retirement are almost identical thanks to the adjustment factors29 . 
Later retirement now leads to higher rates of return by around 0.1 PP which 
indicates that adjustment factors for later retirement are slightly too high 
from the perspective of the pension insurance30 • This result corresponds to 
the findings by Sozialbeirat (2004) and shall not be evaluated further here. 
Note that it is crucial for the analysis to compare pensioners of the same 
cohort31 • 
5.3.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The results presented above were based on the Rurup scenario. In the follow-
ing, we will look at how these results change if projections are based on the 
Denmark or Status Quo scenario as defined in section 5.3.1. Furthermore, 
the effects of different growth rates will be analyzed. 
29See Ohsmann, Stolz, and Thiede (2003) for a justification of the sizes of the adjustment factors. 
30This is an interesting aspect which needs to be evaluated also under the latest 2007 reform once appropriate 
data is available. 
31 Ohsmann and Stolz (2004) e.g. choose to present their scenario results for different cohorts. 
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Figure 5.6. - Early Retirement Effects on Rates of Return 
2.0% 
1.5% 
1. 0% +-...--...---.--.--.-................................... -.--.-..................... """T"""T"""T--'I 
- • - Retirement at age 65 --o-Retirement at age 63 
-Retirement at age 67 
Note that only rates of return for the single male are displayed. 
Source: Author's computations for cohorts 1930 to 1950. 
Demographic and labor market effects. The three scenarios introduced 
in section 5.3.1 can be nicely used to illustrate both, demographic and labor 
market effects. Regarding demography, the Riirup scenario is based on a 
lower life expectancy and higher migration than the Denmark and Status 
Quo scenarios that are based on the MEA 3Wl.5 population projections. 
On the other hand, the absolute development of the labor market are almost 
identical in the Riirup and the Denmark scenario whereas the Status Quo 
scenario assumes a much lower labor supply. As a consequence, contribution 
rates turn out highest (and pension levels lowest) under the Status Quo 
scenario and lowest (highest) under the Riirup scenario (recall Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5. 7 illustrates the effects on the resulting rates of return for the single, 
male standard pensioner. 
Projected rates of return turn out highest for the Denmark scenario and 
lowest for the Riirup scenario whereas the Status Quo scenario ends up in 
the middle. At the first glance, this seems a surprising result as one would 
expect that the Riirup scenario with the smallest rise in contribution rates 
(and smallest drop in pension levels) records the highest and the Status Quo 
scenario the lowest rates of return. However, the negative effect of the lower 
life expectancy in the Riirup scenario is much stronger than the positive 
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effect of lower contribution rates and higher pension levels - so strong that 
resulting rates of return end up being lowest for the Rurup scenario. 
Effects of different wage growth rates. It was demonstrated in sec-
tion 3.5.3 that higher wage growth rates lead to lower contribution rates 
and lower pension levels in the long-run. The resulting net effect on the 
rates of return is positive. Figure 5.8 illustrates this effect for single men 
under the Rurup scenario. For the 1940 cohort, which is already close to 
retirement, a by 0.5 percentage points higher wage growth leads to around 
a quarter percentage point higher rate of return. For younger cohorts that 
just entered the labor force, like the 1980 cohort, a by 0.5 percentage points 
higher growth rate translates directly into 0.5 percentage points higher rates 
of return. Note also, that rates of return turn negative for cohorts from 1974 
on if a zero growth rate (real 1.5% with 1.5% inflation) is assumed. 
Thus, how rates of return will develop for future cohorts not only depends 
on the projected development of contribution rates and pension levels of the 
German PAYG system but also on the underlying demographic, labor market 
and growth assumptions. 
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5.4. Stochastic Projections on Future Rates of 
Return 
This section presents projections on the future rates of return of the German 
public pension system based on the stochastic approach. Again, projections 
cover cohorts from 1940 to 1980. For the stochastic approach, additional 
data on survival and retirement probabilities is needed which is described 
in section 5.4.1. Taking the deterministic results from the previous section 
as a starting point, the characteristic features of the stochastic approach 
are introduced in three consecutive steps in section 5.4.2. Finally, the overall 
results of the stochastic approach are compared to the deterministic outcomes 
in section 5.4.3. 
5.4.1. Probability Data 
The stochastic approach requires additional data on the probabilities of sur-
vival, disability and retirement entry which will be described in the following. 
Probabilities of survival. Historical survival probabilities are calculated 
from the age-specific annual mortality rates provided by the German Sta-
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Figure 5.9. - Conditional Survival Rates for Men and Women (Cohorts 
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tistical Office32 . Future probabilities are consistent with the underlying de-
mographic Rurup population projections described in chapter 2. Figure 5.9 
illustrates the survival probabilities for men and women of the 1940 and 1980 
cohort across age. It can be seen how the curve shifts outward for the 1980 
cohorts as life expectancy is projected to increase. 
Estimated probabilities of retirement entry. As was explained in chap-
ter 3, the 1992 and 1999 pension reforms shifted the statutory retirement 
ages for women and disabled workers upwards and introduced adjustments 
for early retirement33 . In addition, the 2001 reform toughened eligibility rules 
for disability pensions. Depending on the extent to which cohorts are affected 
by these reforms, their probabilities of retirement both for disability as well 
as for old age retirement will therefore change. For the following computa-
32See www.destatis.de. Note that data on mortality rates is available only from 1954 on. For our calculations 
we assume mortality rates before 1954 to be equivalent to those in 1954. 
33Note that disabled workers in Germany can get a disability pension at any age (if they fulfill eligibility 
rules). At the statutory retirement age this pension is turned into a lifelong pension. 
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tions, I use the results of Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004) who model these 
behavioral effects by predicting retirement decisions based on an option-value 
approach34 • Since Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004) do not explicitly differ-
entiate between disability and old age retirement, their results are split into 
two respective probability matrices. I do this on the basis of the institutional 
transitional rules on the cohort-specific earliest possible retirement ages with 
and without adjustments, as it was depicted in Figure 3.1 on page 58. 
Probabilities of disability retirement. For the probabilities of disability 
retirement, I take the values for the 1940 cohort (not affected by the 1992 
and 1999 reforms) and for the 1944 cohort (fully affected) from the estima-
tions by Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004). For the 1941 to 1943 cohorts the 
respective probability values are derived by linear interpolation of the pre-
and post-reform probabilities. The probabilities are displayed in Table H.l. 
The earliest age for a significantly positive probability of disability retirement 
in the data is age 54 for both men and women. Probabilities after age 62 are 
zero since it is assumed that old age retirement turns more favorable then. 
Until age 62 for men probabilities are positive for all cohorts since their ear-
liest possible old age retirement age is 63, both before ( without reductions) 
and after the reforms (with reductions). However, probabilities decline for 
younger cohorts due to the toughened disability eligibility rules. For women, 
probabilities for cohorts not affected by the reforms are only positive until 
age 59 since old age retirement is possible from age 60 on and probabili-
ties of disability retirement turn zero then. For younger women affected by 
the reforms, probabilities eventually remain positive until age 62. Thus, for 
women, probabilities up to age 59 decline for younger cohorts and increase 
up to age 62. 
Probabilities of old age retirement. For the probabilities of old age re-
tirement, I again take the values for the pre- (1936 for men and 1939 for 
34This option value approach goes back to Stock and Wise (1990) and can be regarded as an approximation 
of the 'stochastic dynamic programming model' developed by Rust ( 1989). A discussion of different 
approaches on modeling retirement behavior can be found in Lumbsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992). The 
study by Berke! and Biirsch-Supan (2004) is based on the econometric analysis of Biirsch-Supan, Kohnz, 
Mastrobuoni, and Schnabel (2004) that was conducted in the framework of an international social security 
project on the causes and implications of early retirement, see Gruber and Wise (1999) and Gruber and 
Wise (2004). 
145 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
5. Internal Rates of Return of the German PAYG System 
Table 5.2. - Step-wise Analysis of the Stochastic Approach - Concep-
tual Overview 
Life length Disability Retirement Age 
Step 1 a) stochastic contributions1 deterministic deterministic 
b) stochastic benefits2 
c) total effect 
Step 2 stochastic stochastic deterministic 
Step 3 stochastic stochastic stochastic 
1 Accounting separately for the first bias that does not account for possible death 
before age 65. 
2 Accounting separately for the second bias that results from neglecting Jensen's 
inequality. 
Source: Author's compilation. 
women) and post-reform (1944 for men and 1945 for women) cohorts from 
the estimations by Berkel and Borsch-Supan (2004). Probabilities for cohorts 
in between these dates are interpolated such that accumulated disability and 
retirement probabilities after age 72 - when everybody retired - add up to 
one. The probabilities are displayed in Table H.2. Probabilities are positive 
from age 63 on when old age retirement becomes possible for those with an 
earnings history of at least 35 years. For men, probabilities from age 63 on 
increase for younger cohorts since former pathways of earlier retirement can 
no longer be used. For women, retirement probabilities up to age 62 decrease 
for younger cohorts and eventually turn zero. This is due to the increase of 
the statutory retirement age for women from age 60 to 65. From age 63 on, 
as for men, probabilities for women increase for younger cohorts. 
5.4.2. A Stepwise Introduction of Stochastic Elements 
In order to demonstrate the different impacts of the stochastic compared to 
the deterministic approach, I will analyze the results from the stochastic ap-
proach in three consecutive steps - similar to my proceedings in section 5.2.3. 
Table 5.2 gives an overview of the parameters introduced deterministically 
and stochastically in the single steps. 
Step 1: Introducing probabilities of survival. In a first step, the life ex-
pectancy data used in the deterministic approach is replaced by the respective 
survival probabilities. Figure 5.10 depicts the way in which this affects the 
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size of the payment flow for the contribution and the pension phase respec-
tively35. 
For the contribution phase (Step la), contributions are slightly lower as 
compared to the deterministic approach because there is a probability that 
contributors die before reaching the normal retirement age. Around age 50, 
contribution payments are more than 5%, around age 60 already more than 
10% lower than the contribution payments recorded under the deterministic 
approach36. 
For the pension phase (Step lb), Figure 5.10 depicts a totally different 
picture. Under the scenario-based approach, survival until the remaining 
life expectancy age 81.5 is sure and benefits increase according to real wage 
adjustment. After age 81.5, benefits are zero. In the stochastic approach, 
however, expected benefits decline steadily because the probabilities of sur-
vival decrease faster than the wage adjustment37. 
The next question is which impact these two effects have on the resulting 
rates of return. Figure 5.11 shows the resulting real internal rates of return 
for the 1940 cohort for all three demographic groups. The effects on the con-
tribution phase (Step la) and on the pension phase (Step lb) are illustrated 
separately before the combined effect is shown as Step le. 
The internal rates of return turn out higher if the probability of death 
before retirement is taken into account (Step la) since expected contribution 
payments are lower. On the other hand, internal rates of return are lower if 
remaining life expectancies are replaced by survival probabilities (Step lb) 
due to the concave survival probability function and Jensen's inequality as 
it was explained at the end of section 5.2.2. The overall effect (Step le) is a 
decrease in the rates of return. For women, whose survival probabilities are 
clearly higher than those of men (recall Figure 5.9) the effects are considerably 
smaller than for single men. 
Married men are the only group recording higher rates of return in the 
35Note that the only difference between the two payment flows shown in Figure 5.10 lies in the use of the re-
maining life expectancy and survival probability respectively. In particular, this means that contribution 
payments are only considered with 80% according to the usual practices common for the deterministic 
approach. The contribution correction factor will be introduced in step 2. 
36Figure 5.10 is based on real values for 2004. 
37For data reasons, the maximum age for the calculations presented in this chapter is assumed to be 100 
years. 
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Figure 5.10. - Introducing Probabilities of Survival - Contribution and Pension Phase of 
the Single Male of the 1940 Cohort 
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stochastic approach. This is due to two effects. On the one hand, there 
is already a positive probability of death and survival of the spouse before 
retirement (recall section 5.2.3) which is not taken into account under the 
deterministic approach and which has a positive effect on the rate of return. 
On the other hand, this probability rises with age which means that according 
to Jensen's inequality the true rate of return is underestimated in the case 
the remaining life expectancy and a subsequent survivor pension are assumed 
as it is done under the deterministic approach. Figure 5.12 illustrates these 
effects on the overall payment flow. 
Step 2: Introducing probabilities of disability. As it was explained in 
section 5.2.2, the deterministic approach does not include benefits from dis-
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Figure 5.11. - Introducing Probabilities of Survival - Rates of Return 
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ability pensions but instead uses a contribution correction factor that reduces 
the applicable contribution payment size by the percentage that is assumed 
to finance the invalidity risk. 
In Step 2 I now explicitly consider disability risk. The contribution correc-
tion factor is abandoned and probabilities of disability are introduced instead. 
Since the pool of pensioners for a specific cohort remains unchanged, this 
means that less people retire at the statutory retirement age of 65 but retire 
earlier due to disability. They thus receive lower pensions, but for a longer 
time period38 . The net effect is negative. As Figure 5.13 shows, resulting 
rates of return for Step 2 are lower than for Step 1. 
However, a second effect counteracts this first one. The higher the proba-
bility of disability for younger ages near age 54, the higher the weight of these 
potential pension benefits for the remaining payment flow calculation, since 
for each subsequent age the potential benefit flow from an earlier claimed 
disability pension is considered. For this reason, the decline in the resulting 
rates of return turns out highest for single women. As was explained in sec-
tion 5.4.1, women of the 1940 cohort have a much lower probability to retire 
before age 60 than men. 
The effect of the change in retirement behavior can also be shown nicely 
for single men. Figure 5.14 compares the effects for the 1940 and 1980 cohort. 
The size of potential disability pension flows clearly diminishes from about 
two thirds for the 1940 to one third of the overall pension flow for the 1980 
cohort, as was to be expected from the assumptions made above. 
Step 3: Introducing a stochastic retirement age. In contrast to the 
deterministic approach, the stochastic approach allows taking into account 
all potentially possible early, normal and late retirement scenarios. Step 3 
replaces the statutory, fixed retirement age by a flexible one based on the old 
age retirement probabilities displayed in Table H.2. The results are shown 
in Figure 5.15. Note that a positive old age pension flow for ages below the 
statutory retirement age of 65 is now recorded. 
38It is likely that those people receiving a disability pension in general have a lower life expectancy than 
healthy people that work until the statutory retirement age. Since data on this feedback effects is not 
readily available, this aspect is neglected here. 
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Figure 5.13. - Introducing Probabilities of Disability - Rates of Return 
for the 1940 Cohort 
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The effect of the introduction of the stochastic retirement age on the re-
sulting rates of return is shown in Figure 5.16 for the 1940 and 1980 cohort. 
While the effect is positive for the 1940 cohort across all demographic groups, 
the results from Step 2 remain almost unchanged for the 1980 cohort. This 
result nicely demonstrates the effects of the introduction of adjustment fac-
tors for early retirement with the 1992 and 1999 German pension reforms 
and also shows that these adjustment factors are indeed roughly actuarially 
neutral from the viewpoint of the pension insurance39. Remember the re-
forms are phased in gradually and don't affect the 1940 cohort fully. The 
slight decrease in the rates of return (compared to Step 2) for single men 
and women of the 1980 cohort indicates that the concept of adjustment fac-
tors probably also goes back to a deterministic approach based on remaining 
life expectancy figures and that once survival probabilities are applied this 
actuarial fairness no longer fully holds. As could be seen from Step 1, the 
39For a discussion on this subject, see Ohsmann, Stolz, and Thiede (2003) who justify the current adjust-
ment factors and Borsch-Supan (2004a)? who argues they should be higher. The Riirup Commission 
(Kommission fiir die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003a)) takes 
a neutral view. 
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Figure 5.14. - Introducing Probabilities of Disability - Contribution and Pension Phase 
of the Single Male for the 1940 and 1980 Cohorts 
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introduction of survival probabilities leads to a negative effect on the rates 
of return. 
5.4.3. Simulation Results 
The previous three steps transformed the deterministic approach into a 
stochastic one. Under this stochastic approach, married women no longer 
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Figure 5.15. - Introducing a Stochastic Retirement Age - Contribution and Pension Phase 
for the Married Male of the 1940 Cohort 
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record the same rates of return as single women since their husbands may 
still outlive them with a certain probability. In the following, I therefore 
present results for all four demo-graphic groups. In contrast to the determin-
istic approach, contributions as well as pension phases now differ among all 
groups because of different survival and retirement probabilities throughout 
both phases. 
Results for the weighted average pensioner. The results of the stochastic 
approach are depicted in Figure 5.17. Real rates of return in general turn 
out lower than under the deterministic approach. For the 1940 cohort, single 
women and married men nearly record equal rates of about 3.1 %. Rates of 
return of married women are at 3.3% slightly higher while those for single 
men are again lowest at scarcely 2.2%. For the 1980 cohort, real rates of 
return are reduced to 2.0% for single women and married men, to 2.1 % for 
married women and to 1,5% for single men. 
Across demographic groups, married women now record the highest rates 
of return because of the probability that their husbands might outlive them. 
Rates of return for married men and single women are no longer equal but 
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Figure 5.16. - Introducing a Stochastic Retirement Age - Rates of 
Return for the 1940 and 1980 Cohorts 
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turn out higher for married men. As under the deterministic approach, dis-
tances between the rates of return of the several demographic groups get 
smaller over time, however, overall, they are larger. While rates of return 
for single women of the 1940 cohort are approximately 0.9 PP or 29% higher 
than for single men of this cohort, they are only higher by 0.5 PP or 24% for 
the 1980 cohort. In contrast to the deterministic approach, this is no longer 
purely the effect of differences in life expectancy or survival probabilities re-
spectably but also differences in retirement probabilities which show into the 
opposite direction. 
For the comparison of results across cohorts, the same up-and-down-
pattern as under the deterministic approach can be observed. In addition, 
there is an upward kink for men and a downward kink for women during the 
transitional period of the 1992 and 1998 pension reforms. The upward kink 
for men can be explained by declining probabilities of disability retirement 
and later probabilities of old age retirement leading to higher pension pay-
ments. During the transitional phase. The downward kink for women can 
be explained by the rise in disability retirement and declining probabilities 
of old age retirement despite a later retirement age in case of old age. 
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Table 5.3. - Rates of Return for the 1940 and 1980 Cohorts According to the 
Deterministic and the Stochastic Approach 
Cohort 1940 Cohort 1980 
Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Det. Stoch. Det. Stoch. Det. Stoch. Det. Stoch. 
Single, male 3,99% 3,83% 1,74% 1,54% 2,87% 2,12% 1,35% 0,61% 
Single, fem ale 4,60% 4,40% 2,35% 2,12% 3,49% 2,95% 1,96% 1,41% 
Married, male 4,66% 4,79% 2,41% 2,49% 3,50% 2,91% 1,97% 1,47% 
Source: Author's compilation. 
A comparison of the results of the two approaches. A summary of the 
results of the two approaches for both the 1940 and 1980 cohort is given in 
Table 5.3. Across demographic groups, it can be seen that both for single 
men and for single women rates of return turn out lower under the stochastic 
approach. In contrast, rates of return for married men turn out slightly 
higher for the 1940 and slightly lower for the 1980 cohort than under the 
deterministic approach. Across cohorts, both approaches deliver very similar 
results for the 1940 cohort that hardly differ by more than 0.2 percentage 
points. However, projections for younger cohorts like the 1980 cohort turn 
out considerably different under the two approaches. The results here differ 
by 0.5 to about 0.7 percentage points. 
This outcome shows that for today's retiring cohorts the differences be-
tween the two approaches in the end are surprisingly small, given the differ-
ences that could be seen during the step-wise transformation above. However, 
the fact that the results vary significantly for younger cohorts calls into mind 
that both approaches are based on very different concepts and assumptions 
that react very differently to longer life spans and different retirement be-
havior of future cohorts. Still, rates of return remain positive under both 
approaches as long as positive real wage growth is assumed. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The calculations presented in this chapter show that under realistic assump-
tions of future demographic and labor market development, rates of return 
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of the German public pension system will indeed decline in the future but 
they will remain positive. 
In contrast to the deterministic approach typically applied in the German 
pension literature, this chapter picks up a stochastic approach that allows 
to consider the entire range of possible scenarios simultaneously instead of 
restricting the analysis to one selected scenario at a time. Hence, all risks 
covered by the German pension insurance can be adequately captured in the 
rate of return calculations, which is not possible under the deterministic ap-
proach. Therefore these rates of return more adequately reflect the situation 
of the "average" pensioner of a certain cohort. Real rates for the 1980 cohort 
are projected to be around 0.6%, 1.4% and 1.5% for single men, women and 
married men respectively in contrast to 1.5%, 2.1% and 2.5% for the 1940 
cohort. Future nominal rates of return are of course much higher than the 
real rates. The results show that they will remain above 2% for all demo-
graphic groups. Since the juridical debate refers to nominal rates of return, 
the future constitutionality of the German public pension system thus seems 
to be warranted also in the future. 
While the stochastic approach presented in this chapter allows for a more 
precise calculation of the size of future rates of returns, its application requires 
appropriate data on the respective survival and retirement probabilities. This 
is not much of a problem concerning the age- and cohort-specific survival 
probabilities as concerning the probabilities of retirement entry. For the 
calculations in this chapter, this data was available thanks to the estimation 
of these probabilities by Berke! and Borsch-Supan (2004) that adequately 
reflects projected future changes in response to the recent reform measures 
in this area. If such data is not available as is currently the case for the 
latest 2007 reform, a stochastic computation that adequately considers all 
risks is no longer possible. However, as a first step towards a more proper 
computation of cohort-specific rates of return, the introduction of age- and 
cohort-specific survival probabilities into an otherwise deterministic approach 
could at least correct for the two mistakes named above. 
With regard to fairness, the question of course is how low rates can fall 
until the system is perceived to be unfair. This question is hard to answer, 
especially as the notion of intergenerational fairness requires a much broader 
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view which cannot as easily be expressed in numbers.40 Given the demo-
graphic trends it is clear, however, that some intergenerational redistribution 
cannot be prevented. The baby-boom cohorts will end up with much lower 
public pension income then their parent cohorts. This gap can only be filled 
with supplementary private old age income. 
40See Borsch-Supan {2003b) and Riirup (2004) for a thorough discussion of the concept of intergenerational 
fairness. 
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This thesis delivered an assessment of the German pension system and its 
past reforms. It showed that the demographic transition in Germany will 
more than double old age dependency ratios by 2050, creating enormous 
pressure. Some of this pressure can be reduced if labor force participation 
of the young, women and the elderly are increased and unemployment is 
decreased. However, even if it is assumed that Germany will reach the current 
Danish participation rates by 2040, thanks to profound and consistent labor 
market reforms as outlined by the former Schroder government in the Agenda 
2010, the pensioner ratio is projected to rise from 55% today, to around 78% 
in 2040. Without any labor market reforms, this ratio is expected to rise 
even more steeply to 105% in 2040. In this case, roughly one worker has to 
finance one pensioner in 2040. This rise in the pensioner ratio is projected 
to continue after 2040. 
In order to cope with these challenges, past reforms have shifted the Ger-
man pension system from the former monolithic system towards a multi-pillar 
system, with an increasing emphasis on supplementary private pension in-
come in old age to fill the gap caused by the anticipated future cuts in public 
pension levels. In addition, the previous generosity of the system established 
under the 1972 reform, which provided numerous early retirement options, 
has been cut considerably. This began with the 1992 reform and culminated 
in the increase of the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 with the 2007 
reform. This thesis looked at whether pension reforms of the past quarter 
century have been successful in stabilizing the system. My assessment of 
these reforms has focused on five selected dimensions: (1) Adequacy, (2) af-
fordability and sustainability, (3) fairness and redistribution, (4) robustness 
and (5) transparency. In the following, I will briefly summarize the main 
findings. 
Adequacy The 2001 Riester reform set an upper limit for the future develop-
ment of contribution rates of 20% in 2020 and 22%, in 2030, as well as 
159 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
lower limits for the future development of (modified) net pension levels 
before tax of 46% in 2020, and 43% in 2030. Pension levels above this 
limit were still considered to be adequate compared to average wages. 
The projections in chapter 3 have shown that these targets can be met 
if the demographic and labor market projections of the Rurup Commis-
sion are assumed. Higher increases in life expectancy, only moderately 
increasing labor force participation rates, or lower wage growth, can 
shift the Riester targets out of sight. The scale of the reductions in 
pension levels also demonstrates that public pension benefits will no 
longer be sufficient to safeguard pensioners' standards of living in old 
age. 
Affordability and sustainability The introduction of the sustainability fac-
tor into the German benefit indexation formula in 2004, linked the 
development of benefits to the development of the pensioner ratio, the 
most crucial internal system parameter. Depending on the size of a, 
the system now technically can either follow a defined benefit approach 
(a= 0) or a defined-contribution approach (a= 1). With the setting 
of a = 0.25, the German public pension system was effectively shifted 
from the formerly defined-benefit to a defined-contribution oriented sys-
tem. Given this development as well as its earnings points system and 
the actuarial adjustment of benefits to the retirement age, the German 
pension system now largely resembles an notional defined contribution 
(NDC) system. As argued in chapter 4 an NDC system - such as the 
Swedish PAYG system - would not have been a suitable reform alterna-
tive for Germany as it leads to large distributional effects, mainly due 
to the development of contribution rates and wages. Moreover, it was 
shown that an NDC system may require large buffer funds which are 
not available under the current German pension system. However, in 
one point the NDC system still better ensures long-term sustainability 
than the German system: benefits are automatically actuarially fair 
adjusted to the retirement age - accounting for future developments in 
life expectancy. In the German system, in contrast, the adjustment fac-
tors are not linked to the future development of life expectancy. They 
were once computed on a given set of assumptions and are now simply 
160 Christina Wilke - 978-3-631-75049-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 08:51:40AM
via free access
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
retained. This remains a weak point spot of the German PAYG pension 
system. 
Fairness and Redistribution As a consequence of the further increasing con-
tribution rates and simultaneously decreasing pension levels, internal 
rates of return will decrease for future pensioner cohorts. It was shown 
in chapter 5, however, that - even under very different demographic, 
labor market and growth settings - rates of return are unlikely to turn 
negative. The simulations showed that for single men of the 1980 co-
hort, real rates of return are still around 0.6% compared to a rate of 
1.5% for single men of the 1940 cohort - if all risks are considered 
in the calculations. The question of course is how low rates can fall 
until the system is perceived to be unfair. This question is hard to 
answer, especially as the notion of intergenerational fairness requires a 
much broader view which cannot as easily be expressed in numbers. 1 
Given the demographic trends, it becomes clear that some intergener-
ational redistribution cannot be prevented. The baby boom cohorts 
will end up with much lower public pension income then their parent 
cohorts. This gap can only be filled with supplementary private old 
age income. In terms of intra-generational redistribution, the German 
system contains few redistributive elements. With the introduction of 
the tax-financed minimum pension guarantee in 2001, the last redis-
tributive elements besides additional credits for child raising have been 
basically abolished. 
Robustness Thanks to the shift from the former monolithic to a multi-pillar 
system, the German pension system as a whole has become a lot more 
robust as risks have been diversified better. Public pension benefits of 
course are still subject to political risk even though the introduction 
of the sustainability factor, a somewhat automatic balancing mecha-
nism, has reduced this risk considerably. However, the many ad hoc 
rulings with regard to benefit adjustments since 2004 as well as the 
current debate on an intermission of the Riester staircase for 2008 and 
2009 in favor of a higher pension adjustment in these years show that 
1See Biirsch-Supan (2003b) and Riirup (2004) for a thorough discussion of the concept of intergenerational 
fairness. 
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even such an automatic balancing mechanism provides no guarantee 
against further discretionary interventions. Supplementary private old 
age income in contrast is subject to the rate of return risk on the capi-
tal market. However, as it was discussed, pertinent model calculations 
show that the demographically-induced fall in rates of return will not 
be as dramatic as often predicted in the popular press2. 
Transparency Finally, it can be argued that account based systems such as 
NDC systems naturally provide a larger degree of transparency than 
traditional PAYG systems. However, it was shown that the German 
earnings points system along with the recent introduction of so-called 
'pension briefs' (Renteninformation) that provide insight into peoples' 
accumulated earnings points as well as the earnings points' projected 
value at retirement actually may create a similar transparency as ex-
pected from account-based systems. 
Overall, past reforms have put the German pension system back onto a 
stable path and moved it towards a multi-pillar system. There remain some 
unresolved issues, however, the main one being the discrete adjustment fac-
tors that do not automatically adjust for future rises in life expectancy and 
therefore cannot be actuarially fair in the long run. In addition, if Germany 
does not succeed in cushioning some of the demographic pressures via the 
labor market, the demographic burden eventually could necessitate a further 
increase in the statutory retirement age. 
For the moment, further fundamental reforms seem unlikely. On the con-
trary, after the courageous reform propositions of the Rurup Commission, 
politics in Germany right now seem to try to soften down already the first 
sensible effects of the past reforms. However, the transition towards a more 
sustainable system with scaled-back public benefits supplemented by growing 
funded private pillars has only just begun. It will be essential to continue the 
new direction set by the past reforms if this transition shall be successful. 
2See e.g. (Borsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2006) and Ludwig and Kriiger (2007) who find that the 
capital market rate of return, owing to demographic factors, will fall by merely one percentage point if 
diversification within the EU region is assumed. 
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A. Variations of the 'Denmark' Scenario 
In the 'Denmark' scenario a convergence of the German to the Danish labor 
force participation rates is assumed until the year 2040. If this convergence 
happens quicker or slower, the labor supply will develop significantly differ-
ently in the mid-term (see Figure A.I). 







2005 20 10 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
l--2020 ·· <> ·· 2030 ~ 2040 D 2050 1 
Source: Author's computations. 
If the German rates would reach the Danish level already in 2020, the 
labor force size would rise to nearly 46.5 million, which corresponds to a rise 
of 4 million. This is caused by a strong increase of participation rates in a 
short period while the population decrease is still moderate. However, this 
increase in labor force size is not sustainable. After 2020, the labor force 
size decreases again, following the same trend as the other scenario variants 
with a constant labor force participation. In this case only the population 
and the age structure determine the development of the labor force size. If 
the convergence takes place until 2030, there is no kink of these dimensions. 
Instead, the labor force size increases only moderately to 43 million in 2020. 
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A. Variations of the 'Denmark' Scenario 
It will then fall slightly below today's levels by 2030 and thereafter follow the 
underlying demographic trends. If convergence is even slower and is reached 
only by 2050, the labor force size between 2020 and 2045 is nearly one million 
lower than if the convergence was reached by 2040. 
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B. The German Public Pension System 
from Bismarck until Today 
1889/1991 
• Introduction of capital funded disability pension 
• Old age pension for workers age 70 and older 
• Employer and employee share contributions equally 
1913 
• Retirement at age 65 (white-collar workers only) 
1916 





• Inflationary compensation 
• Retirement at age 65 (blue-collar workers) 
• Retirement at age 60 for elderly unemployed ( white-collar workers 
only) 
• Conversion into pay-as-you-go-system 
- Contribution related pension benefits 
- Safeguarding the standard of living in old age is main objec-
tive 
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- Dynamic benefits: indexed to gross wages and salaries 
• Normal retirement age 65 
• Retirement at age 60 for elderly unemployed (blue-collar workers) 
• Retirement for women at age 60 
• Pure pay-as-you-go-system with minimum reserves for three 
months 
• Public retirement insurance system open for all citizens (self-
employed, housewives) 
• Ex post payment of contributions becomes possible 
• Flexible early retirement age for insured with a long service life 
(63) and disabled persons (60) 
• New minimum pension mechanism 
• Pension splitting option for divorced couples 
• Minimum reserves are reduced to one month 
• Benefits for child education (usually one year of service life) 
• Equal treatment for men and women regarding survivor's pensions 
• Integration of East Germany 
• Indexing of pensions to net instead of gross wages and salaries 
• Step-wise increase of retirement ages for unemployed, disabled and 
women 
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B. The German Public Pension System from Bismarck until Today 
• Introduction of actuarial adjustments for early retirement 
• Significant reduction in years of education counting towards ser-
vice life 
• Benefits for child education are raised to three years of service life 
• Value added tax is increased in order to stabilize contributions to 
the pension insurance 
• Introduction of the demographic factor 
• Introduction of demographic factor is revoked 
• Early retirement options for women and unemployed are restricted 
- Early retirement only for the long-insured and with benefit 
adjustments 
- Exceptions for disabled persons 
• Ecological tax is increased in order to stabilize contributions to 
the pension insurance 
• Transition to a multi-pillar pension system (" Riester reform") 
- Reduction of first pillar pensions through modified gross in-
dexation 
- Strengthening of capital funded second and third pillars by 
subsidies and tax relief 
• Redefinition of "disability" 
• Further allowances for child education 
- Higher value in terms of recorded years of service life 
- Additive recording of employment becomes possible 
- Bonus for part-time employment 
• Reform of survivors pensions 
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- Expansion of eligible income base 
- Reduction of survivor's pension benefits 
- Introduction of a child bonus 
- Optional pension splitting for married couples 
• Minimum reserves are reduced to two weeks 
• Introduction of the means-tested minimum pension (zero pillar) 
• Introduction of the sustainability factor 
• Full contributions to the long-term care insurance for pensioners 
• Minimum/ Sustainability reserve is increased from 0. 7 to a maxi-




• Old Age Income Act: Introduction of deferred taxation for old age 
income 
• Increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 
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C. Pension Level Concepts in the 
German PAYG System 
In Germany, pension levels in the official statistics are typically displayed 
for the so-called standard pensioner. The standard pensioner is a fictitious 
person who worked for 45 years, always earned the average wage income and 
retired at the statutory retirement age of 65. He is thus credited 45 earnings 
points EPstrd, which multiplied by the current pension value P½ in a specific 
year t gives his annual pension income (see Equation 3.1 on page 43). The 
pension level P Lt describes the value of this pension income relative to the 
average wage income AGW1 of the covered labor force in the same year t: 
(C.1) PL = (EPstrd x P½) t AGWt 
The pension level is to be distinguished from the replacement rate that 
describes the individual pension income relative to the last or average indi-
vidual wage income during the working life. Pension levels can be expressed 
in gross or net terms and may comprise additional aspects. In the follow-
ing, the different concepts that have been applied in Germany are briefly 
explained. 
Net pension level. This measurement was used during the nineties. The 
net pension level describes the relation between the pension income net of 
taxes and net average wage income. Hitherto, only the interest portion of 
the accrued pension benefit was subject to taxation while wage income was 
fully taxable. As a consequence, net pension levels were distinctively higher 
than gross pension levels (around 70% compared to roughly 50%). 
Modified net pension level accounting for supplementary Riester pen-
sion contributions. The Riester reform modified the definition of the net 
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C. Pension Level Concepts in the German PAYG System 
pension level. From 2001 on not only taxes, but also the recommended con-
tributions to the state-subsidized private Riester pension were subtracted 
from the average net wage income, so that net pension levels turned out to 
be higher than according to the conventional definition (projected values for 
2040 of 67% instead of around 63%). 
Net pension level before tax. Since from 2005 on, pension income will 
step by step become subject to deferred taxation, a universal pension level 
that is equally applicable to all pensioners, will no longer exist. Instead, 
during the transition to deferred taxation for pension income, pension levels 
will vary across cohorts depending on the respective degree of fully taxable 
pension income of each cohort. The tax adjusted net pension level accounts 
for this by specifying an annual pension level that is solely applicable to the 
standard pensioner of the cohort that retires the same year. 
Gross pension level. In view of scheduled tax relieves for the labor force 
as well as the planned introduction of deferred taxation for pension income, 
the pension level definition was changed to gross terms in the context of 
the Rurup Commission's work in 2003. The gross pension level describes 
the relation between gross pension income and gross average wage income 
(see Equation C.1). It is considerably lower than the net pension level since 
differences in taxation and labor fringe costs are not taken into account. 
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D. Riester Criteria for Certified 
Individual Pension Plans 
Individual retirement accounts qualify for state promotion only if they meet 
criteria laid down in the new Certification of Retirement Pension Contracts 
Act ('AltZertG'). It originally contained a long list of rules which made the 
system complex for customers and potential insurers alike. See Borsch-Supan 
and Wilke (2003). However, these stringent regulations have been dramat-
ically loosened in the course of the 2004 reform. Qualifying pension plans 
require certification by the Federal Financial Markets Authority ('Bunde-
sanstalt fiir Finanzdienstleistungs- und Finanzmarktaufsicht ') which will be 
granted automatically if they fulfill the following preconditions: 
l. Pension benefits may be paid out only when the beneficiary reaches the 
age of 60 at the earliest or upon reaching retirement age, unisex rates 
have to ensure equal treatment of men and women and the possibility 
to extend benefits to survivor and invalidity benefits must be provided. 
2. At the beginning of the disbursement phase, the accrued pension contri-
butions (inclusive of subsidies) must be guaranteed ( that is, the nominal 
rate of return must be nonnegative). 
3. Pension payments must be in the form of a life annuity or a disburse-
ment plan linked to lifelong periodic installments with an initial lump-
sum payment (up to 30% of the accumulated capital). 
4. Initial commission and administrative charges must be spread equally 
over a period of at least 5 years. 
5. The investor must have the right to suspend contributions during the 
saving phase, to allow the policy to continue running without making 
additional contributions, to switch policies, to withdraw capital in order 
to finance privately owned housing or to terminate the policy. 
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Products eligible for subsidy support and into which old age pension con-
tributions and the proceeds on such contributions may be invested include 
pension insurance and capitalization products, bank accounts with accumu-
lated interest, and shares in growth and distributing investment funds. These 
products are offered by life insurance companies, banks, capital investment 
companies, financial services institutions, and securities services companies. 
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E. Investment Vehicles for Occupational 
Pension Plans in Germany 
Under the 2001 Riester reform pension funds were introduced as a further 
vehicle for occupational pensions. Pension funds until then had not been 
permitted in Germany, even though they were already widely used in other 
countries. There are now five different investment vehicles in German occu-
pational pension schemes. Table E. l provides an overview of their specific 
features as well as their eligibility for Riester subsidies and/or tax relief. Note 
that only three of them are eligible for Riester incentives: (1) direct insur-
ance, (2) staff pension insurance and (3) pension funds. As the employer has 
to provide the employee with the possibility to benefit from the Riester incen-
tives, this means - especially for smaller companies - that some companies 
had to restructure their pension schemes after the 2001 reform. 
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6 Bundesaufsichtsamt fiir das Versicherungswesen 
7 Beitragsbemessungsgrenze = earnings threshold 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Investment Vehicles 
Direct insurance 3 Staff pension insur-
ance 4 
1. Flat-rate tax 
2. Fully taxed but Ri-
ester subsidy/ tax de-
ductable expense 
1. Tax on returns only 
2. Fully taxed 
1. Flat-rate tax 
2. Fully taxed but Ri-
ester subsidy/ tax de-
ductable expense 
3. Tax free until 4% of 
BMG7 
1. Tax on returns only 
2. Fully taxed 
3. Fully taxed 
external 
Acc. Insurance Supervisory Act 
No 
Pension funds 5 
1. Fully taxed but Ri-
ester subsidy/ tax de-
ductable expense 
2. Tax free until 4% of 
BMG7 
1. Fully taxed 
2. Fully taxed 
None 
Membership in PSV 





















































F. Notes on Life Expectancy, Survival 
Rates and Rates of Return 
It was pointed out in section 5.2.2 that under the scenario-based approach 
the use of the remaining life expectancy in order to determine the relevant 
retirement period leads to two severe biases: (1) the possible event of death 
before retirement is neglected and (2) the remaining life expectancy of the 
cohort is assumed to adequately reflect the 'typical, average' pensioner of 
that cohort. In the following, it is explained in more detail why resulting 
rates of return turn out higher if these two biases persist. 
Figure F.1 shows how the contribution and pension phase look like if re-
maining life expectancies or survival probabilities are applied (recall Fig-
ure 5.10). The question is why rates of return turn out differently under 
these two approaches. 
The rates of return are derived from the proportion of the size of benefits 
to the size of contributions as represented by the two rectangles and areas in 
Figure F.l. However, due to the compound interest effects, this relationship 
is not linear. Even if the rectangles and areas in Figure F .1 were of equivalent 
size, the resulting rates of return in all but one case would still differ. 
The following stylized example shows in what respect the rates of return 
calculations differ for the two approaches. Assume an annual net payment 
flow of -1 and plus 1 for the contribution and pension phase respectively. 
Using the remaining life expectancy, the rate of return r is derived by solving 
Equation F.l: 
(F.1) 
RA-I ( l )a-a0 0RLE ( l )a-RA 
I::(-l)x - + L(l)x - =0 l+r l+r a=ao a=RA 
The age of the remaining life expectancy aRLE is thereby determined as 
follows: 
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(F.2) 
Figure F.1. - Contribution and Pension Phase Based on Remaining Life 
Expectancy or Survival Probabilities 
t1emarns rectangJe C 
Cont.ributions 




aRLE = I: S(alRA = 65) + 1 
a=RA+I 
S ( a IRA = 65) = S ( a - I IRA = 65) x S (a) 
S(a) = 1- M(a) 
The survival rate S(a IRA= 65) determines the probability to reach age 
a given that the age RA =65 was reached. S(a) represents the conditional 
survival rate to survive at a certain age while M(a) represents the mortality 
rate to die from one year to the next. 
In contrast, when survival probabilities are used, the rate of return r is 
to be derived from Equation F.3. Note that the probability Pa is equivalent 
to the survival rate S(a lao = 20) and is now placed in the sum instead of 
determining the final sum index. 
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F. Notes on Life Expectancy, Survival Rates and Rates of Return 
RA-I ( 1 )a-ao amax ( 1 )a-RA 
(F.3) I>-l)xpaX l+r + L(l)xpaX l+r =0 
a=ao a=RA 
where Pa= S (a lao = 20) = S (a - l lao = 20) XS (a) 
and S (a) = 1 - M (a) 
Apart from the fact that F.1 relies on S(a IRA= 65) whereas F.3 relies 
on S(a lao = 20) which alone obviously would lead to higher rates of return 
for the first approach, the introduction of the survival rates once as the final 
running index of the sum and once as a part of the sum will in general not 
lead to identical results. 
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G. Notes on Expected Payments Flows 
and Expected Rates of Return 
Section 5.2.3 presented a stochastic approach where the rate of return is 
calculated on the basis of the expected payment flow in order to consider 
all risks that are covered by the German pension insurance simultaneously. 
Alternatively, one might want to calculate the expected rate of return E(r) 
as it is known from the finance literature. In this case, the rate of return rn 
is computed for each possible scenario n of a cohort c: 
(G.1) 
amaxc,n P, (-l -) a-ao L c,a,n 1 +rn 
a=RAn 
RAn-1 ( l )a-ao 
'°'C - -0 ~ c,a,n l+rn -
a=ao 
with n ... Scenario index with N=maximum number of 
possible scenarios, 
RAn ... Retirement age in scenario n, 
amaxc,n ... Maximum age/ end of pension period in sce-
nario n, 
Pc, a, n ... Pension payments to cohort c at age a in sce-
nario n, 
r n ... Internal rate of return for scenario n, 
Cc,a,n ... Contribution payments by cohort c at age a 
in scenario n. 
These scenario-specific rates of return r n are then weighted according to 
their probability Pn to occur: 
N 
(G.2) E(r) = Lrn Xpn 
n=I 
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llmaxc,n J 
with Pn = IT Pa,i and I: Pa,i = 1 
a=ao i=l 
Pn ... Probability of scenario n to occur 
Pa,i ... Probability of the event i to occur at age a as as-
sumed in scenario n ( e.g. old age retirement at age 
65) 
i ... Index of possible events (working, receiving a cer-
tain pension type, death, survivor pensions) with I = 
maximum number of possible events at age a 
This expected rate of return method, however, has a drawback. For each 
case where a person dies before retirement the respective scenarie>-specific 
rate of return amounts to -100%, since this person receives no benefits at 
all. This amount enters into the calculation weighted with the respective 
probability of death at that age and has a large negative impact on the 
overall expected rate of return. Figure G.1 illustrates this point. It depicts 
the scenarie>-specific rates of return for the case of a standard pensioner who 
- if surviving - retires at age 65. Figure G.1 displays the rate of return by 
time of death. 
Although the scenarie>-specific rates of return eventually turn positive for 
ages above 75, they are not sufficiently large in order to make up for the 
extremely negative rates until age 65. Weighted with their probabilities to 
occur and accounting for all possible scenarios including disability, early re-
tirement and survivor pensions, the scenarie>-specific rates of return lead to 
a highly negative expected rate of return E(r). Calculations show that the 
latter amounts to about -28% for the 1940 and about -22% for the 1980 
cohort. 1 
1 Note that the expected rate of return for the 1980 cohort is lower since it records considerably lower 
probabilities of death for younger ages (recall Figure 5.9). 
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1--old-age retirement at r 
I age 65 
-
Source: Author's computations. Figures arc base.d. on calculations for the 1940 cohort. 
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H. Estimated Disability and Old Age 
Retirement Probabilities 
Table H.l. - Probabilities of Disability Retirement 
Age 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Cohort (Men) 
54 0.0214 0.0196 0.0178 0.0160 0.0141 
55 0.0200 0.1760 0.0153 0.0129 0.0105 
56 0.0230 0.0197 0.0164 0.0131 0.0097 
57 0.0264 0.0224 0.0183 0.0143 0.0103 
58 0.0262 0.0215 0.0169 0.0123 0.0077 
59 0.0267 0.0215 0.0163 0.0111 0.0059 
60 0.3125 0.2799 0.2446 0.2093 0.1739 
61 0.0797 0.0885 0.0974 0.1062 0.1151 
62 0.0602 0.0572 0.0543 0.0513 0.0484 
Cohort (Women) 
54 0.0176 0.0163 0.0151 0.0138 0.0125 
55 0.0179 0.0163 0.0147 0.0131 0.0115 
56 0.0192 0.0175 0.0159 0.0143 0.0126 
57 0.0172 0.0155 0.0137 0.0120 0.0102 
58 0.0186 0.0158 0.0129 0.0101 0.0073 
59 0.0171 0.0150 0.0130 0.0110 0.0089 
60 0 0.0381 0.3628 0.2450 0.3272 
61 0 0 0.0795 0.0850 0.0915 
62 0 0 0 0.0306 0.0304 
Source: Probabilities for the 1940 cohort {that was not affected l,y the reform) and for the 
19,U cohort (for which the reform changes will be already fully implemented) are taken from 
estimations l,y Berke/ and Borsch-Supan {2004) who explicitly model the behaviornl effects of 
this reform. For the 1941 to 1943 cohorts that are directly affected l,y the phase-in of the new 
regulations, the respective probability values were derived by linear interpolation of the pre- and 
post-reform probabilities. In addition, the probabilities account for the fact that women can no 
longer receive their old age pension at the age of 60 with their earliest pos,ibility now being age 
63 if they have an earnings history of at least 35 years. Probabilities after age 62 are zero since 
it is assumed that old age retirement turns more favorable then. • 
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H. Estimated Disability and Old Age Retirement Probabilities 
Table H.2. - Probabilities of Old Age Retirement 
Age 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 
Cohort (Men} 
63 0.1303 0.1320 0.2326 0.1333 0.1335 0.1372 0.1424 0.1481 0.1598 
64 0.0437 0.0458 0.0478 0.0479 0.0479 0.0530 0.0580 0.0630 0.0841 
65 0.2047 0.2053 0.2054 0.2060 0.2066 0.2196 0.2477 0.2808 0.3094 
66 0.0074 0.0077 0.0080 0.0083 0.0086 0.0089 0.0092 0.0095 0.0098 
67 0.0044 0.0045 0.0046 0.0047 0.0048 0.0049 0.0051 0.0052 0.0053 
68 0.0016 0.0029 0.0041 0.0054 0.0067 0.0079 0.0092 0.0105 O.Oll8 
69 0.0023 0.0031 0.0039 0.0047 0.0055 0.0062 0.0070 0.0078 0.0086 
70 0.0024 0.0031 0.0037 0.0044 0.0050 0.0057 0.0063 0.0070 0.0076 
71 0.0023 0.0026 0.0029 0.0032 0.0036 0.0039 0.0042 0.0045 0.0048 
72 0.0020 0.0022 0.0023 0.0024 0.0025 0.0026 0.0028 0.0029 0.0030 
Cohort (Women} 
60 0.4127 0.3985 0 0 0 0 0 
61 0.0654 0.0698 0.0741 0 0 0 0 
62 0.0312 0.0310 0.0309 0.0308 0 0 0 
63 0.2340 0.0250 0.0266 0.0282 0.0298 0.0314 0.0330 
64 0.0284 0.0305 0.0326 0.0347 0.0369 0.0390 0.04ll 
65 0.29ll 0.3023 0.3134 0.3246 0.3358 0.3469 0.3581 
66 0.0128 0.0131 0.0135 0.0139 0.0143 0.0146 0.0150 
67 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015 
68 0.0058 0.0063 0.0068 0.0073 0.0078 0.0083 0.0088 
69 0.0044 0.0053 0.0061 0.0070 0.0078 0.0087 0.0095 
70 0.0068 0.0073 0.0077 0.0082 0.0086 0.0091 0.0095 
71 0.0040 0.0042 0.0045 0.0048 0.0051 0.0054 0.0057 
72 0.0043 0.0045 0.0047 0.0049 0.0051 0.0053 0.0055 
Source: Probabilities for the 1938 and 1939 cohorts (that were not affected by the reforms) and for 
the 1945 and 1946 cohort (for which the reform changes will be fully implemented} are again taken 
from estimations by Berke! and Borsch-Supan {2004). For the 1940 to 1944 cohorts that are directly 
affected by the phase-in of the new regulations, the re,pective probability values were again derived 
by linear interPolation of the pre- and post-reform probabilities. 
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